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On 28 March 1979 the House of Commons passed a Motion of No Confidence in the 
Government. It was the first (and only) time since 1924 that a British government had lost 
such a motion. The result of the following election is well known; Margaret Thatcher 
changed her address to 10 Downing Street, and it would be 18 years before the people of 
the United Kingdom again elected a Labour Party government. The previous winter had 
been difficult for both the Government and the British people, and has in numerous 
narratives been described as “The winter of discontent”. It had been marked by uncollected 
garbage in the streets and unburied bodies in the graveyards as a consequence of heavy 
disputes between the trade unions and the Government, but the final issue which sealed the 
Government’s fate was its failed attempt to introduce devolution to Scotland and Wales. 
Polls had repeatedly shown that for several years the majority of the Scottish people 
wanted a greater degree of home rule. Administrative devolution through the Scottish 
Office was not considered sufficient and, indeed, many Scots were not even aware that it 
existed. In the post-war era the Labour Party had been the party of centralisation, and had 
successfully resisted any suggestions of devolving power to elected assemblies on the 
peripheries of the kingdom. When the Labour Party in 1974 abruptly changed its policy 
regarding devolution from opposition to support, and after one failed attempt finally 
managed to get a Bill through Parliament, it was simply rejected by the Scottish people. 
How could this happen? Why did Labour change its policy? What happened to the 
devolution Bill on its passage through Parliament that made it so unattractive to the voters? 
What took place during the referendum campaign, which resulted in this humiliating defeat 
for the sitting Government? These are some of the questions which will be explored in this 
thesis.       
 
The chosen topic 
 
Two main research questions have been formulated for this thesis: 
1) What were the reasons for the Labour Party’s change of policy on devolution to 
Scotland, from opposition to support, during the 1970s and how can the outcome of this 
process be explained?  
 1
2) Why was it not possible for the Labour Party to secure a large enough majority 
in favour of its Scotland Bill in the 1979 referendum?   
The term “devolution” is commonly interpreted as “some kind of self-government”, 
but in search for a more detailed definition the one formulated by the prominent political 
scientist, Professor Vernon Bogdanor, has been adopted. He defines devolution as “the 
transfer to a subordinate elected body, on a geographical basis, of functions at present 
exercised by ministers and Parliament”.1 An elaboration on this definition, what devolution 
is and, also, what it is not, can be found in chapter 4 of this thesis.  
The policy of the British Labour party with respect to devolution, with the sudden 
policy change that took place around 1974, has previously been discussed in academic 
literature, but mostly in passing in books dealing more generally with the subject of 
Scottish devolution or British history. Indeed, there are introductions to modern British 
history which omit the issue altogether when describing the fall of the Labour Government 
in 1979. The main work on the subject was published more than 25 years ago and written 
without access to the primary sources which later have been released. When the issue of 
Scottish devolution resurfaced in the public debate around 1997, culminating with the 
opening of the Scottish Parliament in 1999, this naturally prompted the writing of a large 
number of books on the subject. However, the focus was on the events of the late 1980s 
and the 1990s, whilst the story of the 1970s was confined, at best, to a background chapter. 
Still, Labour’s policy change in 1974 came to have dire consequences for both the Party 
and the devolution process. On a point of more general interest, it aptly illustrates the 
complications and perils of a hasty policy change, possibly made for pragmatic reasons, 
and not thoroughly embedded in the party. For these reasons the rather abrupt change of 
policy and the subsequent debate between the different factions within Labour up to the 
time of the fall of its Government, is deemed interesting enough to deserve a separate 
study. 
 The topic of Labour’s policies on devolution can be approached from several 
angles. One is nationalism: how different theories of nationalism and identity can be used 
to understand the idea of the Scottish nation and the place nationalism has in the quest for a 
Scottish parliament. Were there profound nationalist ideas within Scottish Labour, or was 
Labour merely reacting to (or even against) nationalist surges in Scottish society? Another 
approach is to explore the issue by applying theories of political science. Seen from this 
                                                 
1 Vernon Bogdanor, Devolution in the United Kingdom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 2. 
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perspective, an attempt could be made to shed light on how the electorate has voted for and 
against devolution and what has happened in the debates within and between parties, 
political movements and social groups. A third approach would be to focus on the 
ideological foundations of the Labour party: how the profound change of the ideological 
base of the social democratic parties of Europe in recent decades has contributed to 
changes in party policy, including policy on devolution. Where, ideologically speaking, it 
may make sense for New Labour in 1997 to be in favour of devolution, this was far less 
obvious in the ideological climate of the mid-1970s and is therefore worth a closer look. 
Since the issues dealt with in this thesis are complex and many-faceted, it has been found 
necessary to make use of all three approaches outlined above. For instance, one of the main 
topics which will be explored, the possible failure of the Labour Party to get the new 
policy to permeate the entire party, demands both the two latter approaches.   
Scottish nationalism is of course far too extensive a subject to be dealt with within 
the limits of a postgraduate thesis, but some of the theories on nationalism and identity that 
are presently on offer will be examined and their relevance to the situation in Scotland 
assessed. 
The time span selected for this thesis largely coincides with the Labour 
Government from February 1974 to May 1979. However, to be able to discuss whether the 
events of the spring of 1974 really entailed a break in Labour Party policy, or were merely 
a change of tactics or a return to a previous position, requires a review of some earlier 
statements made on the issue. A brief chapter will also be devoted to the period between 
the 1979 referendum and the establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999, mainly in 
order to discuss the further development of some of the arguments and ideas which had 
dominated the debate in the late 1970s.  
As the parallel process of devolution to Wales involves other issues, other 
demands, and other background histories, it would be a far too extensive subject to include 
in a thesis at this level. Thus, the case of Wales will only be touched upon when deemed 







Sources and literature 
 
A great variety of primary source materials has been identified and consulted in the 
research for this thesis. Hansard’s minutes from the House of Commons Second Reading 
and committee stage of the Scotland Bill in 1977/78 were accessed at the Parliamental 
Archives in Westminster. To simplify the process of textual analysis they were digitalised 
by the National Library of Norway. A selection of other parliamentary debates from the 
relevant time span (1974-1979) has also been consulted. The Labour Election manifestoes 
of the post-war era reflect the official Labour policy toward devolution, as do the White 
Papers on devolution presented by the Wilson and Callaghan Governments.  
The archives of the National Library of Scotland in Edinburgh contain several 
pamphlets, press releases, minutes of meetings and other similar material from the 
seventies from the Scottish National Party, the Labour Party in Scotland and the Scottish 
Labour Party. In the manuscript collections access was obtained to the papers of George 
Lawson, a now deceased Labour MP, which hold some important private letters not 
referred to in the main secondary literature.  
Minutes from meetings of the Parliamentary Labour Party, the National Executive 
Committee of the Labour Party and from Labour Party Conferences were consulted at the 
Labour History Archive and Study Centre in Manchester, along with the private papers of 
Eric Heffer, Judith Hart and Michael Foot. Minutes from Cabinet Committee meetings, 
deposited in the National Archives in Kew, were also studied. Both written and oral 
evidence submitted to the 1969-1973 Royal Commission on the Constitution has been 
reviewed, together with the final report of the Commission.  
In order to gather information and to get a feeling for the referendum campaigns 
and the arguments used by a wide range of combatants, one national daily newspaper (the 
Guardian) and one Scottish daily newspaper (the Scotsman) have been studied. The 
selection has been limited to the last two weeks prior to the referenda in March 1979 and 
the first week afterwards. The choice of newspapers is based both on practical reasons and 
on the editorial policy of the paper in question. The Glasgow Herald from 1979 has not 
been used to the same extent as the Scotsman, as it has so far not been microfilmed. 
Previous studies carried out on the newspaper coverage of the referendum campaign have 
shown that the Scotsman offered a much broader coverage of the devolution issue than any 
other Scottish newspaper. Also, as the English quality broadsheets were quite sceptical of 
devolution plans the assumption was that a pro-devolution Scottish paper such as the 
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Scotsman would provide a more balanced view and, while the Glasgow Herald had an 
official pro-devolution line, it was more divided on the issue. The Scotsman is based in 
Edinburgh, the political capital of Scotland, and could therefore be expected to take a 
greater interest in the referendum campaign. Among the English national dailies, the Times 
was unfortunately on strike for most of the relevant period of time. Of the remaining major 
newspapers the impression was that the Guardian had the least hostile view of the 
Government at the time, and was therefore more likely to report on the devolution issue per 
se, not merely as an issue presented by an unpopular government.2
A strict definition of primary sources has been applied, and includes only such 
archival documents as referred to above. In addition there are some sources, such as books 
about the Scottish nation and the devolution issue published in the mid-seventies, which 
can arguably be treated as primary sources, and have indeed been used as such by other 
scholars. They were written by participants in the debate at the time, and can be said to 
provide a first-hand impression of contemporary events as well as the arguments that were 
used. They are, however, listed along with other secondary sources, as they are found to be 
less accurate than would be expected. The same applies to autobiographies by prominent 
politicians such as Harold Wilson and James Callaghan, as they have been written or 
published with the advantage of hindsight (as will be shown later, they are far from always 
trustworthy).   
A broad range of secondary sources has been consulted, from general introductions 
to Scottish history, nationalism and British politics, to more specific articles and books 
related to the main issues covered in this thesis. Among the many books which have 
influenced my thinking, I wish to emphasise David Bleiman and Michael Keating’s 
impressive study from 1979, Labour and Scottish Nationalism3 and Neil Davidson’s The 
Origins of Scottish Nationhood.4 Also, Frances Wood’s seminal article “Scottish Labour in 
Government and Opposition 1964-1979” has been particularly valuable in the attempt to 
understand what really took place in Scottish Labour during this period.5  
 
                                                 
2 Some relevant newspaper cuttings have been discovered elsewhere, for instance in the papers of George 
Lawson. As these did not contain page numbers, the source of information is given with the name of the 
journalist and the heading of the article, although this differs from the chosen format elsewhere in this thesis.  
3 David Bleiman and Michael Keating, Labour and Scottish Nationalism (London: Macmillan, 1979). 
4 Neil Davidson, The Origins of Scottish Nationhood (London: Pluto Press, 2000). 
5 Frances Wood, "Scottish Labour in Government and Opposition: 1964-79," in Forward! Labour Politics in 
Scotland 1888-1988, ed. Ian L. Donnachie, Christopher T. Harvie, and Ian S. Wood (Edinburgh: Polygon, 
1989). 
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The Narrative Structure 
 
The background information included in this thesis has been divided into three separate 
sections, the first giving relevant information on the historical background of the 
government of Scotland and of the Labour Party in this context, while the second briefly 
reviews the concept of devolution. Even if this is not a thesis mainly preoccupied with the 
development of Scottish nationalism, it has been deemed necessary to take a look at some 
significant theories on nationalism and national identity, and this forms the third section. 
Each background section (chapters 2, 4 and 6) has been placed prior to the main chapter it 
concerns. The first of the main chapters (3.The Turning Point) examines the debate within 
the Labour party with emphasis on the period from 1973 up to the general election in 
October 1974. The second (5.The Parliament Years) follows the issue through two 
attempts at passing Bills to legislate for devolution, from 1974 to 1978. The third main 
chapter (7.The Referendum Campaign) deals with the referendum campaign and the 
immediate aftermath. While the focus of this thesis is on the 1970s, it has been found 
useful to briefly survey the debate on devolution during the next two decades, up to the 
establishment of a Scottish Parliament, something which is described in the fourth main 
chapter (8.The Long Road to Parliament). The ninth and last chapter is dedicated to a final 
discussion and some concluding remarks.  
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2. BACKGROUND: SETTING THE SCENE 
 
The administration of Scotland 
 
In 1603 the independent kingdom of Scotland became linked to that of England, when 
James VI of Scotland became James I of England upon the death of the childless Elizabeth 
I. This was a purely dynastic union, and the two countries remained politically 
independent, each retaining their own parliament for the next hundred years. By the terms 
set down in the ‘Bill of Rights’ in 1689, however, the monarch became accountable to the 
English Parliament, and to the Scottish Parliament by the corresponding ‘Claim of Right’. 
Thus, a single monarch was obliged to rule in accordance with laws laid down by two 
different Parliaments, somewhat complicating this Union of the Crowns.  
Several factors, e.g. economic, constitutional and related to the European political 
context, led to negotiations between Scotland and England in 1706.6 The negotiations 
finally resulted in a draft Treaty of Union, which had to be ratified by the two Parliaments. 
After further discussions, rioting, threats and bribery, the Anglo-Scottish Union came into 
effect on May Day 1707 after the Scottish Parliament had voted itself out of existence. 45 
MPs and 16 peers were sent to what was now a British Parliament in London, which met 
for the first time in October 1707. Scotland was joined with England and Wales and, in 
Linda Colley’s words, “Great Britain was invented”.7  
This union was only partial, as Scotland gave up its own parliament but kept 
control of the key agencies of an incipient civil society, namely the Scottish Presbyterian 
Kirk, a separate legal system, a separate educational system and a system of local 
government.8 While a single British state had been created, this did not lead to a uniform 
system of government within this state. For instance, the Act of Union lacked clear 
provisions for the executive branch of government. The Scottish Privy Council was 
supposed to be kept, but this was abolished by Parliament a year later without any 
                                                 
6 This is for obvious reasons a far too extensive a subject to deal with here. For further readings see for 
instance Linda Colley, Britons. Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (London: Vintage, 1996) or Tom Devine, The 
Scottish Nation 1700-2000 (London: Penguin Books, 2000).   
7 Linda Colley, Britons. Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (London: Vintage, 1996), 11. 
8 Lindsay Paterson, "Scottish Home Rule: Radical Break or Pragmatic Adjustment?" in Remaking the Union. 
Devolution and British Politics in the 1990s, ed. Howard Elcock and Michael Keating (London: Frank Cass, 
1998), 54. 
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replacement being provided for.9 Thus, for the main part of the period between 1708 and 
1725, and again from 1742, Scotland was governed by a Scottish Secretary appointed by 
the Government, but the authority of the office depended on the informal power and 
influence of the individual who held the position. The Edinburgh legal establishment also 
had a large degree of influence over the government of Scotland. It was often given the 
task of adapting legislation to the Scottish legal framework, and sometimes even reformed 
existing Scottish law. This concentration of well-educated professionals also provided an 
important resource from which to recruit men for the administration of the country.10  
Lindsay Paterson accentuates how the agencies which were kept in 1707 helped 
shape the Scotland which emerged with the industrial revolution.11 After the local 
government was reformed in 1832, the emerging network of boards and committees which 
oversaw growing parts of state activities in Scotland, such as the poor law and education, 
played an influential role. At a local level, the legal system supplied the figure of the 
sheriff who, in addition to being the local judge, also organised boards and committees, 
and was an efficient means by which local issues were communicated to the central 
government in Edinburgh. The Lord Advocate would then articulate these preferences to 
London.  
Since 1892 the Scottish Secretary has held a seat in the Cabinet, and in 1926 the 
holder of the office was made a Secretary of State. In 1894 a Scottish Grand Committee 
was set up and its functions became more extensive in the 1940s. The Scottish Office was 
set up in 1885. According to James Mitchell, the Scottish Office embodied the UK’s 
willingness to acknowledge Scottish distinctiveness but, as it was part of Whitehall and 
accountable to the Westminster Parliament it also represented the unity of the British 
state.12 Lindsay Paterson sees it from the opposite angle and argues that in Scotland the 
new technocracy was a displacement of nationalist pressure for a separate Scottish 
legislature. In his words, the Scottish Office “rose to become the embodiment of Scottish 
national government”.13 As the role of the state grew, its responsibilities and the number of 
civil servants it employed increased accordingly. In 1939 the Scottish Office moved to 
Edinburgh. It kept a branch in London, but the administrative devolution - which the later 
                                                 
9 Atle L. Wold, Draft version of chapter 2 in "The Scottish Government and the French Threat, 1792-1802" 
(Unpublished Ph.D.-thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2003). 
10 Ibid. 
11 Paterson, "Scottish Home Rule: Radical Break or Pragmatic Adjustment?" 54. 
12 James Mitchell, Governing Scotland. The Invention of Administrative Devolution (Basingstoke, 
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 1. 
13 Paterson, "Scottish Home Rule: Radical Break or Pragmatic Adjustment?" 55. 
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devolution proposals were based on - greatly increased from the time of this move. A 
Royal Commission on Scottish Affairs under Lord Balfour reported in 1954 and 
recommended that the administrative devolution should be extended, giving more 
responsibility to the Scottish Office. Mitchell defines the primary purpose of the Scottish 
Office as it developed as threefold: 1) as an institutional expression of the union state 
demonstrating that Scotland would be treated distinctly but within a centralised state; 2) 
articulating Scottish interests especially in the Cabinet and Whitehall; and 3) fulfilling 
administrative duties.14 Throughout the 20th century administrative devolution was brought 
as far as was considered possible, with gradually more powers being given to the Scottish 
Office. In Parliament, the establishing of separate Scottish committees recognised that 
policies regarding Scotland needed to be seen apart from those relating to England, or the 
United Kingdom as a whole. The Scottish Office was reorganised in 1962 and was 
gradually allotted a broad set of responsibilities and powers, allowing it to develop an 
important planning function. Its scope made it necessary to establish five main departments 
within the Scottish Office, and the Secretary of State for Scotland was expected to take an 
interest in all matters affecting Scotland. While at its founding the work of the Scottish 
Office was held to be “not very heavy”, by the early 1980s an estimate suggested that it 
had responsibilities equivalent to approximately eleven other Whitehall Departments.15 To 
sum up, Scotland’s position in the union always involved negotiations and compromises, it 
has never been a matter of straightforward assimilation of Scotland to England. Scotland 
has developed its own autonomy in a variety of ways based mainly on the institutions of 
civil society, and on administrative devolution through the Scottish Office. Thus, when the 
pressure for a Scottish Parliament mounted, it could thus be seen merely as the latest phase 
in the process of negotiation within the union.16
 
The Labour Party in Scotland 
 
The Scottish Labour Party, founded in 1888 by Keir Hardie, had a consistent and clear-cut 
policy in favour of Home Rule right from the outset. A few years later, Hardie co-founded 
the Independent Labour Party (ILP) in England, into which the Scottish Labour Party was 
integrated. The ILP provided an important activist base as an affiliate of the Labour Party 
                                                 
14 Mitchell, Governing Scotland. The Invention of Administrative Devolution, 5. 
15 Ibid., 1. 
16 Paterson, "Scottish Home Rule: Radical Break or Pragmatic Adjustment?" 62. 
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when the latter was established in 1906. The incorporation of the Scottish party into the 
British Labour Party structures took place in 1915 with the forming of a Scottish Advisory 
Council, and in 1918 the Labour Party’s constitution formalised the ‘regional’ status of the 
Scottish party.17 Formally it was just a branch, but it nevertheless retained a degree of 
autonomy and was often referred to as the Scottish Labour Party. The policy in favour of 
Scottish Home Rule was restated at several party conferences throughout the 1920s. In the 
early 1920s Labour held a majority in Scotland and some factions of the party, including a 
number of ‘Red Clydesiders’, the grouping of left-wing Labour MPs elected in 1922, 
wanted Scotland as a separate socialist state. An image was drawn of a Scottish Socialist 
Commonwealth, and in 1929 Scotland had more Labour MPs than did England.18 The 
mass unemployment of the 1930s changed this notion into a call for national ownership of 
the industries and a strong central government, but as late as 1937 there existed a London 
Scots Self-Government Committee, publishing a pamphlet with a preface written by no 
other than Clement Attlee.19 The trade unions were the first to realise the importance of 
national wage bargaining, and consequently withdrew their support from the devolution 
cause. This leaning towards a more centralist outlook became more prominent in Labour’s 
post-war ideology of Keynesianism and central economic planning, which was not easily 
combined with a commitment to home rule. While Labour was in office from 1945-1951, 
Hugh Gaitskell attempted to explain to the Scots that nationalisation would be more 
effective than nationalism, and as the Government demonstrated the ability of the British 
state to deliver for Scotland, there were few protests when the commitment to home rule 
faded.20 It was agreed that both nationalisation of key sectors of the economy, which was 
one of the main priorities for the Labour Government, and the development of the welfare 
state, required strong centralist planning. (In spite of this, the official Labour party policy 
in favour of devolution was actually maintained until 1957, as the issue was not on the 
agenda at Party conferences.)  
The change in Labour’s policy towards home rule for Scotland made it possible for 
the Conservatives to play the ‘Scottish card’ during the nationalisation era of the 1940s and 
1950s, arguing that the nationalisation schemes placed control of Scottish industry with 
                                                 
17 Gerry Hassan, "The People's Party, Still? The Sociology of Scotland's Leading Party," in The Scottish 
Labour Party. History, Institutions and Ideas, ed. Gerry Hassan (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2004), 1. 
18 John Mercer, Scotland, the Devolution of Power (London: J. Calder, 1978), 169. 
19 The London Scots Self-Government Committee, Plan for Scotland (London: Victor Gollansz Ltd., 1937). 
20 Bob McLean, "Labour in Scotland since 1945: Myth and Reality," in The Scottish Labour Party. History, 
Institutions and Ideas, ed. Gerry Hassan (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 36. 
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London bureaucrats, as illustrated by their 1950 manifesto: “Until the Socialist 
Government is removed neither Scotland nor Wales will be able to strike away the fetters 
of centralisation and be free to develop their own way of life.”21 Despite this attitude when 
in opposition, the Conservative rule from 1951 onwards saw few results regarding home 
rule or decentralisation, and the Labour Government under Wilson from 1964 to 1970 
continued the centralist Labour position. Since 1959 Labour had won the majority of 
Scottish seats at every general election and, as 1945 and 1966 were the only elections in 
which Labour had secured a majority of English seats, Scottish votes were considered 
vital. Without Scotland the party would have lost the election in 1964.   
 
The challenge from the SNP 
 
The Scottish National Party (SNP) was founded in 1934. Initially it sought a Scottish 
Parliament within the United Kingdom, to be achieved in cooperation with other political 
parties. During the war it became explicitly separatist, and began to contest elections on a 
separatist agenda. It won a by-election in Motherwell in April 1945, but lost the seat at the 
next general election. The next breakthrough came in local elections in the mid-1960s, but 
the SNP did not play an important role on the British political scene until the next electoral 
victory at parliamentary level in November 1967, when Winnie Ewing from the SNP won 
a by-election in Hamilton with 46 per cent of the vote. This came as a great shock to 
Labour, as it had been considered a safe seat. The Scottish Council of the Labour Party 
confirmed their anti-devolution stand in 1968, but there were discussions within the party 
on how the emerging threat from the SNP should be met. At the end of the year a Royal 
Commission under Lord Kilbrandon was set up to discuss the constitutional future of the 
United Kingdom, and at the same time it was hoped this would buy the Government some 
time. The Kilbrandon Commission reported in 1973 and recommended some degree of 
devolution, but only as far as it was consistent with the preservation of the political and 
economic unity of the United Kingdom. A week later, voters in the Glasgow Govan by-
election returned Margo MacDonald of the SNP. In the general election in February 1974, 
the SNP won 21.9 per cent of the Scottish vote, which gave the party seven seats in 
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Parliament. Labour won 301 seats in the House of Commons, which allowed them to form 
a minority government. 
In the Labour manifesto for the February 1974 general election, there had not been 
a single word said about devolution, and neither had devolution been discussed after the 
election by the National Executive Committee or any other official organ of the Labour 
party. In the Queen’s Speech delivered on 12 March 1974, it was stated that “my Ministers 
and I will initiate discussions in Scotland…and bring forward proposals for 
consideration”.22 This was a natural follow-up to the report from the Kilbrandon 
Commission, especially considering the Government’s lack of a majority in the House of 
Commons, and the recent electoral success of the SNP. Then, in the Prime Minister’s 
speech the same afternoon, the Prime Minister responded to a question by Winnie Ewing 
of the SNP with the reply: “Of course, we shall publish a White Paper and a Bill”.23 
Suddenly, Labour had committed itself to devolution to Scotland and Wales. 
                                                 
22 Tam Dalyell, Devolution the End of Britain? (London: Cape, 1977), 99.  
23 HC Deb 12 March 1974 vol 870 c84. 
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3. THE TURNING POINT 
 
The Labour Party and Devolution in the 1960s  
 
This chapter will trace the Labour Party’s policy on devolution through the late 1960s, the 
early 1970s and examine the policy change on devolution and the debate it caused in 1974. 
When the support for the Scottish National Party (SNP) increased in the 1960s, the Labour 
view was that this was largely a protest vote and that the mood would blow over, given 
time. According to David Bleiman and Michael Keating, there was a strong ideological 
aversion to nationalism in the Labour Party, as it was regarded as a force dividing the 
workers of Scotland and England, and diverting attention from the class struggle. Even a 
concession to an assembly without any economic powers would raise the ‘national 
question’ and give credibility to Scottish nationalism.24 The strategy chosen to avoid this 
was to push for a continuation of further administrative devolution and special treatment 
for Scotland in economic matters.  
 As Secretary of State for Scotland from 1964 to 1970, and again from 1974 to 
1976, William Ross played an influential part in the shaping of Labour’s policy on 
devolution. Ross had a close working relationship with the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, 
and was given more autonomy in dealing with Scottish affairs than any other post-war 
Secretary of State for Scotland. He was a committed unionist and during his first period in 
Cabinet he ardently opposed devolution. Frequently expressing his strong dislike of the 
SNP, whom he described as ‘Tartan Tories’, he earned himself the nickname ‘the hammer 
of the Nats’. During his first period in the Government, the majority of the Cabinet were 
persuaded to take his view, but he met little opposition from his colleagues or his 
subordinates. Judith Hart, the Under-Secretary of State for Scotland from 1964 to 66, later 
played an important pro-devolutionist role on the National Executive Committee (NEC), 
but she neither said nor did anything about the issue at the time.25  
Between 1945 and 1966, which has been termed the age of two-party politics, 
Labour won between 46.2 and 49.9 per cent of the popular vote in Scotland at general 
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elections.26 The first sign of what was to come could be seen in March 1967. At a by-
election in the Labour constituency of Glasgow Pollock the SNP polled an unusually high 
28 per cent. As this split the traditional Labour vote, the Conservatives won the seat. The 
next month, seemingly unaffected by this event, Wilson stated in the House of Commons 
that there were no plans for separate parliaments for Scotland and Wales.27
Winifred Ewing from the SNP won the Hamilton by-election with a solid 46 per 
cent of the vote in November 1967, but this did not change Labour’s stand either. It had to 
be admitted, however, that it was a considerable blow. Hamilton was not just any 
constituency, but a mining seat in what was perceived as socialist heartland and believed to 
be the safest of the Labour seats in Scotland. In the local elections of May 1968 the SNP 
outpolled all the other parties with 34 per cent of the vote.28 Demands were now made in 
the Labour Party for a fresh examination of the devolution issue and it was discussed 
during the Scottish conferences in both 1967 and 1968, but these deliberations did not 
result in any change of policy. At the 1968 Labour Party Annual Conference a resolution 
was moved by a delegate from an Edinburgh constituency, calling on the Government “to 
recognise the desire of the people of Scotland and Wales for elected assemblies”.29 After 
ten speakers had debated the resolution, James Callaghan replied on behalf of the NEC, 
initially stating that this was “one of the most serious and comprehensive debates we have 
had on the political relationships that exist in the British Isles in the 25 years I have been 
coming to the Party Conference”, which indicated the low priority this issue had in the 
post-war Labour Party.30 Callaghan argued that more facts and information were needed, 
and upon the recommendation of the NEC the resolution was remitted. Later that year the 
Scottish Executive appointed a sub-committee to discuss Scottish government, the 
Working Group on Scottish Government, which primarily met during the summer and 
autumn of 1969. In a preliminary memo to the group, they were reminded that the Labour 
Party was “on record” declaring their belief that the economic and social problems of 
Scotland could only be resolved on a UK basis, and that the aspirations of the working 
people only could be realised by the labour movement acting in unison in England, Wales 
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and Scotland.31 In its interim report the next year the committee argued strongly against a 
Scottish Assembly on ideological grounds, and with a  
 
basic socialist belief that the economic and social problems of any part of 
the United Kingdom are the common concern of all, and can only be 
adequately resolved by concerned action on a United Kingdom scale…To 
achieve our aims, we Scots need our comrades in England and Wales. They 
need us. Fragmented we are weak, even powerless. Our strength lies in 
unity; a unity which transcends the narrow limits of prejudice and 
nationalism, and reaches out toward a Democratic Socialist 
Commonwealth.32  
 
The final report was produced with few changes in March 1970, and this was later 
accepted by the Scottish Executive with only two dissenting votes. The report firmly 
rejected a Scottish Assembly, and after its ratification by the Scottish Conference it formed 
the basis of the Scottish Council of the Labour Party (SCLP) evidence to the Commission 
on the Constitution, which will be further discussed below (see p.17).    
Some rather isolated members of Labour did argue in favour of constitutional 
change, be it devolution or a quasi-federal solution. An example of this was the Labour MP 
for Berwick and East Lothian, John P. Macintosh, who in 1968 published The Devolution 
of Power, where he advocated nine elected regional councils in England and elected 
assemblies for Scotland and Wales. Also Richard Crossman, who was Lord President of 
the Council at the time, regarded devolution as a viable option. He saw it as the only way 
of keeping the votes away from the SNP, as he did not believe improving the economic 
situation would be sufficient.   
The Royal Commission on Local Government in Scotland under Lord Wheatley 
reported in 1969 and advocated the creation of Scottish regions. This was endorsed by 
Labour, and was obviously seen as an alternative to an assembly. The subsequent Local 
Government (Scotland) Act was based on the Wheatley proposal, and can be interpreted as 
an indication of how far the party was from seriously considering a Scottish Assembly at 
that time.33 Admittedly, a few MPs complained that the report of the Kilbrandon 
Commission should be awaited before any changes were made to local government in 
Scotland, but their protests were largely ignored. The only concession made was the setting 
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up of the Select Committee on Scottish Affairs, which would hold limited powers to 
examine economic development and land use planning.  
The 1968 local authority elections, however, resulted in 34 per cent of the votes to 
the SNP, with 33 per cent to Labour.34 This made even the unionist Conservative Party 
come out in favour of some kind of Scottish Assembly, voiced by Edward Heath in the 
‘Declaration of Perth’ that year.35 The pro-devolution policy was even included in the 
Conservative Party’s 1970 Scottish manifesto, but never emerged as legislation and was 
later rejected by their Scottish Conference in 1973.36
 
The Royal Commission on the Constitution 
 
To counter the accusation of Labour being insensitive to the problems and demands of the 
Scottish people, a Royal Commission was appointed late in 1968 under the leadership of 
Lord Crowther. In his personal record of the 1964-1970 Government, Harold Wilson did 
not mention the setting down of the commission, thus indicating that this was not 
something he felt very strongly about neither at the time nor when his memoirs were 
published in 1971.37 According to the Labour MP and anti-devolutionist Tam Dalyell, the 
decision to form a commission was made by the Prime Minister without consulting the 
Scottish Council, any Scottish Labour MPs or the Secretary of State for Scotland.38 As 
Home Secretary, it was James Callaghan who was responsible for establishing the 
committee, but he was very sceptical of the idea at the time. According to William Ross, it 
was intended to kill devolution.39 Even if this might have been a view not generally held in 
the Labour Party leadership, it was undoubtedly hoped that the issue could now rest until 
the next election. After all, Wilson was the one who coined the expression of royal 
commissions as something to “take minutes and waste years”.40  
                                                 
34 Mercer, Scotland, the Devolution of Power, 154. 
35 Edward Heath, "The Declaration of Perth, 1968," in A Diverse Assembly. The Debate on a Scottish 
Parliament, ed. Lindsay Paterson (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998). 
36 William Miller, "The Scottish Dimension," in The British General Election of 1979, ed. David Butler and 
Dennis Kavanagh (London: Macmillan, 1980), 109. 
37 Harold Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-1970. A Personal Record (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1971). 
38 Dalyell, Devolution the End of Britain?, 89. 
39 Hill, "Devolution," 226. 
40 Thinkexist.com Quotations, Harold Wilson Quotes (2006); available from 
http://thinkexist.com/quotes/harold_wilson/. 
 16
 The written evidence to the Commission submitted by the Labour Party in Scotland 
in March 1970 was overwhelmingly centralist, a restatement of the unionist case. It clearly 
rejected the idea of a parliament, an assembly or any elected authority with executive or 
legislative powers covering the whole of Scotland, believing it would “create an 
unfavourable environment for the methods of government which we require”.41 The 
argument sometimes heard from a section on the left of the Labour Party, that decisions 
should be taken as close to the people as possible, was countered with the argument that 
democratic socialism had held it essential to support international perspectives as well.42 It 
asserted that “maximum benefits to Scotland will only come if the United Kingdom 
economy is planned as whole”, arguing that any attempt at changing this would require 
different levels of taxation, prices, customs barriers etc. 43 The solution to the “Scottish 
problem” was seen in the instruments of economic power which the Labour Party had set 
up or supported, e.g. the Scottish Economic Planning Council and the Highlands and 
Islands Development Board. Greater democratic scrutiny could be achieved by expanding 
the work of the Scottish committees already established in Parliament. The evidence was 
presented by a delegation including the SCLP Chairman, John Pollock, who rejected the 
mere suggestion that more democratic control over St Andrew’s House might not be a bad 
thing.44 In spite of a Labour government being regarded as the only solution for Scotland, 
the SCLP explicitly stated that they would rather prefer the status quo with a Conservative 
government at Westminster, than devolution with a Labour controlled Scottish Assembly. 
The SCLP evidence was submitted just prior to the Scottish Conference in April, but the 
Executive agreed to state to the Conference that the debate which took place there could 
supplement the document when oral evidence was given at a later date. The Scottish 
evidence was cleared by the NEC of the Labour Party, but copies were only made available 
at the meeting, and it was a very hurried process.45
 In addition to the evidence given to the Commission by the SCLP, two local 
branches submitted separate statements, namely the Edinburgh City Labour Party and the 
Central Edinburgh Constituency Labour Party. Both statements were written in October 
1969, before the final version of the Scottish Council’s evidence to the Commission, and 
served to strengthen the impression that attitudes towards devolution were more favourable 
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in Edinburgh than in the rest of Scotland. The Edinburgh City Labour Party stated that they 
chose to focus on the evolutionary and empirical approach to the British constitution, 
which in their opinion had worked so well in the Scottish case and had resulted in a 
substantial measure of devolution of administration to Scotland. They felt there was a need 
for the continued delegation of executive powers to Scotland, but maintained that this 
could be given in the form of a representative supervisory body which could “exercise a 
continuing home-based oversight of the increasingly powerful home-based executive arm 
of government”, trying to meet the criticism of growing bureaucratic power at the Scottish 
Office outside democratic control.46 The Select Committee on Scottish Affairs had already 
been established as an experiment, and the Edinburgh City Labour Party proposed that this 
should be expanded to include all Scottish Members of Parliament. In addition, the MPs 
should be supplemented by members, directly elected by the Scottish electorate, who 
should be resident in Scotland.47  
The Central Edinburgh branch’s statement went further, and stressed that a critical 
reappraisal of the constitutional set-up of the United Kingdom was necessary, and that it 
had to be based on rational and empirical considerations as opposed to emotional ones. It 
argued that the administrative devolution to Scotland needed a parallel legislative 
authority, and that this was now clearly “overdue”.48 At each level of government (United 
Kingdom, Scotland or local unit) the civil service should be responsible to an elected 
assembly. According to their proposal, the Assembly for Scotland should have executive 
authority, but no tax-raising powers were suggested.  
Unlike the SCLP, the Labour Party’s Welsh Executive had been enthusiastically 
committed to an elected Welsh Council or Assembly, and this was the substance of the 
evidence they gave to the commission. This position was to be rather grudgingly endorsed 
by the Welsh MPs in 1973, and as the major election push by the Welsh nationalist party 
Plaid Cymru failed to materialise, their reservations against the policy in some cases 
hardened into opposition.  
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The Impact of the Scottish Trades Union Congress on the Devolution Policy 
 
The Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC) played an important part in promoting the 
cause of a Scottish Assembly. The STUC was usually given the task of formulating its own 
policies on matters affecting Scotland, and often the British TUC would then adopt that 
policy. The notion from the pre-centralist era of the Labour Party could still be found in the 
caucus of the STUC in the late 1960s and early 1970s, where some of its members 
favoured devolution in the belief that they could more easily achieve some of their political 
objectives in a Scottish rather than British context. The subject of devolution was discussed 
by the STUC in a major debate in 1968. The pro-devolutionist view was put forward by a 
representative from the Scottish Miners, who was also a member of the Communist Party, 
which had taken a pro-devolution position since 1964. Since, in his view, Scotland was a 
nation and not merely a region, the logical conclusion would be to recommend a federal 
solution.49 He was opposed by a delegate from the Amalgamated Union of Engineering 
and Foundry Workers (AUEW), who declared that an economically viable and secure 
Scotland could only be achieved within the economic framework of the United Kingdom, 
with the pay and work conditions of Scottish workers kept in parity with those of England 
and Wales through the national joint negotiating machinery. After the debate both 
resolutions were referred to the General Council, which for the 1969 congress produced an 
interim report rejecting separatism but arguing in favour of a legislative assembly. The 
report was passed unanimously.50 The written evidence to the Kilbrandon Commission 
was based on this document, but by the time the STUC gave oral evidence to the 
Commission in June 1970, the membership of its General Council had changed and its 
policy was now to support an assembly without legislative powers. It reverted later to its 
support for a legislative assembly and supported the majority proposals in the Kilbrandon 
Report (see p. 23), while stressing that devolution had to take place within a British 
framework. In a report to the 1975 STUC on its submission to the Prime Minster on the 
subject, the General Council called for “a meaningful Scottish Assembly which will not 
simply degenerate into a talking shop”.51  
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According to Dalyell, devolution was seldom discussed in any detail by individual 
unions at the national level. He believed that the members were not in accord with the 
STUC policy: “If ever a tail wagged an enormous dog, that tail was the caucus of the 
STUC General Council: Never, to parody Churchill, did so few commit so many in so 
short a space of time to so much about which they knew so little.”52 Some individual 
unions remained firmly opposed to devolution, such as the Union of Construction, Allied 
Trades and Technicians (UCATT). Many of its members migrated between England and 
Scotland, and feared they would be adversely affected by devolution. Two of their 
sponsored MPs were Eric Heffer and Tom Urwin, both very critical of the concept of 
devolution, arguing from a socialist position. The Edinburgh Divisional Committee of the 
AUEW passed a resolution instructing its National Committee to ask the Government to 
withdraw the Scotland and Wales Bill. Several other unions also came out firmly against 
devolution. But, as the leadership of the Labour Party kept its main contact with the 
leadership of the STUC, the individual unions were largely ignored. Bleiman and Keating 
argue that the somewhat confusing and at times ambiguous policy of the STUC was based 
on the dilemma of how to reconcile its support for the economic unity of the United 
Kingdom and its desire to democratise the structure of the Scottish administration. The 
Communist Party also had a disproportionably large influence on the STUC, as they sought 
influence within the trade union movement in lieu of an effective electoral platform.53 
George Lawson, a retired Labour MP and anti-devolutionist, later wrote to a Welsh Labour 
member active in the England Against Devolution group, attempting to explain the role the 
STUC had in the Scottish devolution debate:  
 
One substantial difficulty with us comes from the role and influence of the STUC. 
Existing administrative devolution gives it a continuing role to play and naturally it 
wants to extend that role. On top of this, the General Council of the STUC contains 
most of the more prominent Scottish trade union “leaders” and since it carries a bit 
of prestige to be on the General Council and votes are “bargained” for this purpose, 
very few of those TU officials will move much out of line. Without doubt it was 
this that secured the “about-turn” on devolution at the reconvened conference of the 
Labour Party in Scotland in August 1974.54  
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The Early 1970s 
 
When support for the SNP decreased again at the 1970 general election, the general 
impression was that the nationalist wind had already subsided. Centralisation was 
preferable to devolution, and this view was still expressed by the majority of the Labour 
Party in the early 1970s. In the South Ayrshire by-election in March 1970, Jim Sillars 
entered Parliament on a 54 per cent vote against the SNP’s 20 per cent. Since Sillars at the 
time was strongly anti-devolution this was seen to prove that socialist policies had more 
appeal than nationalist ones. In the manifesto for the June 1970 general election, Labour 
briefly stated that a Royal Commission was working on the issue of devolution, and 
referred to the Labour Party in Scotland who “has welcomed any changes leading to more 
effective Government which do not destroy the integration of the U.K. or weaken 
Scotland's influence at Westminster. They too reject separatism and also any separate 
legislative assembly.”55  
At the Dundee East by-election in March 1973 the seat almost fell to the SNP. This 
brought new life to the discussion in the Labour Party regarding the appropriate response 
to the Scottish question. Two separate schools of thought had now developed. The first 
maintained that this was a purely economic question, and that the problem would simply 
go away with the right economic policies for the United Kingdom together with special 
measures for Scotland. As the discovery of North Sea oil in the early 1970s undermined 
Labour’s traditional arguments that the union was economically necessary for Scotland, it 
was increasingly important to illustrate the benefits the union still held for Scotland. The 
other side thought that a measure of devolution would be necessary, but whether this was 
for tactical reasons or because of a genuine belief in the principle of devolution is not clear. 
William Ross was still firmly opposed to the idea, but had to accept that it was increasingly 
difficult to hold this position as the issue became a burning one. Frances Wood refers to a 
speech by Wilson in Edinburgh in 1973 which can be seen as a sign of his gradual 
conversion to devolution, as he now called for regional government in England and 
implied that this should be part of a general scheme of devolution.56
Compared to the statements given by the Labour Party to the Commission on the 
Constitution in 1970, there is some evidence that the mood in some sections of the party 
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was changing in the early 1970s. Alex Eadie and Jim Sillars jointly wrote two papers 
intended for discussion purposes within the SCLP. In 1968 they issued the first, titled 
Don’t Butcher Scotland’s Future. The Case against the SNP Together with an Argument 
for Reform at All Levels of Government. The paper strongly argued against all forms of 
separatism and in doing so it also explicitly rejected calls for a Scottish Parliament, even 
on a federal basis. The need for a strong central government was emphasised, with 
effective economic and political power continuing to reside at Westminster. Thus, a 
Scottish Parliament “would not have a dynamic role to play, and would be a bogus 
proposition to put before the people”.57 In 1974 the two authors had been joined by Harry 
Ewing and John Robertson, and together they produced a new report: Scottish Labour and 
Devolution: A Discussion Paper. This time around they supported devolution, but also 
made it clear how far this view was from separatism: “The underlying wish is to see the 
United Kingdom continue as one State, and the British Labour movement continue as one 
movement”.58 They criticised the optimism which had led Labour to leave the issue after 
the SNP lost its seat at the general election in 1970, believing that “the Labour Party made 
the mistake of believing that nationalism relied upon the SNP for existence, whereas in 
fact, in political reality, it is the SNP which relies on nationalism for its existence”.59 Eadie 
and Ewing ceased meeting with the others in early 1974, but the remains of the group 
would later form the basis of a significant breakaway from Labour (see p.48).60
The early signs of a changing policy were far from being the general view of the 
Party. Labour’s 1973 Programme was clearly anti-devolution, stating that “there is within 
all the countries of the United Kingdom a powerful identity among the workers. As 
Socialists, we would not readily squander this heritage of unity”.61 Still, the Scottish 
Executive of the Labour Party decided to review its position on Scottish government, and a 
new sub-committee was appointed; its report Scotland and the UK was released in October 
1973, on the very day before the publication of the Kilbrandon report. It emphasised that 
the present document was intended as a supplement to and not a replacement for the 1970 
evidence to the Royal Commission, and once again the Labour Party specifically rejected 
the possibility of a separate assembly or parliament in Scotland. The report stated that the 
Labour Party in Scotland was “convinced that the gradual but continual extension of 
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administrative and legislative devolution within the UK Parliament is in the best interest of 
the Scottish people”.62 The final paragraph in their evidence to the Kilbrandon commission 
was reiterated, where an assembly was ruled out on the grounds that Scottish influence at 
Westminster would be reduced. It was also maintained that such an assembly would pose a 
threat to the new local authorities, and threaten the economic unity of the United 
Kingdom.63 As alternatives, more powers to the new local authorities and further 
administrative devolution by the establishing of a Scottish National Enterprise Board were 
recommended. The report also called attention to the fact that the 1970 evidence had been 
overwhelmingly endorsed at the 1970 Scottish Conference, with only one delegate out of 
over three hundred voting against it.64
 
The Kilbrandon Commission Reports 
 
The next major event in the debate on devolution was the report of the Royal Commission 
on the Constitution. It was published in 1973 but prompted little discussion, and there was 
no immediate debate at Westminster. For instance there is little evidence, if any, of the 
report leading to any immediate debate in the Labour Party. Lord Crowther had died in 
March 1972 and Lord Kilbrandon had taken over as leader of the Commission, and the 
report therefore came to bear his name. Lord Kilbrandon was a distinguished member of 
society, and there were few protests at his appointment. By the SNP leader he was 
described as “a Scottish judge known to have respect for the place and rights of Scotland in 
the United Kingdom”.65 The Commission had initiated several surveys. One of them 
showed that 52 per cent of those questioned had never even heard of the Scottish Office, 
and two thirds of these simply stated that it did not exist. Ironically, the largest support of 
the ‘extreme’ proposals (either no change at all, or a maximum transfer of power) came 
from those least well informed.66 As will be further discussed in chapter 6, the commission 
found that there was a strong sense of Scottish nationhood. There was also a widespread 
assumption that in any new constitutional arrangement Scotland, in spite of its size and 
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population, should be equated with the nation of England as a whole instead of with 
individual regions of England. This view even led some Scots to argue in favour of an 
English Assembly, even though there might not be a call for it in England.  
The Commission concluded that the separate national identities of the Scots and the 
Welsh did not require Scotland and Wales to be separated from the rest of the United 
Kingdom and that recognition of the nations could be done without disturbing the essential 
unity of the United Kingdom.67 As well as rejecting the idea of full separation, the 
Commission also rejected federalism. For Scotland, there were three models that had some 
measure of support amongst the members of the Commission: legislative devolution, 
executive devolution and a third model involving the establishment of a directly elected 
assembly or council with advisory and deliberative functions, and some powers in relation 
to Scottish legislation introduced in the United Kingdom Parliament.68  
The Commission found the Scottish opinion regarding the need for a representative 
assembly to be divided, where especially the respondents who had knowledge and 
understanding of the existing system of administrative devolution were in doubt. However, 
they clearly saw the desire among the majority of the Scottish people for a representative 
assembly, which was seen to be necessary both in recognition of Scottish national identity 
and as means of giving the Scottish people greater control of their own affairs.69 While not 
being able to agree on the scope and powers of such an assembly, all members of the 
Commission favoured an assembly of some sort. The majority report, supported by eight 
members, proposed elected assemblies in Scotland and Wales, with legislative powers, tax-
raising powers and a large range of devolved functions and services. Any amending or new 
legislation affecting transferred matters would be left to the new Scottish or Welsh 
legislatures, with a veto power for the UK Government if supported by the UK Parliament. 
The assemblies would be single-chamber bodies with 100 members elected by the single 
transferable vote system of proportional representation in multi-member constituencies. A 
cabinet system would operate, with a Chief Minister. In England, only regional bodies 
were suggested. A minority of one rejected the idea of legislative powers altogether, and 
proposed assemblies with more limited functions. Lord Crowther-Hunt and Professor Alan 
Peacock submitted a memorandum of dissent, where they proposed a quasi-federal solution 
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in which Scotland, Wales and five English regions were treated equally.70 In their view 
each would have assemblies established, their members elected by proportional 
representation, but with more moderate powers than what the majority report outlined. 
Maybe one of the most important consequences of the Kilbrandon report was that just any 
suggestions of change, such as the ones proposed by the Labour Party on the eve of the 
report, were no longer enough. Anything short of the Commission’s majority view would 
be considered centralist. 
 
The Govan By-Election 
 
The well-timed SNP campaign of 1973 around the slogan ‘It’s Scotland’s oil’ was a 
brilliant initiative which took the SNP out of small-town politics and into Labour’s 
industrial heartland by creating a focus of protest comprehensible to working-class Scots. 
The one-month old report Scotland and the UK was the official platform of the Labour 
Party when Margo MacDonald won the Glasgow Govan by-election in the beginning of 
November, considered one of the most significant events in the history of Scottish 
devolution. The SNP polled 41.9 per cent and Labour 32.2 on a rather meagre turnout of 
51.7 per cent. With other business to attend to, and the holidays around the corner, no 
alternative Labour policy on devolution was made. Then, Prime Minister Heath quickly 
and quite unexpectedly went to the country, and a general election was called for 
28 February 1974. This took place in the middle of the “three-day week” energy crisis, and 
neither devolution nor any other constitutional change received much attention during the 
short election campaign.   
 
The February General Election and its Aftermath  
 
In his 1977 book Devolution the End of Britain, Dalyell refers to a MORI poll taken in 
Scotland on the outset of the election, which showed that only 19 per cent wanted complete 
independence, while 78 per cent favoured some kind of Scottish Parliament. Among 
Labour voters in support of the latter alternative, the figure was as high as 83 per cent. The 
MORI Director, Bob Worcester, concluded from these figures that “Scottish Nationalism is 
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a unifying force for a wide variety of Scottish people”.71 This would make it an important 
issue in the election. Still, when Harold Wilson later described in his memoirs the February 
1974 Labour manifesto as “cautious” when it came to devolution, this was as best an 
understatement.72 In the Labour Party’s election manifesto, there was actually not a single 
word about devolution, nationalism or any other constitutional issues regarding Scotland or 
Wales.73 The official position of the Labour Party in Scotland was one of firm opposition 
to devolution. This did not, however, keep Wilson’s successor James Callaghan from 
reporting in his memoirs that “the Labour Party had undertaken this commitment in our 
general election manifesto of February 1974, as a response to the Report of the Kilbrandon 
Commission”, a misrepresentation which seems to have gone unnoticed.74
With 37.15 per cent of the vote in the United Kingdom as a whole, Labour gained 
14 seats and reached a total of 301. While this allowed the party to form a minority 
government, it was plain to see that without the Scottish seats Labour would have lost the 
election. The contestant in almost all of Labour’s Scottish marginal seats was the SNP, not 
the Conservatives, and evidence suggested that Labour Party voters were far less reluctant 
to switch to the SNP than to the 
Conservatives.75 For Scotland in general 
the SNP polled 21.93 per cent. Of the 
six new seats the SNP gained, only two 
were taken from Labour, the other four 
were taken from the Conservative Party. 
In these constituencies the Conservative 
vote nevertheless stayed much the same, 
and the SNP votes were gained from 
Labour, and to a lesser extent from the 
Liberal Party.76 It is also clear that in the 
election results in the post-war period, 
the SNP and Labour results were very 
Figure A. Results from general elections 1945-
1979. Source of figures: Brown, McCrone and 
Paterson 1998 
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closely and negatively correlated (see figure A).77
The threat from the SNP had to be taken seriously. The eminent Scottish historian 
Christopher Harvie, at the time an active member of the Labour party, described a 
particularly alarming scenario in a 1975 article:  
 
With a majority of seats (thirty-six) in Scotland, the SNP would then, in 
terms of its constitution, withdraw from Westminster and set up its own 
Constituent Assembly and government, as Sinn Fein did in Ireland in 1918. 
There will then be only two ways out for an English government – 
concession or occupation. It is not a situation any government should 
attempt to gamble on: the only precedent is a tragic one.78  
 
A comprehensive survey was carried out by the Opinion Research Centre (ORC) in 
the aftermath of the February election. Amongst other things, it sought to probe the reasons 
why electors had voted as they did in the recent General Election. A desire for home 
rule/independence for Scotland figured strongly in the answers of the 21 per cent who 
voted SNP, along with the phrase “it's time Scotland ran its own affairs”. More than 60 per 
cent of the SNP voters chose ‘devolution/more self-government for Scotland’ as one of the 
key influences of their voting decision. 43 per cent selected ‘North Sea Oil’.79 The report 
testified to the widespread dissatisfaction with Whitehall’s record in Scotland. Half the 
Scottish electorate believed that central government was doing a bad job of taking care of 
the needs of Scotland, barely more than a quarter believed it was doing a good job.80 When 
asked to choose between five alternatives, ranging from leaving things as they were to 
letting Scotland take over complete responsibility for running things herself, there was 
little difference between the opinions expressed by women and men. Broken down by age 
groups, however, the tendency to support the fifth and most extreme alternative drastically 
increased with decreasing age, with 28 per cent in favour in the 18-24 age group, and only 
10 per cent in the 65+ group. The survey showed that the greatest support for “letting 
Scotland take over complete responsibility for running things in Scotland” could be found 
in the central belt, while the greatest resistance was expressed on the peripheries. When 
party preferences were included, the survey showed that 55 per cent of the SNP voters 
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chose the fifth and most extreme alternative, with 23 per cent in favour of a Scottish 
Parliament with economic powers. The Labour voters were almost equally divided 
between alternatives (1) status quo, (2) Scottish council with regional representatives and 
(3) elected Scottish Assembly, with about a quarter of the votes for each alternative. As 
much as 29 per cent of the Conservative voters wanted an elected assembly, while 10 per 
cent wanted an elected parliament with economic powers.81  
The newly-elected minority Labour Government had to find an appropriate 
response to this swing in the public mood. As mentioned in chapter 2, the Queen’s Speech 
on 12 March stated that “My Ministers and I will initiate discussions in Scotland….and 
bring forward proposals for consideration”.82 This was an extremely open wording, which 
to the Press and the Labour backbenchers did not necessarily imply devolution, and it was 
not even mentioned when the Parliamentary Labour Party debated the speech.83 Later the 
same day, the Prime Minister’s Speech was interrupted by Winifred Ewing from the SNP, 
who demanded concrete proposals instead of more loose talk. Harold Wilson replied “We 
on this side believe in full consultation and discussion. We are not an authoritarian party. 
Of course, we shall publish a White Paper and a Bill.”84 This commitment to devolution 
has often been described as an “off the cuff remark” as a response to a haphazard 
Parliamentary interjection, for instance by Tam Dalyell and George Lawson.85  However, 
the previous day the Prime Minister had in fact informed the House that he had appointed 
an adviser to the Government on constitutional questions, concentrating particularly on 
advice to the Ministers concerned in connection with the intended discussions on the 
Kilbrandon Reports, and this he actually repeated in his speech only seconds before the 
interruption by Winifred Ewing.86 So, even though the commitment to devolution did not 
take the form of a statement from an Annual Conference, or a Prime Ministerial Statement, 
there cannot be any doubt that it was part of a policy which at the very least was planned 
by the Prime Minister. The advisor appointed by the Prime Minister was Lord Crowther-
Hunt, co-author of the Minority Report from the Kilbrandon Commission. A few days after 
the Queen’s Speech, he wrote to the Lord President and asked him to include in a speech 
that the purpose of the planned discussion was “not to avoid action, but to produce action 
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as quickly as possible. Because their purpose is to produce the White Paper and a Bill”.87 
From this it can reasonably be assumed that the Prime Minister could reckon with some 
support from his close colleagues. However, Dalyell and other anti-devolutionists do have 
a point when they stress that the policy change had not been discussed formally or 
approved by any level in the Party. Regardless of the intention behind the Prime Minister’s 
comment, and how planned or unplanned it was, from that moment it was necessary to 
bring the Labour Party, and as a first step the Scottish Council, into line.  
Some comfort could be found in the fact that when the Scottish Executive had met 
two days previously, there were some signs of a mellowing of the ardent resistance to the 
concept of devolution. While the Executive at the meeting issued a statement that 
welcomed the Kilbrandon rejection of separatism but disagreed with most other parts of it, 
they did also approve the report of yet another sub-committee, which carefully stated: 
 
There is a real need to ensure that decisions affecting Scotland are taken in 
Scotland, wherever possible. A measure of devolution could perhaps give to 
the people a feeling of involvement in the process of decision making. We 
believe this might best be done by the setting up of an elected Scottish 
Assembly.88
 
In their book Labour and Scottish Nationalism, Bleiman and Keating assert that the crucial 
word here was ‘might’, and that this statement was aimed at keeping some sort of unity at 
the impending Scottish Conference. The Scottish Conference held in Ayr in March adopted 
the statement, and thereby gave the Executive a free hand in interpreting it. According to a 
‘Scotland is British’ leaflet from 1977, a more firm demand for a legislative assembly was 
rejected on a card vote at the same conference by 555,000 votes to 208,000.89
Tam Dalyell claims that the Government’s policy was decided by the Prime 
Minister’s choice of people to carry it out, as the White Paper was primarily to be written 
by two prominent politicians who were known pro-devolutionists. According to Dalyell, 
there was no discussion whatsoever in the Cabinet as to whether the Party should opt for 
devolution.90 The men chosen for the task were the Deputy Leader for the Parliamentary 
Labour Party and Deputy Prime Minister Ted Short, and the political advisor Lord 
Crowther-Hunt. On 3 June 1974 the first White Paper was published, entitled Devolution 
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Within the UK – Some Alternatives for Discussion. Five possible schemes for devolution 
were listed, and comments were to be submitted by the end of the month. The schedule 
was extremely tight, as the authors of the October manifesto were waiting for input on this 
point.91 With another election pending, the minority Labour Government could not afford 
the luxury of a longwinded ideological debate. The circumstances also meant that the 
development of a Scottish and Welsh strategy was too important to be left to the Scottish 
and Welsh wings of the party. 
22 June 1974 Scotland played Yugoslavia in the final rounds of the soccer World 
Cup, and Ross was in Frankfurt, where the match took place. Meanwhile, the Scottish 
Executive of the Labour Party was having a meeting to debate the White Paper, but only 
eleven of the twenty-nine members turned up. Six of the members present were opposed to 
the proposed Assembly (among them the Chairman, Allan Campbell), and five voted in 
favour. So, with a majority of one vote, the Scottish Executive of the Labour Party 
reaffirmed their policy that an Assembly was “irrelevant to the real needs of the people of 
Scotland”.92 All five of the Government’s White Paper options were rejected. The 
resentment of the pressure put on the Scottish Executive from Transport House (the Party 
headquarters in London) may have decided the final vote.  
Further pressure was put on the Scottish Executive when, on 26 June, the National 
Executive Committee (NEC) of the Labour Party met at Transport House and agreed to 
Judith Hart’s and Alex Kitson’s proposal for a recall conference of the Scottish Labour 
Party.93 The Scottish Executive felt in no position to refuse calling the new conference, as 
their meeting on 22 June had been so poorly attended. They did, however, refuse to change 
their mind, call a new vote or do anything other than make arrangements for the 
conference. The Labour Vote No Campaign later spoke of this as “indeed one of the few 
examples of London imposing its will on the Scots!”.94 The NEC had that spring 
established a separate committee on devolution under their permanent Home Policy 
committee, headed by Alex Kitson who repeatedly argued strongly in favour of assemblies 
to Scotland and Wales. The Devolution Committee not unexpectedly came down heavily 
in favour of devolution.95 Subsequently the NEC later in the summer agreed upon a 
resolution submitted by Kitson, recognising the “desire of the people of Scotland for an 
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elected Assembly”, and calling for party support.96 As described in the Glasgow Herald; 
“in a matter of minutes … the Labour Party executive declared its voice on an issue that 
had been undecided for years, and had split the party in Scotland”. 97 Neither the Prime 
Minister nor his deputy, Ted Short, were present at the poorly attended meeting. 
 
The Tartan Curtain Fell 
 
On 17 August the Scottish Labour Special Conference on Devolution was held in Glasgow. 
The Conference began with a Scottish Executive opposed to devolution, a government 
pledge to legislate on it, a NEC who favoured a Scottish Assembly with legislative powers 
and a split Party membership. Alex Kitson, who was National Officer in the highly 
influential Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU), had been lobbying to convince 
the major unions in Scotland, and had got his own union to pledge support to devolution in 
March the same year. The Conference took place during the holidays, and few had any 
chance to discuss it with their members or other union officials. The debate opened with a 
speech by the Scottish leadership which made it clear that it would have been appreciated 
if the NEC at Transport House had held back from making a statement on Scottish 
devolution until after the Conference. The speeches against devolution were numerous; the 
retired MP George Lawson made a case against it, and as a former Scottish Whip in the 
House of Commons he could argue with some authority that Scottish issues had had more 
than their fair share of time in the House, and he wanted to know exactly where this 
demand for an Assembly was to be found. Brian Wilson advocated that the Party should 
square up to the challenge of the SNP instead of hiding under the umbrella of a Scottish 
Assembly, something that could lead to nothing less than the wholesale destruction of the 
Labour Movement. It was also argued that it would be impossible to keep all the Scottish 
MPs, with the obvious consequences this would have. Jim Sillars was still a Labour Party 
member at the time and made a fervent pro-devolution speech, advocating decentralisation 
and, therefore, as a logical implication, devolution.  
The two first propositions put to the Conference backed the return of a majority 
Labour Government and opposed separation, and were unanimously carried. The third put 
forward the line of the Scottish Executive and declared an Assembly “irrelevant to the 
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needs and aspirations of the people of Scotland”, but this was lost by a large majority.98 A 
card vote (see note 89) was not held, as with most union representatives in favour, there 
was an overwhelming majority in favour of the fourth proposal which stated “…that this 
conference, recognising the desire of the Scottish people for a greater say in the running of 
their own affairs, calls for the setting up of a directly elected Assembly with legislative 
powers within the context of the political and economic unity of the UK”.99 The fifth and 
last proposition, which was carried unanimously, called for the retention of the office of 
the Secretary of State for Scotland and all the 71 Scottish MPs. This last proposition meant 
in practice the incorporation of an Assembly into the existing system, without any 
extensive alternations of the existing institutions, and made the idea of devolution much 
easier to handle for devolution sceptics. Bleiman and Keating assert that because of this 
attempt at keeping most of the constitutional status quo, this change of policy should not be 
seen as a radical departure from Labour’s centralist beliefs. They also stressed that support 
of legislative devolution was the only option available, short of total opposition to an 
Assembly. Because the conference was called at such a short notice, no amendments or 
alternative propositions could be submitted.100 The Scottish Executive had fairly quickly 
been brought to heel, along with the official policy of the Scottish Council, but enthusiastic 
grassroots support for the concept took a while longer to manifest itself and its failure to 
permeate all sections of the Party was to cause severe trouble at a later date. 
The Labour Party devolution advisor Lord Crowther-Hunt wrote a confidential 
letter to Judith Hart only few days after the Scottish Conference, where the main point was 
that many issues were still left open, and now needed to be resolved. This included the 
form of the Executive, the scope of powers transferred, taxing powers, the role of the 
Secretary of State, and which authorities should be taken over; in short, just about 
everything.101 Subsequently, the Devolution sub-committee of the NEC decided to draw up 
its own paper. This report was published in the beginning of September, calling for the 
creation of directly elected Assemblies for Scotland and Wales. One sentence read “it was 
the Scottish Council of Labour which, in 1974, after an open, honest debate, 
overwhelmingly called for an elected Scottish Assembly with legislative powers”, thereby 
attempting to re-write history, placing the initiative firmly in Scotland. According to the 
diary of the Cabinet member Barbara Castle, the report was published before it had been to 
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the NEC, and it had not been shown to the Secretaries of State for Wales and Scotland.102 
On the rushed process, Dalyell commented: 
 
It is impossible to exaggerate the long-term significance that the fluke 
chance of a near-tie in the House of Commons can have on the attitudes of 
the major parties to a delicate constitutional problem…The closeness of the 
February and October Polls meant that many decisions which would 
normally have been taken in a deliberative manner were hasty and 
rushed.103
 
The demand for a legislative Assembly was reiterated in the second White Paper on 
devolution, Democracy and Devolution; Proposals for Scotland and Wales, which was 
published later in September. The proposals included a Scottish legislative Assembly with 
an executive, with devolved powers over a wide range of functions, but no power to raise 
revenue, and a veto power retained by the Secretary of State, subject to affirmative 
resolution in Parliament. At the same time, the unity of the United Kingdom was strongly 
defended, along with a promise of the continued existence of the full number of Scottish 
MPs and the Secretary of State for Scotland. The Government did, however, promise to 
legislate for the establishment of Scottish and Welsh assemblies “as soon as possible”.104 
Harold Wilson emphasised during the process of writing the White Paper that it was 
crucial that the Government could not say less (and would be ill-advised to say more) than 
what was in the Party document already published earlier that month.105
The next day, Wilson called for a new general election, and this time devolution to 
Scotland and Wales was included in the manifesto. But, where the British manifesto 
restricted itself to stating that “the next Labour Government will create elected assemblies 
in Scotland and Wales”, the Scottish Manifesto promised that “we shall … give high 
priority in the next Parliament to the setting up of a legislative assembly for Scotland with 
substantial powers over the crucial areas of devolution making in Scotland. We do not 
believe that the Scottish people want the separatism advocated by the Scottish National 
Party … They do however want an Assembly to have real status and power”.106 The 
different wording can be explained by the fact that the matter had not yet been discussed 
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by the Labour Party Annual Conference, as would have been customary before such a 
drastic proposal entered the manifesto.  
The results of the general election were highly favourable for the SNP, but Labour 
gained 18 seats nationwide and remained in power, this time with a majority of four. The 
SNP swept into second position in Scotland with 30.4 per cent of the vote and 11 seats. 
The two-party system was thus at a low point; in England the Liberal party matched the 
Celtic Nationalist Parties in Scotland and Wales. To the Labour Party, the support for the 
SNP found in the election results seemed to confirm Scottish devolution as a central issue, 
which had to be acted on in one way or another. 
 34




As mentioned in the introduction, devolution can be defined as the transfer to a subordinate 
elected body, on a geographical basis, of functions at present exercised by ministers and 
Parliament.107 The functions may be legislative, the power to make laws, or executive, the 
power to make secondary laws and be responsible for the administration. Regardless of the 
functions devolved, devolution takes place within a primary legal framework determined in 
the superior Parliament, in this case Westminster. It involves the creation of elected bodies, 
subordinate to Parliament. In the British case it seeks to maintain the central feature of the 
British Constitution, which is the supremacy of Parliament, and thus leaves the state 
unitary. The development of what is termed administrative devolution has been sketched in 
chapter 2 (see p. 8).   
Devolution differs clearly from federalism in that in a federal state, the authority of 
the central or federal government and the provincial governments is co-ordinated and 
shared. A constitution defines the scope of the governments.108 Thus, power would not be 
devolved, but instead divided between Westminster and regional parliaments. In the British 
devolution debate references are sometimes made to a “federal solution” for Britain, but 
this usually implies devolution applied to all the four nations, sometimes subdivided into 
larger regions: what was formerly know as “Home Rule All Round”. So far, the devolution 
proposed in the United Kingdom has been asymmetrical, and proposed only to the “fringe” 
areas.109
According to Bogdanor, the idea of devolution was originally a peculiarly British 
contribution to politics.110 It was first introduced in 1774 as a way of reconciling the 
American demands for local autonomy with the imperial rights and might of Britain. It 
reappeared under the name of Home Rule, as a way of solving the “Irish problem” in the 
period between 1884 and 1912. In Britain the longest experience with a devolved 
government is the Northern Ireland Parliament from 1921 to 1972. By the Government of 
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Ireland Act of 1920, Westminster established in Belfast a subordinate parliament with wide 
powers over the domestic affairs of Northern Ireland.  
 
Main Issues in the Devolution Debate 
 
Whenever devolution is debated, there are some critical issues that keep arising, and for 
which it has been difficult to find solutions. One of these is the West Lothian Question, 
which draws attention to perhaps the main constitutional and political imbalance arising 
from introducing asymmetrical devolution in an otherwise unitary state. It was named after 
Tam Dalyell, MP for West Lothian, who frequently voiced it in the Parliamentary debates 
of the mid-1970s, but it has been discussed ever since the 1890s and especially around the 
time of the 1912 Home Rule Bill. It is related to the question of how to organise an 
appropriate level of representation for the territorial authorities at the centre, and how to 
achieve a satisfactory balance of power between the respective levels of government. By 
Dalyell it was formulated in two parts, of which the first is how it can be right that MPs 
representing Scottish constituencies in the Parliament of the United Kingdom will have the 
power to vote on issues affecting England (including those that do not affect Scotland), 
while English MPs will not have the power to vote on Scottish issues. The second part of 
the question was important to Dalyell, but is often left out when defining or debating the 
West Lothian Question, and asks how it can be right that MPs elected to Westminster from 
Scottish constituencies have no ability to affect the issues of their own constituents when 
these issues have been devolved to a Scottish Parliament. Several solutions have been 
suggested to the first part of the question, but no acceptable and permanent solution has so 
far been found. One of the suggestions is to limit the number of MPs from the area which 
has received its own parliament or assembly. During Northern Ireland’s half century of 
devolved government, the number of Northern Irish MPs at Westminster was cut, giving 
the region two thirds of its appropriate share. Dalyell himself felt that reducing the number 
of Scottish MPs in Westminster would in no way solve the problem, as there would still be 
Scottish MPs voting on English issues. Another possibility is limiting the powers of the 
MPs returned to Westminster from the area in question. William Gladstone, Prime Minister 
four times in the 1868-1894 period and the principal architect behind Home Rule, proposed 
such an “in and out” solution in 1893. This implied that the powers of the MPs in question 
would be limited and that they would not be able to vote on devolved issues, but this idea 
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was later abandoned as the political consequences of a shifting majority in the House of 
Commons would be grave for any government with a small majority. A logical solution to 
the first part of this problem is, for the time being, politically unrealistic, as it would mean 
Britain having to implement legislative devolution all around, giving England or the 
English regions their own assemblies or parliaments. Even if the regional assemblies were 
to be strengthened, legislative powers would be a large (and uncalled for) step. As 
Westminster is responsible for reserved matters, and taxation for Scotland and Wales is 
decided by Westminster by the present Act, severely reducing the number of the Scottish 
and Welsh MPs has been strongly opposed. 
The suggestion of limiting the number of seats when a region achieves its own 
parliament or assembly has also been an issue in its own right, as Scotland for some time 
was overrepresented in Parliament to varying degrees. By the 1707 Act of Union, Scotland 
was allowed 45 seats in a 558-seat Parliament. At the time this was fewer than a strict 
population-based allocation would have provided for, but this was of rather less 
importance than it would have been in more modern democratic times as the powers of the 
House of Commons were limited. This under-representation diminished throughout the 
eighteenth century due to changes in the relative populations of Wales, England and 
Scotland, and was further reduced by the Union with Ireland in 1801, when Ireland was 
granted only 100 of 658 seats. By 1918 Scotland’s share of seats and electorate in the UK 
was almost equal.111  
The Speaker’s Conference in 1944 led to the institutionalisation of the ‘over-
representation’ of Scotland and Wales within the modern boundary review system. This 
also led to the myth that the Act of Union guaranteed Scotland over-representation. The 
historian Ian McLean concluded in a survey that the over-representation of Scotland and 
Wales did not arise from considerations of principle, but from the bargained compromises 
of 1944, which then were hammered into the legislation governing the allocation of 
seats.112 During the devolution debate of both the 1970s and the 1990s, a minimum 
demand was that Scotland’s share of seats should be fixed according to its proportion of 
the electorate. In the mid-1990s, this would mean 57-59 seats instead of the 72 seats 
Scotland held at the time. As one of the major political parties has tended to hold a rather 
large majority of the Scottish seats, this is not only a theoretical constitutional issue, but 
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one which could have a large impact on the formation of a majority in the House of 
Commons.  
 What largely determine the degree of autonomy for the devolved administrations 
are the financial agreements that are reached. The most common alternatives debated are 
full revenue-raising powers with a portion transferred to Westminster to cover the expense 
of reserved functions, limited revenue-raising powers on top of a block grant, or only a 
block grant from Westminster. By which formula such a block grant should be worked out 
has also been an open question. The economic relationship between the devolved 
institutions and the local authorities has also been much discussed.  
 The checking of powers (vires) is a difficult issue, for which several solutions have 
been suggested. There is a general agreement that provisions are necessary to ensure that 
the new assemblies/parliaments do not overstep their powers, but by whom this should be 
done and when and in what way has been fiercely debated. The Scottish Secretary, the 
relevant Secretary of State depending on the matter, the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council and the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords have all been cast in this role.  
 Which electoral system to choose has also been a topic for debate, with suggestions 
reaching from the Westminster model of single member constituencies, via the single-
transferable vote system, the additional member system, to full proportional representation 
with party lists in large regional constituencies. As different political parties would benefit 
from the various models, this has always been a difficult issue to settle.   
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5. THE PARLIAMENT YEARS 
 
 
Devolution is a boring word, a boring and soporific subject so far as 
legislation is concerned, but potentially a most powerful means of achieving 
one of the highest aims of democracy, bringing the process of decision-
making as close as possible to the people affected by it.113  
 
A Change of Venue 
 
As seen in chapter 3, the Labour Party had committed itself to devolution, fought an 
election on the issue and issued a manifesto committed to it. Now that the policy actually 
had to be implemented, the discussion moved to Parliament and to the Parliamentary 
Labour Party. At the same time, however, the anti-devolutionists began to emerge as a 
distinct group amongst the Scottish Labour MPs, with Tam Dalyell, Willie Hamilton and 
Peter Doig as their most vocal representatives. To counter them there were also some 
enthusiastic supporters of devolution, such as Jim Sillars, John Robertson, John Macintosh 
and David Lambie. Two strong devolutionists were included in the Government: Alex 
Eadie as Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Energy, and Harry Ewing who was appointed 
the following year as Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Scottish Office, with 
responsibility for the devolution issue. John Smith, who was later to become leader of the 
Party, had argued against Scottish devolution in the early 1970s. Having later changed his 
mind he came to be the Minister charged with devolution between 1976 and 1978. Several 
Scottish Labour MPs remained uncertain about the issue and did not reach a conclusion 
until they were forced to do so much later in the process. This chapter will examine the 
attempt to legislate for devolution through two Bills, concentrating on the debate and 
disagreements within the different sections of the Labour Party, and on the effects it had on 
the final Scotland Act.  
 
The 1974-1979 Parliaments 
 
To understand what happened in this critical period, it is necessary to take a closer look at 
the relations of power between the different participants in the House of Commons. The 
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February 1974 election saw the return of 301 Labour MPs in a 635-member House of 
Commons. This meant that the combination of opposition parties was sufficient to deny the 
Government a majority. In the course of the two months it lasted before the House rose, the 
Government suffered no less than seventeen defeats.114 As a comparison, the Conservative 
Heath Government from 1970-1974 only experienced six defeats. In parts of the 1974-
1979 period the Government depended heavily on support from the SNP and Plaid Cymru. 
The SNP had debated devolution long and hard and while some sections of the party were 
still highly sceptical of devolution, fearing it would work the way Labour intended it to and 
stem the nationalist tide, the official view was that devolution was to be supported as the 
first step towards independence. Despite the fact that the Government was returned in 
October 1974 with a very small majority, which was then lost in April 1976, it was one of 
the longer Parliaments in the post-war era. During this period the Government suffered 
more defeats than any government in modern British history.  
When the Government was returned in October it was with an overall majority of 
three, but its majority over the Conservatives was 42. On many measures, the Government 
could count on the support of the 13 Liberals and the 14 Celtic nationalists. Thus, the 
majority was under threat only when the opposition parties combined, and were able to 
ensure a full turnout of their members. From March 1977 to May 1978, the “Lib-Lab” pact 
signified that the Government were assured the support of the Liberals in any vote of 
confidence, but this did not imply that they had their support in all votes that took place in 
the House. In spite of this vulnerability in numbers, only 19 of the 42 defeats suffered by 
the Government happened because the opposition parties combined against it.115 The rest 
were because of Labour back-benchers voting against their own government. The left-wing 
Labour MPs were vocal, organised (in the Tribune Group, named after the weekly 
newspaper), often embarrassing the Government, but seldom defeating it. Of the 27 MPs 
who cast 70 or more dissenting votes, all were members of the Tribune Group. But as their 
votes against the Government rarely coincided with Conservative votes against it, their 
bark was worse than their bite. Of the 23 defeats suffered by the Government as a result of 
Labour MPs entering the opposition lobby, only six can be attributed to the Tribune Group 
MPs. The effective bites came from Labour MPs from different wings of the Party joining 
forces with the opposition. During the 1974-79 Parliament, the Parliamentary Labour Party 
was split on a number of issues, of which the two most persistent were the European 
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Community and devolution. When it came to devolution, both the main parties were split. 
The official Conservative stand was against the devolution Bills, and there were more 
dissidents on the Labour benches than on the Opposition benches. Throughout the 1974-
1979 Parliament, the number of divisions where Labour backbenchers went into the 
opposition lobby increased by each session, from 14.5 per cent in 1974-75 to an 
unprecedented 45 per cent in the final 1978-79 session.116 This was the greatest level of 
intra-party dissent in post-war history. In spite of this precarious position, the Government 
was able to carry all but 42 of approximately 1,500 votes held during the course of the 
five-session Parliament.117 One result of the small majority (which eventually became a 
minority) was that both the Prime Minister and his ministers spent a lot of time in the 
House, and this made it possible for them to meet back-benchers and adjust policies 
somewhat according to their worries, something which was done to a rather large extent 
with the devolution Bills.  
 
Inside the Cabinet 
 
In the Cabinet, opposition to devolution surfaced as English ministers gradually came to 
realise what actually had been promised.118 Harold Wilson argued that the Government 
was bound by the previous White Papers, but extensive general discussions within the 
Ministerial Steering Committee on Devolution gave ample room for the doubters and 
opponents of the scheme to consider the matter further. Among the doubters, who at the 
very least were sceptical of giving the Assembly significant economic or industrial powers, 
were Roy Jenkins (Home Secretary), Reginald Prentice, Shirley Williams, Eric Varley and 
the Lord Chancellor Lord Elwyn-Jones. Tony Benn argued against devolution from his 
leftist position, maintaining that the drive for devolution was about a collapse of 
confidence in the English political establishment. He doubted the unions really wanted 
devolution, as he believed it would destroy the centralized union movement, and is 
reported to have said in January 1975 that “industrial democracy brings power far nearer to 
where people are than any talking shop in Edinburgh for the SNP”.119 In June the same 
year he argued that although the new White Paper should be presented, a change of such 
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significance should not be carried through without specific endorsement from the 
people.120 Barbara Castle felt that “if devolution was inevitable we had better relax and at 
least look as if we enjoyed it.”121 Her view was shared by many of her Cabinet colleagues: 
devolution was inescapable, but should not be carried too far. In September 1975 she 
reported in her diary that the anti-devolution minority in the Cabinet seemed stubbornly 
determined to fight against devolution to the bitter end. A last-minute anonymous 
document marked ‘confidential’ was circulated to the Ministerial Committee on 
Devolution before their meeting on 10 September 1975, warning that a large-scale 
devolution of powers to Scotland would make it impossible to retain the full number of 
Scottish MPs at Westminster, and that the Tories would abolish Scottish seats thus 
jeopardizing the prospects for a future Labour government. Instead the document proposed 
much reduced legislative powers to both Wales and Scotland. The Cabinet debate went 
back and forth, with renewed protests and arguments at every junction. The process went 
so slowly that Ted Short, who had drafted the first White Paper and was an ardent 
supporter of devolution, in October 1975 went as far as threatening to leave the 
Government if legislation was not introduced within that parliamentary session.122 All the 
delays meant that the next White Paper did not appear until November 1975.  
 
Labour outside Parliament 
 
On the subject of devolution, not everything in this period can be described as an uphill 
battle. A ‘neo-nationalist’ element also developed in the Party, with long-time supporters 
of devolution joining the increasingly nationalist group summoned around the Ayrside MP 
Jim Sillars. This group started to push for a more far-reaching commitment, including 
economic powers for the Assembly, and were soon joined by sections of the trade union 
movement. At the Scottish Conference in 1975 the TGWU tabled a motion calling for 
economic and revenue-raising powers. This motion was opposed by the Executive, and 
subsequently rejected, but only by 353,000 to 341,000 votes.123 As some of the unions 
were clearly in favour of the motion, the Executive must have found their support in the 
local constituencies. The Scottish Executive continued to be sceptical of devolution for 
                                                 
120 Ibid., 419. 
121 Ibid., 173. 
122 Ibid., 538. 
123 Bleiman and Keating, Labour and Scottish Nationalism, 179. 
 42
some time yet. According to Frances Wood they sent a letter in January 1975 to Ted Short, 
head of the devolutionary Constitution Unit, “in some dismay at the speed with which the 
Government appear to be moving towards greater devolution”.124 The letter also warned 
against tax-raising powers and Assembly control of the Scottish Development Board. The 
Labour Party continued its decline in opinion polls and local elections throughout 1975-77. 
To keep arguing for more administrative devolution must have been hard when in 1975 48 
per cent of the Scottish electorate thought the answer was ‘no’ to the question: “Is there a 
special office or organisation which helps to run Scotland?”125
As the challenge predominantly came from the SNP and later from the break-out 
Scottish Labour Party (see p.48), no-one dared to fundamentally rethink the devolution 
commitment, although it must have been tempting as opposition grew within Parliamentary 
Labour. Instead opposition in the Scottish Council decreased, membership of its Executive 
changed, and at the 1976 Scottish Conference the Executive Committee had come far 
enough to propose a resolution calling for revenue powers for the Assembly and the 
removal of the Secretary of State’s veto, and the Conference swung behind those demands. 
Within two years the Scottish Executive had moved from being ardent opponents to 
pushing for a more extensive devolution of power.  
A 1976 leaflet issued by the SCLP was rather defensive, and evidently written to 
meet internal Labour criticism. It carried the bold subtitle The whole of the Labour 
Movement in Scotland is giving overwhelming support to the Government’s Bill for a 
Scottish Assembly, and was co-written by the SCLP and the STUC. In the opening 
paragraph by James Milne, the General Secretary of the STUC, it was made clear that “it is 
certainly not true, as some assert, that devolution has become an issue for the Labour and 
Trade Union Movement only since the appearance of the Scottish National Party”.126 This 
notion was repeated later, when it was argued that as polls, elections and canvassing of 
views had shown deep dissatisfaction with the present system, it was the duty of the 
Labour Party to do something about this, and that “to respond and react to this mood is not 
expediency nor is it political retreat”.127 It was also emphasised that devolution was the 
only way to “silence the clamour for separation”128, and that this was nothing more than a 
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logical continuation of the administrative devolution which had been going on for 
centuries. The Labour Movement claimed to be “speaking with one voice for the vast 
majority of Scots”, so there should be no doubt about their mandate. Although it was a 
leaflet aimed at the general public in Scotland, it seems to be directed also at Labour Party 
voters, members and groups in England. In the “message from the Party” signed by the 
chairman of the Scottish Executive and the Scottish Secretary, it was reasserted that the 
Government’s proposals were firmly within the essential framework of the political and 
economic unity of the UK, and also stressed that the Labour Party in Scotland “would 
never endorse any form of devolution that carried the least danger politically, socially or 
economically to the rest of Britain”.129 This line of thought was drawn further when the 
reader was assured two pages later that what the Assembly “will not do, and what the 
Labour Party has made sure it will not do, is provide Scotland with any economic 
advantages over other parts of Britain”.130
In spite of the impression given by this pamphlet, there was still some evidence of 
unrest in the STUC. In June 1976 the Scotsman reported that “the long-awaited backlash of 
English trade unionists against Scottish and Welsh devolution” had emerged.131 The 
Annual Conference of the building workers’ union, UCATT, rejected by 113 votes to 91 a 
resolution supporting the establishment of Scottish and Welsh assemblies as proposed in 
the Labour Party manifesto. Within that vote, the Scottish delegates voted 20-6 in favour. 
The Labour MP Eric Heffer, who was sponsored by UCATT, certainly did not mince his 
words when he warned the Conference that “devolution can mean the beginning of the end 
of the United Kingdom and of this working class movement”. He also expressed his wish 
that there should be a socialist Britain covering the whole of the United Kingdom, 
something which devolution would make impossible.132 At a Glasgow meeting of the 
‘Scotland is British’ campaign in February 1977, it was claimed that leading Scots trade 
unionists were being barred by union policies from coming out into the open against 
devolution.133
The all-party ‘Scotland is British’ campaign had been formed in September 1976, 
and formally launched on 23 November the same year. From Labour, it mainly attracted 
people from the right wing of the party, such as George Lawson, the former MP for the 
                                                 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid. 
131 John Tilley: “Builders reject devolution” in Scotsman 5 June 1976. 
132 Ibid. 
133 Easton, John: “Devolution gag on Union Leaders” in Glasgow Herald 3 February 1977. 
 44
Scottish constituency Motherwell, Tam Dalyell and Danny Crawford of the UCATT. The 
campaign was largely funded by industrialists, and therefore gave the impression of being 
rather close to the Scottish Conservative establishment.134  
 
The 1975 White Paper 
 
At the opening of the 1975/76 session in November 1975 the Queen promised that her 
Government would bring forward legislative proposals for establishing Scottish and Welsh 
Assemblies. To the pro-devolutionists this was a disappointing statement, as it implied that 
the Government did not plan to get the measures through Parliament in the upcoming 
session. Instead, new discussions would take place while the Government continued 
working on a Bill. The new White Paper on devolution, Our Changing Democracy – 
Devolution to Scotland and Wales, was presented to Parliament later in November. It was 
what Bogdanor has aptly described as a minimalist conception of devolution.135 The White 
Paper was criticised in pro-devolutionary circles in Scotland for its negative tone, 
grudgingly giving away as little devolution as possible in the current context. A dry 
document, it gave more space to details than to the larger and more fundamental questions. 
It proposed a single-chamber Scottish Assembly with 142 members, two for each of the 
Parliamentary constituencies, elected for a fixed term of four years. Dual membership of 
the Westminster Parliament and the Scottish Assembly was not ruled out. On revenue-
raising powers, the Government proposed that the Assembly should be allowed to make a 
surcharge on local taxation, but apart from that there would be a block grant.136 The 
Secretary of State for Scotland’s role was comprehensive, as he or she would enjoy the 
constitutional role of a monarch in appointing the Chief Executive and the cabinet of the 
Scottish administration and in ratifying Scottish legislation. In addition the Secretary 
would retain powerful political functions, being able to veto Scottish legislation considered 
to be ultra vires but also intra vires on “policy grounds”. 137 The Secretary of State would 
then return the Bill to the Assembly. Social work services were to be devolved, but not the 
social security system as such. Schools would be devolved, but not responsibility for the 
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universities. The industrial functions of the Scottish Development Agency were not to be 
devolved, but most other functions were.138 After five days’ debate the House took note of 
the White Paper by 295 votes to 37, a solid majority, but leaving a large number of 
abstainers.139  
There was little enthusiasm about the White Paper to be found in the public. A 
Systems Three poll published in the Glasgow Herald on 19 January 1976 showed that of 
those who were dissatisfied with the White Paper (48 per cent of those surveyed), no less 
than 92 per cent wanted more powers for the Assembly.140 Even Labour’s Scottish 
Executive regarded the measures proposed as inadequate, and as mentioned previously (see 
p.43) it tabled a resolution to the 1976 Scottish Conference calling for revenue-raising 
powers, the removal of the Secretary of State’s veto and devolution of the Scottish 
Development Agency. This reversal of the 1974 roles reflected public opinion in Scotland, 
which now was increasingly in favour of devolution. By 1977, even the Trotskyite left-
wing group ‘Militant’ had changed its mind and did now endorse devolution. Discontent in 
the pro-devolutionist wing of Scottish Labour is an issue which will be further dealt with 
below (see p.48), but the anti-devolutionists were not happy with the White Paper either. In 
the adjournment debate on devolution in February 1975, Neil Kinnock argued in the 
centralist, socialist tradition of his party, asserting that the aims of the class he represented 
could “best be achieved in a single nation and in a single economic unit”.141  
Norman Buchan, Robin Cook and Denis Canavan, all Scottish MPs and Tribune 
Group members, issued a statement which accepted devolution, but also stated that “this is 
no time to create a division of the working class movement in Scotland. We must unite to 
fight those whose real aim is to break up the UK and with it the British Labour 
Movement”.142 Eric Heffer argued along the same lines, believing that the most important 
thing was not whether or not there would be devolution, but whether there would be a 
disunited Britain. However, more sceptical of devolution than his three colleagues 
mentioned above, he also thought it was about time English MPs woke up and realised 
what damage could be done to the UK as a whole.143  
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The Parliamentary Labour Party did not debate devolution until after the 1975 
White Paper had been published. The Scottish and Welsh groups had discussed devolution, 
but that meant that English Members were unable to take part in the discussion, as George 
Cunningham complained at a meeting.144 When they finally got around to putting it on the 
agenda in December 1975, the English MPs voiced their criticism and reservations towards 
the issue. Cunningham believed the White Paper represented the most the Government 
would stand and the least they could get away with.145 Eric Heffer protested that the social 
conditions were as bad in England as anywhere in Scotland, but no-one in England felt 
regional assemblies would solve these problems.146  
The unions also suffered from an English backlash to the proposed plans for a 
Scottish Assembly.147 According to Bleiman and Keating, there is a certain irony in this, as 
it may have contributed to convince some Scottish union leaders that it was necessary to 
have political institutions capable of defending Scotland’s interests, and including 
economic powers granted to a possible Assembly. The STUC felt that a Scottish Assembly 
with such powers could enhance their status, so the response to the White Paper was to 
welcome the commitment to devolution and reaffirm their commitment to the economic 
unity of the United Kingdom, but at the same time regret the absence of economic or 
revenue-raising powers.148   
In an attempt to meet the criticism, a new White Paper was published in August 
1976: Devolution to Scotland and Wales – Supplementary Statement. This document 
offered further elaborations on many disputed issues, and also included some changes of 
view in an attempt to placate both sides. One of the most important changes was a decision 
not to pursue the idea of devolving any revenue-raising powers, so that finance was 
restricted to the provision of central government block grants.149.Instead of the Secretary 
of State inviting a prospective Chief Executive to form an executive, the Government now 
proposed that it should be entirely for the Assembly to decide who was to be the Chief 
Executive.150 Another important point made was that the Scottish Assembly would be 
given legislative powers in the whole field of Scottish private law. The new statement also 
reduced the role of the Secretary of State further, and proposed to completely devolve the 
                                                 
144 Minutes, Parliamentary Labour Party meeting 23 October 1975.  
145 Minutes, Parliamentary Labour Party meeting 3 December 1975. 
146 Minutes, Parliamentary Labour Party meeting 2 December 1975. 
147 Bleiman and Keating, Labour and Scottish Nationalism, 184-85. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Great Britain Privy Council, "Devolution to Scotland and Wales. Supplementary Statement,"  (Her 
Majesty's Stationary Office, 1976), 3. 
150 Ibid., 2. 
 47
Scottish Development Agency. These concessions meant that the Government had gone 
further on devolution than its manifesto promise, a fact which led to unrest in the 
Parliamentary Labour Party. Six MPs warned Michael Foot against imposing a guillotine 
on the Bill. Another two MPs declared that while they could support the forthcoming Bill, 
this was the absolute limit to what they were willing to yield. As Lord President of the 
Council and Minister in charge of devolution, Ted Short issued a stern warning to the anti-
devolutionist Labour MPs in March 1975: “If we do not act responsibly now then there 
will be a separate Scottish state in ten year’s time”.151 Harry Ewing (Scottish Under-
Secretary with responsibility for devolution) backed him up in rejecting fears that any 
transfer of legislative control from Westminster would be the first step on a slippery slope 
to the break-up of the UK: “It is my view that given meaningful devolution our people will 
say ‘That far and nor farther’”.152
 
The SLP Split 
 
The result of the 1975 referendum on continued British membership in the EEC had 
disappointed many in Labour and in the trade unions. Some of the members in Scotland 
then seem to have converted their anti-EEC position into one favouring independent 
Scottish representation in Brussels. Jim Sillars was in this category. He continued to push 
for a more powerful Scottish Assembly from his position as member of the Scottish 
Executive, but was severely disappointed when his faction lost the motion which would 
have given the Assembly power over the Scottish Development Agency at the 1975 
Scottish Conference. Because of the decline of the Labour Party in opinion polls, there was 
a nervous feeling that the Party was heading towards a collapse, and that a new 
combination of socialism and nationalism therefore was needed. Sillars felt let down by the 
opposition to Scottish devolution found among the left-wing English Labour MPs, and 
attempted in November 1975 to get Eric Heffer to issue a press statement in Scotland 
explaining that he was a supporter and not an opponent of devolution.153 The negative and 
grudging tone of the White Paper issued in November 1975 was the final straw, whereupon 
Sillars and the group around him broke out and founded the Scottish Labour Party (SLP). 
Alex Neil, the party’s Scottish Research Officer, and the MP John Robertson were 
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amongst the people who joined Sillars. The name was taken from the party originally 
formed by Keir Hardie in 1888. The Scottish Council of the Labour Party was furious and 
quickly ruined Sillars’ hopes of dual membership with the British Labour Party.154 William 
Ross himself consigned the SLP rebels to “a special hell”.155 The new party was 
announced just before Christmas in December 1975, but not formally launched until 
January the next year. Membership, which at its high point reached 900, was mainly drawn 
from the working class and students, with a number of middle-class intellectuals also 
supporting the party. Among the active members was Tom Nairn, who has since authored 
several seminal books on nationalism, as well as Lindsay Paterson, who was later to 
become a prominent social scientist.156 Some people who had previously defected from 
Labour to the SNP now joined the SLP.  
The party’s policies on several issues were – not surprisingly - to the left of 
mainstream Labour policies: worker control over the private sector of industry, all land to 
be automatically transferred to public ownership etc. According to the party secretary, the 
SLP was “not in favour of outright independence… but seeking maximum devolution 
followed by independence in a European context”.157 When it was rumoured that the 
coming referendum might offer three alternatives (status quo, devolution, independence) it 
was argued within the party that they should vote for “independence” for purely tactical 
reasons. It was hoped that a ‘yes’ to a suitable third option would give the Scottish people a 
strong bargaining position without it necessarily leading to complete independence.158 The 
SLP’s existence was somewhat of a political gamble; in a future with a Scottish Assembly 
the party could come to play an important role, so in the Party’s Policy papers it was 
assumed that such an Assembly would become reality.159 Perhaps the most important role 
it played was as a pro-devolution challenge to Labour, keeping it from reneging on its 
promises, and also as a left-wing opposition to radical opponents of devolution, such as 
Heffer and Cook.  
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 Changes Within Labour 
 
In April 1976 Harold Wilson resigned as Prime Minister, and James Callaghan was 
appointed as his successor. William Ross joined Wilson in retirement and was replaced as 
Secretary of State by his deputy, Bruce Millan. Until 1976 there had been a parliamentary 
majority of three, this was later reduced to two, and soon after Callaghan took over John 
Stonehouse decided to sit as an Independent. In addition they lost the two MPs who 
defected to the SLP. According to Callaghan, "the ride became even more bumpy as 
Labour Members tumbled to the fact that they too could threaten to abstain or vote against 
their Government unless they got their way."160
Callaghan writes in his memoirs that the broad outline of the Government's policy 
on major issues such as devolution had been settled before his arrival.161 A late convert to 
the cause, Callaghan insisted that devolution was not a break with policy, but a natural 
consequence of the primarily administrative devolution Scotland already had enjoyed, and 
also of the process that had commenced in the 1960s. In May 1976 Callaghan wrote to the 
retired Labour MP George Lawson that: 
  
…our proposals are not, as your letter implies, merely a political 
manoeuvre. They are the latest stage of the process started when we 
appointed the Kilbrandon Commission in 1969. The Commission rejected 
separatism and we agree with that. The Commission also recommended 
devolution. We agree with that, too, and are trying to bring it about by a 
considered and sensible approach which recognises the inadequacies of the 
status quo while firmly rejecting the extreme nationalist position.162  
 
When, in his memoirs, Callaghan later claimed that the devolution promise was made 
already in the February manifesto, and thus created the impression that this was what 
Labour had intended all along, it is difficult to say whether this was merely a slip of the 
tongue or a deliberate attempt to re-write or falsify history, but whatever the truth may be it 
fits nicely with the line of argument he applied throughout the debate.   
Devolution had not been deemed important enough to take up time at the annual 
Labour Party Conferences of 1974 and 1975, and this had resulted in criticism from the 
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anti-devolutionists, especially from Eric Heffer who valued party democracy highly.163 In 
spite of the 1976 Labour Conference being the first discussion of devolution involving the 
entire party since 1968, it allocated only 52 minutes to the issue. There were two opposing 
Composite Resolutions, but apart from one delegate to move and one to second each 
resolution, and Michael Foot to sum up the debate, there was only time to hear three 
speakers from the floor. Neil Kinnock spoke fervently against devolution, together with the 
delegate from Blaydon Constituency Labour Party who commented “it seems to me that 
eleven SNP MPs sometimes have more influence than the whole of the Northern Labour 
Group”.164 Michael Foot attempted to prolong the myth of uninterrupted Labour support 
for devolution by invoking the ghost of Keir Hardie in his reply to Neil Kinnock’s charge 
of the Government’s “indecent haste”: “He [Hardie] would have asked us why we had not 
got on with it before.”165 In spite of several of the unions withdrawing their support, the 
Conference carried a pro-devolution resolution. This important event disarmed left-wing 
opponents of devolution, who were accustomed to upholding the sanctity of conference 
decisions. Opposition to devolution remained in the Party, but in the next couple of years 
the opponents concentrated on limiting the powers of the Assembly, as the time had now 
come for proposing legislation.  
 
The Scotland and Wales Bill 
 
In the Queen’s Speech in 1976 the Callaghan Government finally announced its intention 
to legislate in the coming session. The Cabinet Official Committee on Devolution had 
considered introducing the Bill either in November 1975, January 1976 or November 1976, 
but had concluded that only the last option would allow for solving all the practical 
problems in advance, so they would not have to be dealt with after the assemblies had 
come into being.166 Thus, on 23 November 1976 the Scotland and Wales Bill appeared. It 
is clear from a note written to the Ministerial Committee on Devolution that Ted Short 
initially believed they could get the Bill through on the first attempt, although it might 
become necessary to divide it into two separate Bills.167  
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Margaret Thatcher had been elected as leader of the Conservative Party the 
previous year, and unlike her predecessor she strongly rejected Labour’s devolution plans. 
On 8 December the Shadow Cabinet decided to oppose the Second Reading of the Bill, 
something which led to the resignation of Shadow Secretary of State for Scotland Alick 
Buchanan-Smith and Shadow Scottish Office spokesman Malcolm Rifkind. Mrs Thatcher 
issued a three-line whip against the principle of the Scotland and Wales Bill, but only five 
of her 16 Scottish MPs chose to obey it. The Scotsman greeted the Bill with the headline 
“Assembly in a straitjacket”.168 The public mood should have been an incentive to 
legislate; according to an opinion poll from December 1976, 22 per cent of the Scottish 
electorate opted for a ‘completely independent Scottish Parliament separate from England’, 
52 per cent for a ‘Scottish Assembly as part of Britain, but with substantial powers’, and 
only 20 per cent said they preferred ‘no change from the present system’.169 However, this 
enthusiasm for devolution had not spread to the Parliamentary Labour Party.  
 
Opposition From Within the Party 
 
Already in the summer of 1976 an article in the Scotsman referred to a “growing anti-
Assembly backlash among Labour MPs”.170 On 16 November anti-devolution Labour MPs 
met at Westminster and issued a threat to kill the devolution Bill unless a referendum on its 
Assembly proposals and on independence was held almost immediately. Without such a 
guarantee written into the Bill, there could be more than 35 Labour MPs who would rebel 
by voting against its Second Reading, Neil Kinnock stated. He tabled a Commons motion 
signed by 76 anti-devolution Labour MPs calling for a referendum “before proceeding with 
the Bill”.171
The main criticisms of the Bill was that it went further than there seemed to be 
public demand for, especially in Wales, that the combined Bill for Scotland and Wales 
confused and delayed legislation, and that the degree of power-transfer was insufficient 
and would generate more dissatisfaction with Westminster and lead to a possible break-up 
of the Kingdom. Election to the new assemblies should be by proportional representation, 
and there would be conflict in the fields shared between the assemblies and the 
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Westminster Parliament. Especially among the Scottish MPs there was also the fear of a 
reduction in the number of Scottish seats, at least in accordance with the present share of 
population, from 71 to 57.  
From the Labour backbenches one could repeatedly and consistently hear the 
argument that devolution would pose a threat to socialist unity, and the relationship 
between for instance Glasgow and Liverpool was believed to be closer than between the 
industrial belt north of the border and the Highlands and Islands of Scotland. The 
Liverpool MP Eric Heffer later wrote in his memoirs that his opposition rose out of his 
understanding of international socialism, inspired by Rosa Luxemburg and the Austro-
Marxists. Like them, he dreamed of an empire being transformed into a socialist unified 
state, and he consequently feared that devolution for Scotland and Wales would weaken 
Britain as a united economic unit and be detrimental to socialism in the UK as a whole.172  
Faced with significant internal opposition, the Government repeatedly tried to 
counter it with the argument which they assumed would appeal to the left wing, that 
devolution was all about democracy and bringing decisions closer to the people, or in 
Wilson’s words: “Democracy must be more than a periodic exercise in head counting. It 
must provide for the involvement of individuals in all decision-making processes”.173 
During the Second Reading of the Scotland and Wales Bill, Tam Dalyell argued that this 
was a misapprehension that needed to be cleared up, as the Bill would not make 
government more local. Instead, it would centralise it in Edinburgh.174 As became evident 
later, this was a way of looking at the issue shared by a large number of Labour activists 
and local councillors.  
 
The Bill Came Tumbling Down 
 
The Bill’s opponents in all parties used every delaying tactic available to prevent its 
completion. After an extremely lengthy debate the principle of the Scotland and Wales Bill 
was approved by 292 votes to 247 on 16 December. Uncertain of the result of the vote, the 
Government included a concession to a referendum on the last day of the Second Reading. 
In earlier statements to the Commons, Michael Foot had refused to hold a referendum on 
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the grounds that as devolution was a manifesto commitment, the Government had a 
mandate to carry it through. After pressure from the Labour opponents, John Smith 
introduced an amendment to enter a referendum into the Bill. During the devolution debate 
at the 1976 Labour Conference, the demand for a referendum had been linked to the 
opponents of devolution, and it was therefore clear to all that this amendment represented 
an important concession to this group.175 For the Government to put forward such a change 
to a Bill to be debated as late as at the Committee stage, was entirely without precedent and 
caused great uproar in the House.176 A meeting of the Parliamentary Labour Party was 
called to enable Members to express their views to the Government on the referenda. 
Several Members were in favour of posing two or three questions, allowing the electorate 
to choose between devolution, status quo and independence. One of the Members informed 
the group that he had abstained on the Second Hearing and would have voted against the 
Bill had the Government’s assurance on the holding of a referendum not been given, 
emphasising that this was not a promise to shrink away from. Several Members wanted the 
English electorate to be able to vote as well, as this was an issue of importance for the 
whole kingdom.177  
While the Government held a Commons majority of 45 on the principle of the Bill, 
the considerable cross-party voting was particularly striking. Amongst the Labour 
members 30 abstained and ten voted with the Conservatives, Tam Dalyell the only Scot 
amongst them.178 According to Dalyell, many of the votes in favour of the Bill were given 
under the explicit understanding that the MPs did so because they thought it wrong to deny 
the proposals a hearing, not because they supported them as such.179 This can, to some 
extent, explain what followed. On 22 February 1977 the Government tabled a Guillotine 
Motion. A Guillotine Motion, properly called an Allocation of Time Motion, limits the 
time the House can spend on a Bill by proposing a timetable for the various stages. The 
Second Reading had resulted in the discussion of only three of the Bill’s 115 clauses, and it 
was considered likely it would simply be filibustered to death. The timetable would have 
allowed a total of 35 days for the Bill’s consideration, of which 15 had already been spent. 
The SNP voted in favour of the Guillotine Motion, but this was not sufficient. The motion 
was defeated by 312 to 283 votes, the 312 including 22 Labour MPs who had entered the 
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Opposition lobby, along with the Conservatives and most of the Liberals. In addition, 
approximately 20 Labour MPs abstained. Of the Labour rebels, only Tam Dalyell and 
Willie Hamilton were Scottish; two were Welsh; and the rest were English. Upon the 
failure of the Guillotine Motion, the Scotsman wrote “The Bill was…backed by two-thirds 
of the Scottish MPs but this handsome majority was nullified by the votes of English MPs 
who have, in effect, exercised a veto on devolution”.180  
 
Reactions to the Fall 
 
The defeat of the motion and subsequently the Bill could not have represented a great 
surprise to the Government; as early as June the previous year Dalyell had collected the 
signature of seventy Labour MPs who warned the Government that in the event of their 
introducing a Guillotine Motion on the Scotland and Wales Bill, they could not any longer 
rely on these seventy members’ support.181 The attitude amongst other Labour MPs was 
described as one of resigned acceptance.182 Callaghan later commented dryly in his 
memoirs that he never succeeded in getting any “left-wing purist” to explain why he 
should have a dispensation to ignore conference decisions while he denied the Government 
the right to ever do so.183 Dalyell felt that the criticism levelled at the 43 Labour dissenters 
was more concerned with the fact that they had put the future of the Labour Government in 
jeopardy than with the merits of the Bill itself. 184 Two Parliamentary Private Secretaries, 
who had voted against the Bill, were sacked for their disloyalty.185
Surprisingly enough, the SNP did not organise protest demonstrations in the days 
that followed, but there were several angry reactions in the press and in Parliament. The 
SNP MP George Reid argued that while many MPs passionately protested that it was 
entirely indefensible and unacceptable to bring in the guillotine on a Bill of that nature, 
what happened was no better: he asked “is the filibuster, then, a more acceptable element 
of the parliamentary process?” To prove his case he made a reference to Tam Dalyell, who 
had announced in his initial remarks at the very first sitting that he was “not seeking in any 
way to filibuster” and he consistently repeated this pious intention over successive days 
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and nights of the debate. “But in all conscience, how can this be squared with the fact that 
by 2 February he had already made no less than 10 lengthy speeches and 107 interventions, 
and raised 14 points of order?”186
The SNP soon withdrew its support from the Labour Government, but Labour was 
saved by the ‘Lib-Lab’ pact with the Liberal Party, agreed on 24 March. The Liberal leader 
David Steel wanted the Devolution Bill to be put to the House once more, subject to 
certain changes. As there would not be enough time to get the Bill through all its stages 
before the House rose at the end of July, Callaghan and Steele agreed that it should be re-
introduced at the beginning of the following session in November 1977. Extensive and 
detailed negotiations with the Liberals were undertaken by John Smith, who had assisted 
Michael Foot in the aforementioned Bill.  
The anti-devolutionist part of the party increased their attempts at organising, but 
the distribution of ‘Scotland is British’ literature on the Scottish Conference in March 1976 
led some of the delegates to walk out. In a letter to “supporters” dated May 1977, George 
Lawson wrote that although the first Bill was defeated, the campaign “must none the less 
remain strongly in evidence in Scotland, not only to provide a rallying point for opponents 
of nationalism, but to convince Parliament that opposition is as fierce as ever to any 
attempt to impose a separate legislative Assembly on Scotland”.187 As for the response 
from the Scottish people, it is possible to interpret the District Council elections in May as 
a popular reaction to the fall of the Bill; the SNP gained 107 seats, Labour lost 129 seats, 
and even lost control of Glasgow.188
 
The Scotland Bill 
 
As previously agreed upon by Labour and the Liberal Party, the new Bill appeared in the 
beginning of November 1977. In preparation for the new Bill, the Government had 
conducted talks with the Scottish and Welsh Councils of the Party, the Labour rebels, the 
Liberal Party etc. The Scottish executive pressed for separate Bills, so that opposition in 
Wales would not hinder Scottish devolution.189 This was also the wish of the Scottish 
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Trades Union Congress.190 The Welsh executive was afraid that separate Bills would mean 
the sacrifice of Wales. They believed there had already been too many compromises, 
amongst them the referendum. Both the Welsh and the Scottish executives wanted the Bill 
to be Guillotined from the beginning.191 The Scottish Executive eventually won, and 
separate Bills for Scotland and Wales were introduced. By splitting the Bill the 
Government was guaranteed the votes of some Labour rebels who had voted against the 
combined Bill because they believed that Wales did not want devolution. Guillotines were 
proposed for both Bills from early in the process, with 17 days or 91 hours allocated to the 
Scottish Bill, and the Second Reading restricted to one single day. This was made possible 
with the support of the Liberal Party, but there was also a considerable number of Labour 
dissidents who now returned to the fold. At a Parliamentary Labour Party meeting on 
17 November, a Member claimed that many of his colleagues had sacrificed their own 
personal views on this matter in order to support a vulnerable Government.192 Of the 43 
who had abstained or voted against the Guillotine Motion on the Scotland and Wales Bill, 
only 16 still withheld their support.193 The Whips had this time made the link between the 
Bill and the survival of the Government clearer to the Parliamentary Labour Party, and 
through discussions important concessions had been made, as will be discussed below. 
Thus, in the vote on the Guillotine Motion there was a majority of 26 for the Government. 
After the lengthy debates the previous winter few MPs were interested, and attendance was 
slack, even from the SNP.   
If in-house interest was lacking, the development was followed closely by George 
Lawson of the ‘Scotland is British’ campaign. Just before the introduction of the Bill he 
wrote a letter to several Labour MPs, using his role as an old colleague and party fellow to 
make a plea against supporting the Government in what he called “perpetrating upon the 
British people a measure of criminal folly from which there will be no return”.194 He 
believed that during the past few years Labour had lived on a lie, and had acted in a self-
destructive manner. He warned that should the Bill get as far as a referendum, many 
Labour supporters would regard their party with open contempt. The response he got from 
various quarters clearly showed that this was an issue which cut across left/right divides of 
the Party. In spite of Lawson being on the right wing, he got sympathetic replies from MPs 
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such as Eric Heffer, who complained of the lack of support they were receiving from the 
Scottish Executive.195 Several MPs expressed hopes of the Scottish people turning down 
the proposals, as “the whole thing has gone too far with the Prime Minister and the Cabinet 
committed, to draw back now”.196 There seemed to be a wide-spread feeling that things 
had changed too quickly, and that there now was no way back and no alternative to 
lukewarm support. The English MP John Ellis described how he, when talking to 
colleagues from Wales and Scotland, “was appalled at the changes of view-point and how 
the situation ought to be met, often from week to week”.197  
Some of this opposition was met with a number of significant changes since the last 
Bill, for instance the role of the Secretary of State was further reduced, and disputes over 
vires were to be referred to the judicial committee of the Privy Council. The Liberals had 
wanted proportional representation to be a part of the new Bill, something the Government 
would not concede on, but it did promise a free vote on the Labour side. The Liberals had 
also initially insisted on tax-raising powers, but this demand was dropped when the 
Government made it clear that they would introduce a proposal if they could only find a 
workable system, which they in the end could not do.198 This was partly prevented by the 
Treasury, and partly by the worries of MPs from Northern England who bitterly resented 
what they feared would be economic advantages to Scotland and her economic and social 
problems, disregarding their own deprived areas. Thus, the proposed Assembly was still 
without major economic or industrial functions, and it was hoped that this would make it 
easier to secure the votes of the English Labour MPs. In addition, William Miller reports 
that Northern England was “showered with aid” during 1977.199  
Another significant change from the first time around was that now the referendum 
was included from the start. The Government saw that they might not get the Second 
Reading of the Bill unless they could promise a referendum to those who believed in it, 
and they wanted to provide an excuse for erstwhile anti-devolutionists in the Labour and 
Tory parties to change their minds on the grounds that the position had changed somewhat 
now that a referendum had been promised.200 It addition, the introduction of separate Bills 
made it possible to drop Welsh devolution while securing the consent of even Welsh anti-
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devolutionists to devolution for Scotland alone. Also, a referendum allowed what James 
Naughtie describes as a “controlled schizophrenia in the Labour Party”, where some anti-
devolutionists could vote for their government in the lobbies and still reserve the right to 
campaign for a ‘no’ in the referendum campaign.201 The referendum was to be held after 
the Bill had been enacted and had to be held before the Act was brought into operation. 
During the committee stage in January it was moved that the referendum should be held in 
the whole of the United Kingdom, with several MPs, such as George Cunningham, 
suggesting that this was an absolute requirement as it affected the unity of the United 
Kingdom. The amendment was, however, not passed.   
The Secretary of State for Scotland, Bruce Millan, presented the Bill to the House 
of Commons in the Second Reading on 14 November 1977. He made it abundantly clear 
that the unity of the United Kingdom was not to be questioned, proclaiming “the 
continuing and unimpaired sovereignty of Parliament, which is what devolution is 
about”202 one of the four guiding principles the Bill was based on. He compared Britain to 
other European countries where there was a great deal more decentralisation and 
devolution of power from the centre, and argued that to give the Scottish people improved 
democratic participation would strengthen, not weaken, the unity of the United Kingdom. 
The Scottish Labour MP Norman Buchan expressed the view that while he hoped the Bill 
would not affect the unity of the United Kingdom, this could not be legislated for.203 The 
main speaker for the SNP, Gordon Wilson, did little in the way of helping the pro-
devolutionists in Labour as he started off by emphasising that his party regarded the Bill as 
a first step along the way to self-government for Scotland.204 This was of course jumped 
upon by anti-devolutionists such as Tam Dalyell, who argued that the only beneficiaries of 
the Bill would be the SNP. According to Dalyell the Bill was not a stable resting place, but 
a stepping stone, and would end with federalism or worse.205 In rounding up the Second 
Reading, John Smith spoke for the Government, and tried to rectify this impression. He 
emphasised that there were two central issues, namely the need to decentralise decision 
taking to increase democratic accountability in both Scotland and Wales, and that by doing 
this the unity of the United Kingdom would actually be strengthened instead of weakened. 
The Second Reading is usually a time for examination of the specific clauses in a Bill, but 
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the same basic arguments were repeated time and time again, the opponents arguing that 
each clause drove them back to the principle.206 Still, the Second Reading of the Bill was 
passed with a safe majority: 313 to 274 votes. 11 Labour MPs voted against, amongst them 
Cunningham, Dalyell and Mendelson.207 The Bill went on to be further debated in the 
Committee of the Full House.  
At the Committee Stage already the first clause of the Bill was fiercely contested, 
and actually defeated by a combination of Conservatives, Liberals, Ulster Unionists, 
Nationalists and Tam Dalyell. It had read that the unity of the United Kingdom and the 
supreme authority of Parliament were not impaired by the Bill, and as this was part of the 
Government’s main justification for the Bill, the loss of the clause naturally caused them 
some embarrassment. 
 
Criticism from the Left 
 
Lawson and Dalyell were at the time considered right-of-the-centre in the Labour Party, 
and the most vocal criticism in the first stages of the debate had come from this direction. 
But this was an issue which cut across traditional lines within the Party, and there existed 
different reasons for opposing the Bill. The Scottish MPs Robert Hughes and Robin Cook 
reasserted the standard left-wing position that devolution would contribute nothing to a 
positive development of the British economy, but this was not a very effective argument in 
the House. Robin Cook, who at the time was Labour MP for Edinburgh Central, had 
spoken in favour of devolution on several occasions in the House, but withdrew his support 
during the Second Reading of the Scotland Bill.208 In a letter to George Lawson dated 1 
November 1977, Robin Cook explains that he had supported the commitment to devolution 
ever since the Party agreed to give such a pledge to the electorate. However mistaken this 
commitment was in the first place, it had contributed to make devolution a central issue of 
Scottish politics. He went on: “I am bound to say that I have been forced to reconsider this 
view in the months since the failure of the guillotine motion because of the extraordinary 
lack of response among the ordinary voters”.209 This did not, however, imply that he would 
vote against the Bill in the House: “Frankly, I do not feel that I myself can now do other 
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than support the Bill, although I will again be tabling and pressing amendments on 
questions such as the referendum, representation at Westminster, and finance.”210 After a 
week of further pondering, he wrote letters both to Michael Foot, Leader of the House, and 
George Lawson, on 9 November. To Lawson he wrote: “You will see that whilst I intend 
to support the Bill through its parliamentary stages I now intend to campaign against the 
proposals in the subsequent referendum.”211 In the attached copy of the letter to Foot he 
explained that this conclusion had been reached after speaking to 300 constituents and 
having found only one who could say that he felt deeply about the survival of the Bill.212 
His argument addressing the House went along the same lines: The Labour Party in 
Scotland had not suffered when the Guillotine Motion fell, and there was little interest for 
devolution in Scotland – it was not the issue it was cracked up to be. When Sillars believed 
otherwise, it was because in his mind there was no distinction between the case for 
devolution to Scotland and the case against unemployment and urban deprivation in 
Scotland. “I have always had reservations on the matter and I am not trying to over-
dramatise my conversion (…) I was able to swallow them [the reservations] because I 
believed that there was a deep conviction in Scotland in favour of devolution. Once I lost 
that faith, my reservations loomed up much more sharply.”213 However, he repeated his 
intention to vote in favour of the Bill, because he did not want to kill the Bill but the issue, 
and he believed that this could not be done in the House of Commons, it had to be done in 
the referendum following the Bill.214  
Also speaking from the left wing of the Party, Eric Heffer argued the case against 
any advantage for Scotland at the expense of deprived areas in England. He regretted both 
that devolution was supported at the 1976 Party Conference, and that devolution was in the 
manifesto first and then only went to the conference afterwards. He admitted to have been 
defeated not once but at least three times in the NEC on this issue:  
 
I do not always like decisions that are taken, but as long as we have a 
democratic party and can fight to change those decisions, I can do so … I 
am prepared to go and to argue – if it ever gets to the referendum stage – as 
strongly as I possibly can on a Socialist basis to the Scottish working class 
movement why I think they should oppose this legislation being put into 
                                                 
210 Ibid.  
211 Robin Cook to George Lawson 9 November 1977.  
212 Robin Cook to Michael Foot 9 November 1977. 
213 HC Deb, 14 November 1977 vol 939 cc156-157. 
214 Ibid., c161-162. 
 61
operation … I fear that the people of Scotland, rather than voting on the 
legislation, might be asked to vote for James Callaghan, Prime Minister.215  
 
By the Second Reading Eric Heffer had not yet decided how to vote, because he had 
always argued in favour of the manifesto and believed in party loyalty, even when he 
strongly disagreed with party policy. He hoped, however, that there would not be a 
majority in favour of devolution in the referendum.216 That the party leadership had 
wanted the devolution policy to be endorsed at the Conference in September 1976 to 
persuade reluctant MPs, particularly from the English regions, to vote for the Bill, was no 
secret. This strategy had been hinted at in the press as early as July that year.217 Left-wing 
critics tended to insist strongly that conference resolutions were binding on the government 
– now the tables had turned. 
  
Claiming The Will of the Scottish People 
 
In his opening of the Second Reading the Secretary of State for Scotland stressed that the 
Government was acting according to the wish of “the Scottish people”, claiming that there 
was overwhelming evidence of Scottish people wanting more power of decision making in 
Scotland, and equally overwhelming evidence that they did not want separation and 
independence. This was repeated at the end of his speech, and again by other participants 
during the debate, but ironically enough this was regardless of which point of view they 
argued in favour of. Norman Buchan claimed that there was no overwhelming demand for 
devolution in Scotland.218 He received few letters about it, and devolution was not a topic 
in public meetings, while unemployment and the economy most evidently were. He still 
believed that the question of devolution should be settled in Scotland, and not defeated in 
the House of Commons. He was, however, of the opinion that there had been a 
development of a “particularly nasty form of chauvinism”,219 and there should therefore be 
a second question in the referendum where people could vote in favour of separation. 
Gordon Wilson from the SNP also claimed to know what the people really wanted, and 
argued that what the Scottish people asked for was a governmental organisation, backed by 
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a democratic Parliament with full powers to control the Scottish economy.220 In Jim 
Sillars’ opinion, if there was little excitement about the Bill in Scotland, that was not 
because there was little interest in devolution of power, but because the Government was 
not willing to devolve enough power.221  
 
Economy and Centralism 
 
The Bill did not provide for devolution of economic or industrial powers, and there were 
no provisions for any independent revenue-raising powers. In his speech during the Second 
Reading, Millan explained that this was not because the Government opposed the granting 
of marginal tax powers as a matter of principle.222 In the White Paper various tax powers 
had been discussed, but there were practical disadvantages with all of them. Millan himself 
was in favour of so-called marginal powers, these should only be marginal as the 
Assembly was going to be funded on an expenditure basis, rather than on a revenue basis. 
He preferred the demand for tax powers to be coming from the Assembly once it was 
elected. Robin Cook argued that they would create an Assembly which would  have the 
right to spend public money without having to raise it – “power without responsibility”.223  
Jim Sillars, now sitting from the SLP, attacked the Government for its “centralist 
imagination”, which had led to the proposal of an Assembly that had no direct influence on 
the Scottish economy, or on the management of the oil reserves. He accused them of 
placing their faith in central economic management, and complained (probably quite 
truthfully) that economic powers were no part of the Bill because the Government would 
not be able to deliver a majority for the Bill if this had been the case.224 Sillars also 
accused the Government of setting the unity of the United Kingdom first, “even if the price 
is that Scottish people continue with soul-destroying levels of unemployment and the 
poverty of mind and spirit which that condition carries with it”.225
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The West Lothian Question  
  
The fundamentals of the West-Lothian Question have been explained in chapter 4 (see 
p.36). These were the debates when it received its name, as Tam Dalyell, MP for West 
Lothian, repeatedly reminded the House of this paradox. To thoroughly illustrate it, he 
formulated an endless alliterative list of how a Scottish MP in the House of Commons 
would be able to vote on the issues of Birmingham but not Bathgate, West Bromwich but 
not West Lothian, Carlisle but not Cardiff, London but not Lerwick and Sheffield but not 
Scalloway etc., which was repeated throughout the debate.226 The Government’s response 
was that this was indeed a problem, but not a sufficient reason for blocking devolution. 
According to James Naughtie, the debate on this issue enlivened the Bill’s opponents 
because it was an eloquent statement of a situation they found offensive. To the pro-
devolutionists it was an anomaly which they were prepared to live with. With neither 
faction being able to find a suitable solution to the problem, the debate on the West 
Lothian Question remained concerned with the principle of the thing, and whether such 
problems were symptomatic of the entire issue at hand. The controversial Ulster Unionist 
MP Enoch Powell was the one who gave the West Lothian Question its name, and being 
strongly against the idea of devolution he gave perhaps the most eloquent speech on the 
importance of the question:  
 
The fact that the question has never been answered is the evidence that we 
are in this legislation attempting to do something which runs contrary to a 
principle established by common sense, by experience and by endless 
debate over decades, namely, that it is not possible within a unitary 
parliamentary State to devolve widespread legislative authority to an 
elective Assembly in one part of that State unless the State itself is to be 
resolved into a federation.227  
 
The Amendments  
 
The Government had conceded the demand for a referendum to get the Bill through 
Parliament. However, this shifted the focus of the battle on to the details of the referendum 
instead of the details of the devolution plans. The only serious defeat the Government 
suffered at committee stage was on the so-called ‘Cunningham Amendment’. Weeks 
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before the referendum debate, the Conservative MP George Gardiner warned that he and 
his fellow objectors would be looking very carefully at the question of what constituted a 
decisive majority in the referendum. To the great pleasure of the Tories, it was a Labour 
member who moved the new clause. Already during the first minutes of the Second 
Reading the Labour MP Douglas-Mann asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what 
would be a satisfactory vote in the referendum, and inquired whether he would accept an 
amendment to the Bill which would require a minimum number of people participating in 
the referendum, but it would be the Scottish Labour MP George Cunningham who finally 
tabled the amendment. He argued that it was only proper that the more people who stayed 
at home and did not vote at all, the larger the ‘yes’ majority should be required. He 
suggested that 40 per cent of the electorate in Scotland should declare positive support for 
the proposal, or the referendum would not bind Parliament to go ahead with 
devolution.228 It was hard for the pro-devolutionists to argue against the position 
that:  
 
“if the Government are right, if the SNP is right and if the hon. Member for 
South Ayrshire (Mr. Sillars) for the SLP is right—that the people of 
Scotland overwhelmingly want devolution-there is no problem. If they 
overwhelmingly want devolution, far more than 40 per cent, will 
presumably vote for it. I am not asking that the overwhelming majority, 
or even that the majority, should vote for it, but only that 40 per cent, 
should be prepared to go out and vote for it.229  
 
Ironically, the amendment was put before the House on 25 January, Burns Night.230 First 
came a paving amendment by Douglas-Mann, proposing a 33⅓ per cent test, and when that 
was accepted the anti-devolutionists were confident they would win Cunningham’s 
amendment. The amendment was backed by five Scots Labour MPs: Robin Cook, Peter 
Doig, Tam Dalyell, Bob Hughes and William Hamilton, indeed a strange alliance of left 
and right.231 In total 35 Labour MPs voted in the commons for the Cunningham 
Amendment. A closer look at the voting record shows that while only five were Scottish 
and two were Welsh, the number of Labour MPs from the North of England was as high as 
twelve.232  
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By a margin of minutes, the vote on the Cunningham amendment was over in time 
to table the amendment which promised that a commission should examine the position of 
Orkney and Shetland if they voted “no”, and get it passed by a majority of the House. A 
team from the Shetland Islands Council had been lobbying for such a solution. This was 
conceived as embarrassing to the SNP, who were accused of arguing for autonomy for 
Scotland while simultaneously opposing autonomy for the self-contained community of 
Shetland. There were questions about whether revenues from oil reserves outside Shetland 
would disappear for use in central Scotland, to which the Government’s somewhat 
exasperated answer was that because energy was not a devolved subject, the Assembly had 
no direct right to dispose of the revenue.233  
The only other significant Government defeat was on an amendment from Tam 
Dalyell imposing a statutory three month gap between the referendum and any general 
election. For Dalyell and other Labour rebels the prospect of arguing against their 
Government, and then for it again the next week, was too much to be expected.234 The 
Scottish Labour MP John Macintosh tabled an amendment for tax-raising powers, but this 
fell with a 301-61 margin.235 The only clauses an alliance of the Conservatives, the Ulster 
Unionists and an assortment of Labour rebels, managed to remove from the Bill were 
clause 1, which declared the unending unity of the United Kingdom, and clause 40, which 
stated that the Assembly would “have regard” to national pay policy. 
On 22 February 1978, exactly a year after the Scotland and Wales Guillotine 
Motion had fallen, the Scotland Bill received its Third Reading. The Scotland Act provided 
for the establishment of a Scottish Assembly elected by first past the post consisting of 
145-150 members. The existing parliamentary constituencies would form the basis of the 
election system, with two or three members for each constituency. A separate Scottish 
Executive would be established, headed by a First Secretary chosen by the Assembly. 
There would still be need for a Secretary of State for Scotland, with oversight functions. 
Powers would be transferred for a broad range of subjects including health and social 
services (but not social security benefits), education, housing planning, transport (but not 
trains) and various Home Office functions relating to the courts, the legal profession, crime 
and the fire services. Most matters to do with local government would be devolved, 
including executive responsibility for the Scottish Development Agency and the Highlands 
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and Islands Development Board. There would be no independent powers of taxation. 
Finance was to be derived from a non-statutory block grant. However, the Assembly would 
be responsible for distributing rate support grant to local authorities. Legislation was 
subject to judicial scrutiny by the Privy Council before the Royal Assent, and a post assent 
judicial review was also provided for.  
The Labour Government had managed to get the Scotland Act into the statute 
books, but the price they had paid was the inclusion of a referendum, which was not only 
decisive (as opposed to merely advisory), but also had a 40 per cent minimum included in 
it. The Act the people of Scotland were to vote on had been significantly weakened during 
the parliamentary process, due to the opposition from within the Labour Party. Still, a 
Scottish Omnibus Survey ordered by the ‘Scotland is British’ campaign the following 
month showed support for the devolution Act at 45 per cent, with 34 per cent against.236 It 
was not without reason that the campaign worker who presented the figures to the 
campaign committee scribbled on the accompanying note “I do not think we should 
publish them”.237 The party polls also indicated that people were satisfied with Labour’s 
efforts, as the rest of the year monthly polls averaged Labour 50 per cent, Conservative 26 
per cent, SNP 19 per cent and Liberals 4 per cent, with little variation.238 The future of the 
Scottish Assembly was now to be decided by the Scottish people, but almost a year would 
pass before their voices were heard. A lot would change during this period of time. 
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6. BACKGROUND: NATIONALISM AND IDENTITY 
 
Different Contexts, Different Definitions 
 
In the plethora of theoretical contributions to the issues of nations and nationalism, the 
choice has been made to focus primarily on scholars with an association to Scotland, or at 
least Great Britain. Choosing a universally valid definition of nationalism poses an 
insurmountable problem, as all possible definitions are influenced by context: time, place, 
ideology etc. Benedict Anderson comments that the problem is even more profound if one 
groups nationalism as an ideology, together with other –isms such as ‘liberalism’ or 
‘Marxism’, instead of along notions and concepts such as ‘religion’ or ‘kinship’.239 In his 
recent attempt at rethinking nationalism, the Scottish sociologist Jonathan Hearn starts off 
by dividing the students of nationalism into primordialists and modernists.240 Both 
traditions can be found amongst contemporary contributors to the debate on the Scottish 
nation. To the primordialists ethnicity is central, and thus nationalism is understood as a 
late development of an older process of ethnicity. Common descent, territorial belonging 
and a shared language are dominant themes.241 Modernists generally argue that nations and 
nationalism arose somewhere between the sixteenth and the late eighteenth century, as the 
demands of industrial and capitalist economies generated relatively unified national 
identities. The spread of literacy and the standardisation of education contributed to mass 
culture as well as a national identity.242
Belonging to the latter school, Benedict Anderson and Ernst Gellner see the nation 
state as a product of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Gellner describes 
nationalism as “primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the 
national unit should be congruent”. 243 He defines nationalism as a sentiment or movement 
in terms of this principle. Nationalist sentiment can be the feeling of anger aroused by the 
violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment. This idea 
can be found in the principles of the Scottish National Party (SNP), which strives for a 
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separate Scottish nation. Gellner also emphasises that “there is one particular form of the 
violation of the nationalist principle to which nationalist sentiment is quite particularly 
sensitive: if the rulers of the political unit belong to a nation other than that of the majority 
of the ruled”, something which can be kept in mind when we move on to the Thatcher 
years in chapter 8.244  
Benedict Anderson has attempted to explain nationalism in terms of an “imagined 
community”. The community is imagined because the members of the nation never know 
most of their fellow members, yet they share the image of a community.245 People 
collectively associate with each other even though they may not know each other. Though 
the community is created in the mind it may be no less real and important than a 
community of people who know each other. The collective memories in such a community 
are important, and are often expressed in myths and common history etc. In distinguishing 
the nation from other imagined communities, Anderson stresses the existence of territorial 
limits and sovereignty embodied in a state.246  Neil Davidson also belongs to the group of 
modernists, and goes so far as to argue that there was no collective notion of Scottish 
identity before the Act of Union in 1707, but that the identity grew parallel to, and in 
opposition to, a British identity from this point in time onwards. The Scottish nationalism 
which arose in the late twentieth century was therefore, according to Davidson, an entirely 
new formation.247  
There are among Scottish historians and writers on nationalism also scholars who 
have more sympathy with the historical position of nations as mediaeval realities and who 
argue that the present Scottish nation has evolved continuously out of primordial ethnic 
formations. A proponent of this position is Murray G. H. Pittock, who uncovers in early 
sources references to the Scottish nation, such as in Robert Bruce’s words to his army on 
the field of Bannockburn, or in “The Declaration of Arbroath” from 1320.248 This view of 
the Scottish nation and the Scottish people as a powerful historic reality greatly appeals to 
the SNP, and gives meaning to slogans such as ‘A nation once again’. This position is 
rejected by amongst others Neil Davidson, who dryly comments that “once a group decides 
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that it is a nation then it usually also discovers that it has always been one, or at least that it 
has been one since 1291, or perhaps 1320”.249
While Max Weber wrote that “a nation is a community [of culture] which normally 
tends to produce a state of its own”, and while both Anderson and Gellner emphasise the 
need for a territorial state corresponding with the borders of the nation, Neil Davidson 
suggests that national consciousness does not always involve the objective of attaining 
statehood.250 As everything takes place within a context, it is interesting to note that 
although disagreeing on many other aspects of nationalism, political ideology and nations, 
two of the most prominent Scottish writers on nationalism agree on the important division 
between nationalism and a national consciousness. Tom Nairn distinguishes between 
‘Upper Case Nationalism’ and ‘lower case nationalism’, where the former would be for 
instance the ideology of the SNP, while the latter could be expressed as a pride in being 
Scottish, and wanting some measure of home rule.251 Much of the same distinction is made 
by Neil Davidson, only that he sets national consciousness distinctly apart from related 
concepts such as nationalism and patriotism.252 He reminds the reader that “historically, 
states have no more always embodied nations than nations have always sought to be 
embodied in states”.253 It is perfectly possible for people to develop national consciousness 
without subsequently becoming nationalists in a primarily ideological sense. It is thus 
feasible for instance for Scottish culture to flourish in the 1990s, without it being 
accompanied by an increase in the support for the SNP. When the heightened sense of 
Scottishness appears at certain times in modern history, it seems more often than not to be 
a response to a particular political conjuncture. A demand for a Scottish Parliament need 
not be an expression of nationalism in a strict ideological sense, but can be rather seen as 
an expression of a Scottish consciousness set in a context of economic recession, a 
democratic deficit etc.    
National identity is a collective identity; it involves having a collective memory, 
shared experience and, most notably when discussing contemporary politics, a view of a 
collective future.254 A Scot may feel culturally Scottish, but this need not have any direct 
political or constitutional implications. The two identities of being Scottish and British 
may be complementary. In addition to their national identity people will have a more or 
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less limited number of other identities, and these may strengthen or undermine the national 
one. Such identities are for instance class, religion, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity 
and party identity. The latter is often regarded to be in decline, but can still be important to 
some people in certain contexts.   
The issue of multiple identities is examined by the Nobel Prize winner Amartya 
Sen in his recent book on identity. Given our plural identities, we have to “decide on the 
relative importance of our different associations and affiliations in any particular 
context”.255 We have a choice in deciding what relative importance to attach to the various 
groups to which we belong, and we are all constantly making and remaking these choices, 
making priorities.256 Each of these group identities can give the person a sense of 
affiliation and loyalty. The importance of a particular identity will naturally depend on the 
social context. Also, not all identities need have durable importance. Whether a particular 
classification can plausibly generate a sense of identity or not must depend on social 
circumstances.257 Sen also distinguishes between ‘contrasting’ and ‘non-contrasting’ 
identities. Non-contrasting identities would be for instance citizenship, gender, race and 
profession, and these compete with each other for our attention and priorities. Even within 
contrasting identities it is possible to have plural identities, such as being both British and 
Scottish. This simply entails that a person with plural identities has to decide, in case of a 
conflict, on the relative importance of the different identities for the particular decision in 
question.258
 
The Scottish Context 
 
While participants in the debate on devolution, both from the Labour Party and the Liberal 
Party, have made attempts at portraying devolution as simply a matter of moving power 
closer to the people and increasing democracy, Lindsay Paterson asserts that if the 
discussion of the Scottish Parliament “had only ever been conducted as an academic 
seminar on good government, it would have got nowhere. The emotional fuel on all sides 
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has come from some version of politicised national identity, verging on nationalism even 
among people who would disavow the word”.259  
In the 1960s a significant shift seems to have taken place in Scotland, from 
emphasising British identity to emphasising Scottish. When looking for explanations for 
this shift, there are several factors that spring to mind. The British Empire had in the past 
been an important part of British identity, with Scots playing an important role in 
colonising India and Africa, both as part of the army and as part of the colonial 
administration. Following the Second World War, this empire crumbled. A war-torn Great 
Britain had to be rebuilt in many ways and never again assumed the role of the world’s 
leading power. The onset of the cold war with the US and the USSR as the two main 
combatants further emphasised the decline of Great Britain, so did the founding of the 
European Economic Community in 1957 without the United Kingdom as a member.    
In his 1979 book on devolution, Vernon Bogdanor claimed that in Europe as a 
whole, pressure for devolution had been most evidently felt in those areas on the 
geographical peripheries of countries peopled by national minorities, such as Brittany, 
Alsace, Corsica, the Basque country, Catalonia, Scotland and Wales.260 He commented 
that it might well be that the grievances were felt equally strongly in areas which, lacking a 
distinctive ethnic tradition, also lacked nationalist parties which might give these 
grievances political clout. Neil Davidson is of the same opinion: because Scotland is a 
nation, opposition to the British government, declining economy etc. could take a form in 
Scotland which would not be possible for English regions.261 According to Dilys M. Hill, it 
was not independence or separatism that drew support to the SNP in the late 1960s and the 
1970s, but the party’s role as a pressure group for Scottish interests. The discovery of 
North Sea oil came to reinforce support for the SNP rather than causing it, and played no 
part in the Hamilton by-election campaign of 1967, or the 1970 general election. The 
October 1973 North Edinburgh by-election was the first time the SNP rallied behind the 
slogan “It’s oor oil!”, but from then onwards this focus may well have contributed to a 
certain pride and feeling of economic independence for Scotland. 262   
In their 1973 report, the Kilbrandon Commission writes of “the Scots – an 
intelligent and hard-working race of over five million people”, and in their study of the 
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national feeling in Great Britain they conclude that “if a group of people think of 
themselves as a separate nation than nothing more is needed to demonstrate the existence 
of that nation”. 263 According to the Commission they had also found in Scottish people 
what they felt was ample evidence of the existence of this sense of nationhood. An Opinion 
Research Centre (ORC) survey in 1974 commented that although the feeling that Scotland 
was “particularly proud of its own culture and traditions” had declined somewhat in the 
past four years (from 93% to 81%), it was still the emphatic majority view. They also 
reported to have found a particularly strong current of feeling that Scotland was proud of 
its cultural identity, especially among supporters of the SNP and the Conservative Party.264
 In the mid-to-late 1970s, the debate on nationalism in Scotland ran particularly 
strong to the left of the ideological spectre, a manifestation of which is the establishment of 
the break-out Scottish Labour Party (SLP). Tom Nairn, who throughout the last three 
decades has wandered far ideologically, was for a period of time a member of the SLP. In 
his writings from the mid-1970s, he tries to combine an anti-capitalist position with 
nationalism, while at the same time making a general case for the inadequacy of Marxism 
when studying nationalism. In The Break-up of Britain Nairn sees Scottish and Welsh 
national separatism as legitimate and serious forces arising out of the crisis of British 
capitalism.265 At the time, there were several Marxist liberation movements in Africa, Asia 
and South America to be inspired by, and draw parallels to, especially if one adopted the 
image of Scotland as an English semi-colony. For this reason, some Scottish radicals 
joined the SNP, both before the launching of the SLP and after its post-referendum demise. 
The prominent historian Eric Hobsbawm warned against this tendency at the time: “There 
is no reason to suppose a priori that Scots or Welsh revolutionary Marxists have a good 
chance of transforming the SNP or Plaid Cymru into some kind of Vietcong merely by 
offering their services and leadership to the nationalist cause”.266 Hobsbawm also rejected 
Nairn’s ideas, as he could not see any prospects for socialist progress in a break-up of the 
United Kingdom at the time. He also feared that the secession of Scotland and Wales 
would further encourage English nationalism, which could assume the shape of a semi-
fascist right. For Scotland, he feared that the triumph of the SNP – “a classical petty-
                                                 
263 The Royal Commission on the Constitution 1969-1973, 3;101. 
264 Opinion Research Centre, A Survey On: Attitudes to Devolution in Scotland (Carried out for the 
Scotsman), 13. 
265 Tom Nairn, The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism (London: New Left Books, 1977). 
266 Eric Hobsbawm, "Socialism and Nationalism: Some Reflections on 'the Break-up of Britain' (1977)," in 
Politics for a Rational Left. Political Writings 1977-1988 (London: Verso, 1989), 128. 
 73
bourgeois nationalist party of the provincial right” - could only be achieved on the ruins of 
the Labour Party.267  
While prominent politicians on the left of the Labour Party in England, such as 
Tony Benn and Eric Heffer, were highly critical of the concept of devolution, a group of 
people on the Scottish left wing managed to find ideological reasons for supporting it. This 
meant that as the referendum campaign approached, there were people from the left, the 
Labour right, the Conservative Party and the SNP on both sides of the debate, making it 
increasingly difficult for the voters to choose between different identities, loyalties, party 
affiliations and social priorities. 
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As we have seen in the previous chapters, the issue of devolution to Scotland had been 
debated in the political parties, and had fought its way through Parliament. Now the time 
had come for it to leave high politics and enter the arena of low politics. It was illustrated 
in chapter 5 how all the opponents in the devolution debate within the House of Commons 
claimed to know and act upon the will of the Scottish people. For the Labour Party 
leadership, the support for the SNP in the general elections of 1974 had certainly been a 
sign of a desire for devolution. William Miller has argued that this proved that the Scottish 
people really wanted devolution, and saw electoral support for the SNP as a way of 
achieving it. Monthly polls showed SNP support falling throughout 1975 but leaping to a 
peak of 37 per cent in December, apparently in response to the wide-spread criticism 
levelled at the White Paper on devolution. Then SNP support subsided till the summer of 
1976, when it started flowing back to the SNP at the time when Dalyell and 70 Labour 
MPs published their letter threatening to vote against a Guillotine Motion on the 
devolution Bill. The second peak came right after the guillotine defeat on 22 February 
1977. According to Miller, this shows how SNP support declined when Labour fulfilled its 
devolution promises and increased when Labour appeared to renege.268 Opinion polls had 
shown Scottish voters were two-to-one in favour of devolution during the mid-1970s. In 
spite of this, the ‘yes’ side failed to win a sufficient majority in the referendum held in 
March 1979. This chapter will take a closer look at the campaign, the groups, the press 
coverage and the main events, and try to analyse and understand why the ‘yes’ side failed. 
It will also examine the results of the referendum and the ultimate result – the fall of a 
government. But first, we will turn to the circumstances under which the campaign was 
conducted. 
Both referenda were set to be held on 1 March 1979, St David’s Day, as the 
Secretary of State for Wales had hoped that the compliment would strike a patriotic chord 
in Welsh hearts. The date had been announced on 1 November the previous year, and the 
reason for the date given was that the new and reasonably accurate electoral register would 
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be published in mid-February. In 1978 the tide of nationalism had looked as if it was 
turning, in Scotland Labour won three by-elections, and the results were matched by a 
strong Labour performance in the regional elections, a blow to the SNP who took only 20.9 
per cent of the vote to Labour’s 40 per cent.269 The Guardian aptly summarised the mood 
when in retrospect it wrote that:  
 
last autumn [1978] it seemed a good idea for Labour in Scotland, still rising 
spectacularly high in Scottish opinion polls after two noticeable by-election 
successes, to capitalise on Mr Callaghan’s apparent popularity and base its 
whole publicity drive around a picture of the Prime Minister exhorting 
people to vote Yes. Yet by January the referendum seemed to many voters 
an irrelevant exercise as industrial unrest dominated the front pages and the 
television screens.270  
 
What the Guardian referred to, were the widespread strikes that hit the Labour 
Government during its last winter in power. In 1971 a Social Contract had been set up 
between the Trades Union Congress (TUC) and the Labour Party. James Callaghan 
guaranteed that the next Labour Government would repeal Heath’s Industrial Relations 
Act, and proposed a permanent dialogue and a joint policy. As Callaghan himself put it, 
“by it, the trade unions acknowledged that they had a wider loyalty to the community and 
were not simply seeking to increase their member's wages irrespective of the 
consequences. The Labour Party in return undertook to consult the unions about social 
priorities and policies”.271 It was hoped that this would prevent the repetition of the 
industrial conflicts suffered by previous Labour Governments. A Labour-TUC Liaison 
Committee was established in 1972, and as the agreement between Labour and the TUC 
received a fair share of publicity during the February 1974 election campaign, the election 
victory was regarded as an endorsement of this Social Contract.272 In addition the 1974 
Labour manifesto was distinctly radical, proposing an extension of public ownership, 
nationalisation and a shift in the balance of power and wealth in favour of the working 
class. Britain was facing an economic disaster at the time, with heavy inflation peaking at 
26.7 per cent in 1975, and the unions agreed to a so-called voluntary pay restraint in both 
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1975 and 1976.273 In the third phase of the incomes policy, announced in July 1977, there 
was to be a gradual return to open collective bargaining. This was accepted by the TUC 
after long negotiations. In spite of the previous agreements, the Government introduced a 
White Paper in July 1978 which set out a guideline for pay rises at five per cent, without 
consulting the unions. By this time the annual inflation had declined to below ten per cent. 
The TUC voted overwhelmingly to reject the limit and insisted on a return to open 
collective bargaining.274 In September 1978 Callaghan unexpectedly announced that he 
would not be calling a general election that autumn, but hoped to survive the winter with 
the continued pay restraint, improving the economy before a spring election.  
The strikes started with Ford, a company which could well afford a pay rise after a 
profitable year, but as a major government contractor the company had to follow the five 
per cent guidelines. Workers from the TGWU started their strike in September, making it 
official from October. Strikes and pay rise demands spread to other areas of the private 
sector, and eventually to the public sector unions, which were becoming increasingly 
concerned with keeping pace in terms of pay, especially for those in the lowest income 
bracket. The most significant strike was that of the refuse collectors, causing waste to pile 
high in London and other larger towns. The most notorious one which attracted undesired 
publicity was the Liverpool and Tameside gravediggers. Also, ambulance staff and 
hospital ancillary workers were on strike. When settlements were reached in February a 
total of 29,474,000 working days had been lost.275 In the middle of this situation, the 
Labour Party was supposed to fight referendum campaigns in Scotland and Wales. In 
addition to the problems of the Government drawing attention away from the devolution 
issue in the media, it was hard for the campaigners to make devolution seem like an 
important issue, compared to pay rises, strikes and social welfare. The way the 
Government had handled the strikes did nothing to increase their credibility, which 
influenced how people regarded the policies they promoted, such as devolution. It was not 
a good starting point for a referendum campaign.  
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 The Combatants 
 
When compared to the referendum on the EEC membership in 1975, one of the most 
striking differences was that in 1975 there had been a clear demarcation line between two 
sides offering a clear-cut choice, whereas in 1979 there were at least six different groups or 
parties arguing for a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ in the Scottish referendum. Especially on the ‘yes’ side 
there were several different groups, each envisioning a different post-referendum Scotland, 
and therefore finding it hard to work together.   
Each of the two main cross-party groups went to great lengths to display the 
breadth of support they enjoyed, resulting in very large national committees. Starting with 
the pro-devolutionists, the ‘Yes for Scotland’ (YFS) campaign was launched on 26 January 
1978, and the intention was to create an all-party campaign cutting across party affiliations. 
The Chairman was the Right Hon. Lord Kilbrandon, who had chaired the Royal 
Commission on the Constitution. Among the members of the Committee were two MPs, 
namely Jim Sillars of the SLP and George Reid from the SNP. There were several Scottish 
professors, including a member of the Labour Party, and a number of prominent 
Moderators or former Moderators of the Church of Scotland. Alex Kitson represented the 
trade unions, and there were also four businessmen and bankers, including a member of the 
Conservative Party. The actor Seán Connery also served on the Committee.276 There were 
only three women of a total of 39, including Margo MacDonald as one of three Vice-
Chairmen [sic].277  
As early as November 1977 the Scottish Executive of the Labour Party decided to 
go it alone in campaigning for a ‘yes’ vote in the referendum, and this was endorsed by the 
Scottish Conference in March 1978. Subsequently, the ‘Labour Movement Yes Campaign’ 
(LMY) was formed. In a letter to the Labour Party constituencies, sent out the day 
following the launch and signed by the Scottish Secretary Helen Liddell, the Scottish 
Council reasserted the decision to campaign for a ‘yes’ only with the STUC and the Co-
operative Party (the political wing of the Cooperative movement, a sponsor of Labour 
MPs), and no other parties or groups. The reasons given was that the Labour Party was the 
only party which believed in devolution for its own sake, not as a stepping stone to 
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separation (such as the SNP), or really preferred a federal solution (such as the Liberals). 
Also, the achievement of an Assembly for Scotland would be Labour’s, and they did not 
want to share the credit. The third reason was purely tactical – “to associate with the 
separatists would be to provide our opponents with a major propaganda weapon”.278 At a 
press conference Liddell went further, and when asked whether Labour would campaign 
for a ‘yes’ alongside the SNP replied: “We will not soil our hands with the likes of 
them!”.279 According to Frances Wood, there were also Labour members who threatened 
to campaign publicly against Labour policy if Labour joined the main ‘yes’ umbrella.280 
Harry Ewing, Under-Secretary of State for Scotland, confessed at a Labour Party Press 
Conference in Glasgow on 23 February that he found the SNP’s support for the 
Government devolution plans a source of embarrassment and annoyance. They had jumped 
on the devolution bandwagon, he said, when they should have openly admitted that it was 
not devolution they wanted, but separation.281  
In late November 1978 two MPs announced the formation of a third group to 
campaign for a ‘yes’ vote, called the Alliance for an Assembly (AFA). These were the 
Conservative Alick Buchanan-Smith and the Liberal Russell Johnston. They wanted to 
demonstrate their support for devolution, but were unwilling to cooperate with the SNP, 
and were soon joined by James Milne, the General Secretary of the STUC, and by Donald 
Dewar, Labour MP. The AFA never tried to set up any local organisation, but served as a 
platform for Buchanan-Smith, from which he could campaign to get Conservatives to vote 
yes.282 Their most visible contribution was an eve-of-poll statement declaring “We want 
you to vote Yes”.283  
Moving over to the anti-devolutionists, the ‘Scotland is British’ campaign had been 
formed in 1976 (see p.44). George Lawson described its purpose as: “…to develop a 
campaign among Scots emphasising our common nationhood with the rest of the people of 
Britain and seeking support in persuading Parliament and Government that the Devolution 
Bill endangers that common British nationhood and should be withdrawn”.284 When the 
main anti-devolution umbrella campaign ‘Scotland Says No’ (SSN) was launched on 30 
November 1978, this was really a re-launch of the ‘Scotland is British’ campaign. Some 
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Labour members continued to prefer this cross-party group, and served as members on its 
national committee, such as Dick Buchanan, MP, the former MP William Hannan, three 
Labour Party members active at local level, and Donald McGregor who was the UCATT 
Secretary. Several businessmen and industrialists were present on the committee, as well as 
two Conservative MPs. There were three women on the committee, of a total of 32. Lord 
Wilson of Langside, the former Labour Lord Advocate, and The Very Rev. Dr Andrew 
Herron, former Moderator of the Church of Scotland, were joint Chairmen. The SSN was 
well organised. It quickly raised money (mostly from private companies), produced 
leaflets, booked advertising space in both local and national newspapers and organised 
local groups. Companies helped to distribute material, such as the Clydesdale Bank which 
provided all its branch managers with copies. Other firms went so far as to put leaflets in 
their pay-packets. Throughout the campaign the SSN consistently argued that it was not in 
the business of offering alternatives, and did not have to do so because it was not a political 
organisation.285 In this way it could argue against the Assembly without needing to force 
its varied membership into agreement on what the alternatives ought to be. The 
Conservative Party decided at a conference early in 1979 not to campaign on its own, but 
as a part of the SSN, making it possible for the few party members in favour of devolution 
to campaign through one of the cross-party ‘yes’ campaign groups. Very little party money 
was spent on the campaign, and the contribution of the party machine, Edinburgh Central 
Office staff and local agents was muted.286   
The decision to hold a referendum allowed the anti-devolutionists within the 
Labour Party to campaign openly against Government and party policy. The Scottish 
Executive decided to give official backing to the ‘yes’ campaign, but that did not stop the 
anti-devolutionists from launching their own campaign. There had been an attempt in 1976 
at forming a Labour ‘Scrap the Assembly Committee’ with its basis in the Glasgow area, 
but nothing much had come of it. It had produced a couple of leaflets and letters to the 
editor of various newspapers, and was chaired by a local councillor. After the date of the 
referendum had been made official, the ‘Labour Vote No’ (LVN) campaign was launched 
on 27 November 1978. Brian Wilson was Chairman, with Tam Dalyell, Robin Cook and 
Danny Crawford serving as Vice-Chairmen. It did not formally co-operate with the SSN 
campaign, but there was not as much rivalry between the ‘no’ groups as there was on the 
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‘yes’ side. Although its members desired different political futures for Scotland, this was 
not as striking as the extremely different scenarios the ‘yes’ organisations worked towards. 
Thus it was possible for instance for Robin Cook to appear on a SSN platform.287 The 
LVN cut across traditional left/right borders, and could name the traditional Tribune leftist 
Norman Buchan as one of its active members. At the 1978 Scottish Conference the Labour 
anti-devolutionists tabled an amendment to ban the use of party funds in the referendum 
campaign, but were heavily defeated.288  
 
The SNP and Devolution  
 
In order to understand the Scottish National Party’s role in the referendum campaign, it is 
necessary to briefly review the recent history of the Party and its policy on devolution. A 
paper submitted to the Party’s national assembly in 1971 argued that the electorate would 
always support the status quo if the only alternative choice was a completely separate state, 
and concluded that therefore the SNP should support devolution. This position was not 
very popular at the time, and when the SNP National Assembly met in January 1973 it 
decided that the party should disassociate itself from the devolution plans as put forward 
by the Conservative Party.289 This changed with the general election in February 1974, as 
it led to the creation of a sizeable parliamentary group for the SNP and a Labour minority 
government which was going to propose devolution. The first response by the SNP was to 
put forward several demands as the price of SNP support, including control of economic 
expansion, oil and fish for the new Assembly. Independent international representation for 
Scotland was also suggested, but this was far beyond anything that was realistic for the 
Government to implement. The October elections showed increased support for the SNP, 
and polls displayed extended support for a Scottish Assembly. Thus, at the annual 
conference in May 1975 a resolution which stated that “the SNP will participate fully in 
any Scottish Assembly which is democratically elected…[while working]…vigorously to 
extend the assembly’s powers until it becomes a real Scottish parliament” was accepted by 
an overwhelming majority.290 This was a major shift of policy on two levels, both that the 
SNP now supported a democratically elected Assembly without any demands regarding its 
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powers, and that there was now a commitment to an evolutionary strategy which would 
transform the Assembly by stages. In spite of this, the SNP reaction to the 1975 White 
Paper was that it had failed to give the Assembly sufficient powers. At a local government 
by-election in February 1976, the SNP launched a new pamphlet titled Independence 
Means… and increased its majority six-fold. Shortly after this a SNP Press release 
predicted that Scottish independence would be achieved at the next general election.291 
Devolution looked less attractive to Party members when compared to full independence, 
and the 1976 Annual Conference passed a resolution which was merely lukewarm towards 
devolution, emphasising that nothing less than independence was the goal, and devolution 
merely was a stepping stone.292 In February 1977 an ORC Poll published in the Scotsman 
showed a decline in the support for strong devolution, and only a minority of SNP voters 
now favoured independence. In spite of this, only a few days later the SNP tabled an 
amendment to the Scotland and Wales Bill to include a demand for an independence 
referendum.293  
After the fall of the Scotland and Wales Bill in February 1977 there was a renewed 
drift away from devolution, and the SNP parliamentary group simply refused to meet with 
the Government to discuss the issue, and declared that they should not count on SNP 
support in exchange for a new devolution bill. In the view of Roger Levy, the 
parliamentary group by this manoeuvre put itself into the absurd position of supporting a 
new bill, but at the same time seeking to bring the Government down.294 When the 
Scotland Bill came before the House the following November, the SNP MPs tabled 
amendments regardless of their failure or their effect in slowing down the passage of the 
Bill. At the meeting of the National Council in June 1978 a resolution was tabled calling 
upon the SNP to “campaign for a ‘No’ vote in the devolution referendum and reaffirm the 
slogan ‘Independence – nothing less’”. An amendment substituting the word ‘No’ for 
‘Yes’ was carried, in spite of the oxymoron it created.295  
Popular support for the SNP was now at its lowest in four years, and the party was 
losing members on a daily basis. Some members had already resigned in protest after the 
1977 decision to accept the plans for an Assembly. An Aberdeenshire member wrote: 
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I never thought that the SNP would betray the hard work and trust that so 
many True Scots have put into the party by accepting willy nilly any tit bit 
that YOUR LONDON MASTERS throw you and yes you are indeed slaves 
to london if you think that a Assembly will in the end bring Scotland full 
Independence I would have thought that the party would have learned it’s 
leasion by now that you cant make deals with unionist partys but no you 
make the same mistakes that Irland made.296  
 
A local branch also wrote to ask if they really could use party funds campaigning for a 
‘yes’ if the majority of the members in the branch were opposed to the Assembly.297 In 
spite of the impressive efforts the SNP managed to muster in by-election campaigns, there 
was remarkably little energy spent on the referendum campaign.298 Still, there were some 
true nationalists who argued in favour of a ‘yes’; in a letter to the editor of the Scotsman, a 
Scottish nationalist who was opposed to devolution but in favour of independence, argued 
that although devolution might delay independence with ten years it would mean that when 
it one day came the transition would be smoother, and more people would have had the 
experience of legislation and administration at a national instead of local level.299 Although 
there was internal disagreement on the strategy to achieve it, the SNP members agreed on 
the ultimate goal – independence. This made the official pro-devolution stand an 
embarrassment to the Labour Party, and made it difficult for them to project devolution as 




In order to get a glimpse of the press coverage in the weeks prior to the referendum, as 
well as the following week a decision was made to study one Scottish and one English 
newspaper (see p.4). The general impression of the Scotsman in this period is that it 
attempted to give a balanced news coverage of the devolution debate. For instance, the 
paper’s readers were encouraged to submit their questions about devolution, and from 
26 February onwards the paper tried to answer these questions in a seemingly unbiased 
manner. As the referendum date drew closer, the editorials became more forceful and more 
slanted. On 22 February the paper carried an editorial titled “The case against No”, 
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followed the next day by one titled “Why we must vote Yes”. The first one was an attack 
on the No-side, and a response to many of their arguments against the Assembly: “The 
break-up of Britain is hypothetical and improbable; the malfunctioning of the centralized, 
cluttered Westminster system of government is not hypothetical at all.”300  
Although strongly pro-devolution, the Scotsman was definitely not pro-Labour. The 
Scotland Act was criticised on many levels, and the editorials argued for instance in favour 
of a cut in the number of Scottish MPs in Westminster, in spite of the implications this 
would have for a Labour government. The 22 February editorial was criticised by the 
‘Scotland Says No’ campaign for not giving a fair presentation, but it was added that 
although they strongly disagreed so often with the editorial position of the Scotsman, it had 
always been willing to open its columns to letters giving the ‘no’ side of the case. The next 
editorial was more sober, reminding the readers that the Assembly in itself would not solve 
anything, but was an instrument which might be useful and a great opportunity which 
should not be missed. The main argument applied was that the United Kingdom, and not 
only Scotland, faced an urgent need for a constitutional renewal. The “close and cousinly” 
links with English, the affection for them, the respect for their culture and the degree of 
domestic, social and economic intercourse between Scotland and England “make 
separatism … unthinkable”.301 The Assembly was viewed as a way of keeping the union 
together, and fears were expressed that if the opportunity was lost this time, there would be 
a new Conservative government, leading to a new surge of nationalism and support for the 
SNP: “The devolution option will have been lost and independence will be the only item 
on the agenda.”302 Thus, there hardly seemed to be any nationalist sentiment in their 
argumentation, and definitively no flirting with the SNP. The closest it got was when the 
paper was lamenting that “the lack of national democratic institutions has grievously 
sapped Scottish self-belief. Standardising forces have eroded the external signs of our 
nationhood, speech, custom and dress, and left us confused and adrift”.303  
On 1 March the Scotsman’s editorial titled “Moment of decision” (placed on the 
front page for the occasion) hoped for a high turnout, and repeated that abstention would 
be counted as a ‘no’ vote. It stressed that a ‘no’ victory could lead to a dangerous 
polarisation between independence and unionism, and that there probably would not be 
another occasion to change this for a long time to come, as it only was with great 
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reluctance that “Parliament underwent the boredom of debating devolution Bills in two 
sessions”.304 According to Michael Brown, many journalists on the Scotsman were plainly 
attracted to the idea of a Parliament in Edinburgh, as the prestige it would have brought to 
the capital city would have elevated the resident press.305 Several of the journalists were 
politically active and involved in the devolution campaign.  
Turning to the English newspaper, the Guardian, being a UK national daily, had a 
considerably slimmer coverage of the devolution issue than the Scotsman. The devolution 
coverage was for obvious reasons divided between Wales and Scotland, and the view was 
more distanced. The Guardian was not an active participant in the campaign, and it did not 
write as if it was trying to convince its readers one way or the other, rather as if its readers 
were all English and without a vote. The somewhat elitist coverage concentrated more on 
the ministers in London and their opinions on the issue than on people in Scotland or 
Wales. From quite an early stage onwards, however, the Guardian seemed to understand 
the mood in Scotland:  
 
The taste for devolution … is still there: it is the precise details of what the 
Government is offering that are causing the trouble … A majority of Scots 
back devolution; but among that majority there are many who are justifiably 
apprehensive about the implications of the package they are being asked to 
swallow – or reject – as a whole.306  
 
Devolution was the main theme of five Guardian editorials within the studied time span, 
which is more than one would expect on the basis of the space allocated to the subject in 
the news section. The small number of letters to the editor about devolution could be a 
result of limited editorial interest, or it could be because Scots wrote to Scottish papers and 
the English were not all that interested. The editorial opinion was one of a grudging ‘yes’, 
emphasising the importance of the SNP’s continued support for the Government, and how 
the Government had let this guide their actions. In its editorial the day before the 
referendum they chose to list the many faults of the campaign: The 40 per cent rule 
blighted it from the start. The failure to form umbrella organisations made the campaign 
scrappy and confusing. The arguments of hope had been swamped by the arguments of 
fear. In spite of this, the editorial argued that the disadvantages of having such a centralised 
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system of government would eventually lead to the case for greater self-determination 
rising again, perhaps in a sharper form. “That is why the Scotland Act, despite the many 
(and often justified) batterings it has taken, still seems a chance worth taking.”307  
 
The Campaign Weeks 
 
While most of the campaign activities began in January, the Labour Movement decided to 
wait until the second week in February and instead conduct a short campaign (or a 
Blitzkrieg) of general election length. This was probably a grand tactical blunder, as it gave 
the ‘Scotland Say No’ group an opportunity to put their arguments first and stake out the 
ground for the campaign.308 During the campaign Labour distributed one million leaflets 
and 1,000 posters, held four big rallies and countless smaller meetings, with the Prime 
Minister and seven other Cabinet ministers as speakers. With Labour lacking a majority in 
the House of Commons, however, it was difficult for Ministers or MPs to go to Scotland to 
campaign while Parliament was sitting, and they had to divide their time between Scotland 
and Wales.309  
According to Neal Ascherson, who covered the referendum campaign as a 
travelling reporter for the Scotsman, there was a feeling amongst the Scottish Labour’s 
rank and file that devolution would play into the hands of the SNP and open an ever-
spiralling auction of nationalism which Labour could never win.310 In addition there was 
the resentment of the pressure put on Scottish Labour by the London Party Headquarters, 
and the fear that the Assembly on offer, with its slight economic powers, would be a 
disappointment. The Liberals reluctantly supported the Bill, as they in principle favoured a 
federal solution, while the Tories were split, with the majority opposed to the Assembly, 
and as previously described there were disagreements within the SNP. Thus, by the end of 
1978 no party was united in favour of the Scotland Bill as it stood, with the exception of 
the tiny SLP.  
The support for devolution varied according to gender, class and region. In his 1977 
book on devolution Dalyell lists ‘women’ as one of the pressure groups for a Scottish 
Assembly. When trying to explain why this could be the case, he suggests that it might be 
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because “…some women tend to be more emotional about their politics than men - and 
Scottish nationalism has an extremely romantic aura about it, if only for ‘cultural’ reasons. 
For example, they have been astute enough to capitalise on the cultural traditions of 
Scotland, and they have produced some very attractive silver jewellery in the old Scottish 
style”.311 It is however, hard to find traces of this “pressure group”, whatever its motives 
might have been. With two or three exceptions, Scottish women were remarkably absent 
from the campaign, along with any gender perspective. Even the ‘Scottish Convention of 
Women’ were largely invisible. The ‘Women’s Aid’ admitted “we didn’t think to organise 
politically”.312 Only the Edinburgh group of the ‘National Campaign for Legal and 
Financial Independence for Women’ printed their own leaflet. Members from this group 
also prepared a research paper for the ‘Scottish Council of Fabian Societies’, Women and 
the Scottish Assembly. Concentrating on the legal aspects of, for instance, rape and divorce, 
and important subjects such as child care, it failed to make it clear why a Scottish 
Assembly would be needed for the implementation of the proposals and demands.313  
 
Public Opinion  
 
In February 1977, about 66 per cent of the electorate said they would vote ‘yes’ to the 
Government’s referendum question, which would have allowed the advocates of 
devolution to clear the subsequently imposed 40 per cent hurdle by a comfortable 
margin.314 An ORC Poll for the Scotsman based on interviews conducted in the second 
week of February 1979, showed a fall of 17 percentage points. At that time 49 per cent said 
they would vote ‘yes’, 33 per cent would vote ‘no’ and 13 per cent had not yet decided. 
Only four per cent had decided not to vote. As seen in Figure B, all the parties except the 
SNP had large voter groups in both camps. Only 58 per cent were certain they would vote, 
an additional 16 per cent were fairly certain. Ordinarily this would have been enough to 
secure a victory for the ‘yes’ side, but because of the 40 per cent rule it instead implied that 
it would be a close race, while the campaign for a high turn-out had to be a priority for the 
pro-devolutionists.   
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During the campaign, the ‘yes’ 
majority was steadily whittled away. 
MORI polls (which only showed 
‘yes’/’no’, not ‘undecided’) from the 
last three weeks of February showed 
the ‘yes’ majority at 64 per cent, then 
60 per cent, and by the end of the 
month only 50 per cent. The System 
Three polls showed the same trend.315 
Assembly was not high among the Labour voters. According to the February ORC
when Labour voters were asked “If there is a Scottish Assembly, what difference do
think it will make to the way things are in Scotland?” only 16 per cent believed Scotlan
would be “a lot better off”, 34 per cent believed Scotland would be “a little better off”,
per cent opted for “neither better nor worse”, whilst 17 per cent thought Scotland would b
worse off with an Assembly.











s shown above, the Labour voters were increasingly unenthusiastic about devolution, and 
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Figure B. Source: Scotsman, 16 February  1979 
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they were not alone. While the official campaign directed from St Andrew’s House (with 
London reinforcements) was in favour of a Scottish Assembly, the resistance was still 
strong at grass roots level. In January 1979 Helen Liddell of the SCLP reported to the 
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Scotsman that she had asked all the Labour constituencies to set up official ‘yes’ 
committees and that all but five had agreed to do so. Nevertheless, in the end only
to have fairly active campaign committees. While no Labour constituency parties officially 
backed the ‘no’ campaign, seven had not reached a decision by January and 20 had decided 
not to set up any official campaigns.
 36 came 
 Yes-vote, 
lution issue after motions 
were p n 
 
[T]he fact that committees within the Assembly will be set up to deal with 
l 
 
 the West Lothian District Council the SNP motion won by one vote against the votes of 
n and 
Perhaps the main challenge for the LVN was to convince Labour voters that they 
would 
 
                                                
319 In Kilsyth, the largest town in the West 
Stirlingshire constituency, the Labour party advised its MP not to campaign for a
as the branch was unanimous in opposing the Assembly.320  
Several regional and district councils debated the devo
ut forward by SNP representatives, calling on them to urge electors to vote ‘yes’ i
the referendum. In the Central Region the motion was rejected after it had been argued 
against by the convener of the region, a Labour councillor who expressed the view that: 
 
education, social work, housing etc. spells real danger for the future of loca
government. … If you start administering, say, education and social work in 
Inverness, Aberdeen or Stirling from Edinburgh, then this is not devolution, 
but anti-devolution.321
In
six Labour councillors. The seventh Labour councillor, who was in favour of the 
Assembly, was reported to be “in the bathroom” during the whole of the discussio
subsequent vote.322 This suggests that in spite of the official pro-devolution policy there 
was a certain anti-assembly pressure on local Labour councillors and activists in some 
areas.  
not be betraying the Party by voting ‘no’. Tam Dalyell from LVN and Jim Sillars 
from YFS paired up and went on a travelling debate, with fifteen performances through 
Scotland. Though Sillars was an excellent debater he was also a notorious defector from 
the party. By appearing against him Dalyell looked less of a rebel than he was; after all, 
Dalyell was still a Labour MP and a Labour Party member. Sillars respected Dalyell for 
keeping to his principles: “I have a greater admiration for him because of the depth of his
belief than I do for some of the MPs who I know will vote No while pretending they want 
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a Yes vote”.323 During one of the public meetings Sillars managed to get Dalyell to admit 
that he did not believe there was such a thing as a “Scottish nation”, and that this was the 
basis for his opposition to a Scottish Assembly. Dalyell on his side claimed that as the 
debate progressed, Sillars’ arguments for home rule had become “inseparable” from tho
of the SNP.
se 
ving played an important part in the early stages of Labour’s policy 
change  the 
 be 
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While ha
 regarding devolution, the Scottish trade unions were not particularly visible in
campaign. At a press conference on 23 February Danny Crawford of the UCATT 
Executive claimed that four out of five full-time union officials in Scotland would
voting ‘no’. He declared that the trade union movement at shop-floor level continued t






the internal disagreement on the ‘yes’ side. The ‘Labour Vote No’ campaign committee 
issued a petition for interim interdict against the Independent Broadcasting Authority. Th
reason for this move was that as usual before an election, there was to be political 
broadcasts for the different parties. The SNP, Liberals, Labour and Conservative P
been assigned a time, but the problem was that out of these four, three would be in favour 
of devolution. The LVN sought parity of broadcasting time and treatment for the ‘yes’ and
‘no’ campaigners, and claimed the IBA would be in breach of their statutory duty to 
maintain a proper balance.326 On 16 February Lord Ross in the Court of Session bann
four party political broadcasts. This would not prevent the IBA from broadcasting other 
political programmes on the referendum provided they maintained a proper balance. All 
four programmes were scheduled to be shown on the same dates on all BBC channels, an
although there were no proceedings against the BBC, they too cancelled the broadcasts. It 
was suggested that there could be broadcasts for the ‘yes’ and ‘no’ sides, with parties and 
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organisations co-operating, but Labour were vehemently opposed to this concept. Alf 
Young, Scottish research officer of the Labour party stated: “We believe in a Scottish 
Assembly while others campaigning for a Yes vote are doing so for different reasons”.
added that a ‘yes’ broadcast would involve the SNP, who advocated an Assembly for 
reasons fundamentally different to those of Labour, “It would not be possible to reconc
their case with ours”.
 He 
ile 
The problem would be solved by allocating two broadcasts to each side, 
P, 
 
The Regional Divide 





                                                
327 The consequence was that, in the end, there were no broadcasts. 
The SNP were willing to cooperate, making it even more embarrassing for Labour. This 
was criticised in the Scotsman editorial:  
 
thus giving one to Labour and the Scottish TUC, and the second to the SN
Liberals and Conservative dissidents. The price of that, however, would be 
the near certainty that Tam Dalyell and his band of Labour No campaigners 
would be given their own broadcast for a direct appeal to Labour voters. The
Conservatives would fix that. But it would, in fact, be a small price to pay, 




central belt.329 On several occasions, Neal Ascherson of the Scotsman addressed the iss
of geopolitical divisions, which he termed the ‘Grampian question’, and described as an 
important dilemma for the ‘yes’ side. In the rural areas it was feared that the central belt i
Scotland would be allocated the lion’s share of the Assembly’s resources, and the 
Edinburgh elite would achieve more power and influence. He wrote that it might ev
that some SNP voters in the landward constituencies of the north-east would vote ‘no’ to 
defend the interests of the Grampian region, and one ‘yes’ campaigner dryly commented 
that “they voted against Britain and now they’ll vote against Scotland”.330 The regional 
identity (with corresponding interests) was to some people obviously more important tha
the national Scottish identity. The same scepticism of an Edinburgh-based Assembly 
applied to the rest of the Highlands, and perhaps even more so in the Islands. 
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In Shetland, the Shetland Group had been founded in 1977, with the aim of 
achieving a greater degree of control over the islands’ own affairs. They decided not to 
commit themselves to either the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ sides of the campaign, but issued an 
explanatory statement to the Shetlanders. The Shetland Group adopted a significantly 
different approach to devolution from the Shetlands Islands Council, whose main aim was 
not autonomy for Shetland, but to protect their agreements with the oil industry and their 
status as a most-purpose authority (county borough). The Council concentrated on what it 
considered to be a threat to those acts from the possibility of Scottish devolution, and had 
called for a commission to investigate Shetland’s problems. There was some confusion in 
Shetland about the implications of a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote, because while the original 
amendment to the Scotland Act provided for a commission if people in either Orkney or 
Shetland voted ‘no’ (see p.66), it was later amended to a commitment to commissions 
being established irrespective of how the islanders voted. However, as the provision was 
part of the Act, if the Act was repealed following a ‘no’ majority the commissions would 
not necessarily be established. In a declaration from 1978, the Shetland Labour Party 
argued against devolution for Scotland if it included Shetland on a basis of an assessment 
of the special needs and interests of the island, but also on an ideological basis: “Both 
devolution and independence are devious roads to socialism…a wrong road may have a 
cross road that leads straight on to the highway, so socialists travel hopefully, if not 
enthusiastically”.331 Early in the referendum campaign, Labour in Shetland came out in 
favour of an Assembly. The chairman of the Shetland Labour Party commented that the 
main reasons were the commission, and the chance of a separate representation from 
Orkney for the first time in Shetland’s history, as Shetland was supposed to have its own 
member in the Scottish Parliament.332   
 
The Break-Up of the United Kingdom? 
 
The break-up of the United Kingdom as a result of a failed referendum was projected by 
both sides in the debate. The anti-devolutionists saw the Assembly as a stepping-stone to 
full independence for Scotland. The pro-devolutionists in Labour and the Liberal Party 
warned that if Scotland did not get devolution, the SNP would grow stronger and a 
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separate Scotland would be the result. John Smith, who had been Minister for Devolution, 
spoke at a public meeting in Glasgow in mid-February. There he rejected arguments about 
the break-up of the UK, arguing that “the Scotland Act would increase Britain’s unity 
which had to be founded on diversity as well as conformity.”333 David Owen, the Foreign 
Secretary, promised at a Labour Party eve-of-poll-rally in Edinburgh that a Scottish 
Assembly would not undermine the strength of the Union, but by satisfying the demand for 
greater democratic control of Scottish life it would confound the separatists and “express 
the dangers and narrowness of their slogans”.334 Nationalist sentiments of the more 
fundamentalist kind were occasionally voiced, but more often in letters to the editor than in 
leaflets, advertisements, posters etc. by the official campaign groups. A Lord Birsay wrote 
to the Scotsman to express the following wish: “May our citizens of this ancient nation and 
Kingdom of Scotland vote massively and vote preponderantly Yes”.335  
Michael Foot and James Callaghan argued along the leftist, democratic line; that 
devolution would bring government closer to people. In choosing this argument, they tried 
to give the impression that the demand for devolution had more to do with resentment 
towards an over-centralised government than with the revival of a Scottish national feeling. 
Still, on 25 January at a Labour Party Political Broadcast the “hammer of the Nats” Willie 
Ross talked about Robert Burns, about Scotland’s chance for democracy, about how the 
Scottish people had been working for devolution for a hundred years. According to 
Ascherson, the whole tone of the broadcast was one of “noble nationalism”.336 The Labour 
Party leaders might argue that devolution was an old Labour policy, but the tone had 
certainly changed.  
 
The Fear of Added Bureaucracy and Costs 
 
The value of added democracy - how the Assembly would make the civil servants more 
accountable to public opinion and democratically elected representatives - was seldom 
voiced as an argument per se. It was mostly applied in attempts to counter the “added 
bureaucracy and costs” argument, which was one of the primary objections to the 
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Assembly.337 This argument was mainly used by the SSN campaign, which made sense on 
an ideological level, as the SSN was supported by big business and the Conservative Party. 
Arguing from the left, the ‘Labour Vote No’ campaign produced proposals showing how 
the accountability of government departments could be improved without resorting to the 
creation of an Assembly. LVN suggested, as an alternative to devolution, that the 
Government should introduce plans for the greater accountability of civil servants in the 
major areas of government, and more would be achieved for the quality of democracy this 
way as it would affect all of the British people. The claim that an Assembly would bring 
government closer to the people was met by Brian Wilson with the argument that “The 
people of the Falls Road in Belfast were geographically very close to government. But in 
terms of access or meaningful democracy, they were light years removed”.338  
As mentioned previously (see p.89), there was also a very real fear that the 
Assembly would shift powers away from the local level. There was a worry that the new 
Assembly would erode the powers of the newly reorganised local government, and this 
may have been one of the reasons why so many Labour local councillors were hostile to it. 
When trying to identify the reason for the referendum defeat, Bogdanor argues that there 
existed a powerful mood of disenchantment with institutional reform in Scotland and 
Wales. After the reorganisation of local government, the health service and the water 
industry, the voters felt a deep yearning for stability.339 When Gordon Brown, chairman of 
Labour’s devolution sub-committee, spoke at a Labour Party Press conference in the 
middle of February on the subject of bureaucracy, he argued that a Scottish Assembly 
would provide the opportunity to take important decision-making out of the hands of “old 
school tie civil servants” operating behind closed doors and put it into the hands of elected 
representatives accountable to the people of Scotland. He promised that an Assembly 
would also look closely at the system of quangos. Admittedly, an Assembly would inherit 
thousands of civil servants, but if the country voted in favour of an Assembly the Labour 
Party would hold a special conference to discuss the internal organisation of the 
Assembly.340 The positive effects that devolution could have on democracy were a 
consolation for devolution-sceptics on the left of the Labour Party. Tony Benn, Secretary 
of State for Energy, hoped that the devolution referendum and a subsequent Scottish 
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Assembly would eventually lead to more democratic control to Scotland and to close the 
“accountability gap” between the electorate and the decision makers.341   
The economic arrangements for the Assembly also caused worry. Denis Healey, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, tried to explain the virtues of a block grant instead of taxing 
Scottish people directly. Public expenditure was 30 per cent higher per head in Scotland 
than in England, and tax revenue per head was very much lower than in England. So, if an 
Assembly had to raise the same amount of money it would be necessary for Scotland to 
drop expenditure by a third, or raise taxation by “an intolerable amount”.342 However, the 
block grant was criticised both by people who wanted more power to the new Assembly, 
and by people who were opposed to devolution. Robin Cook and George Cunningham both 
feared that the model would polarise English and Scottish interests and encourage a 
conflict between the two nations where none existed at the present.343 Robert Hughes, 
another anti-Assembly Labour MP, suggested that the only way the Assembly could 
generate extra money would be through measures such as higher prescription charges, 
payments for consulting doctors and entering hospital, school fees and higher charges for 
old people’s homes.344  
 
The Forty Percent Rule Complications  
 
The Cunningham amendment, demanding a ‘yes’ vote from 40 per cent of the electorate, 
received a substantial amount of attention throughout the campaign, probably at the 
expense of the issues of devolution itself. In the ORC February poll, as many as 70 per 
cent reported to have heard about the ‘40 per cent rule’. 46 per cent believed it was an 
unfair rule, while 40 per cent thought it reasonable. Naturally, this varied with the 
respondent’s view on devolution.345  
The Cunningham amendment breached the theory of the referendum as a purely 
advisory device, by defining the mandate for implementation. It also introduced a new 
concept into British politics by ensuring that the final judgement of the result would take 
account of those who did not vote. The electoral register was fairly new, but having been 
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compiled the last autumn it would still contain some errors. It was therefore demanded that 
the Government should deduct a number of voters from the electoral register to take into 
account those who had died since last October, those who would not reach 18 years until 
after 1 March, prisoners and categories of multiple registration such as students and nurses. 
The Government stood firm against demands that an allowance should be made for people 
who were ill or disabled, as they had the right to vote, if not the opportunity. The SNP MP 
George Reid insisted that the discount figure should be 576,000, if the allowance included 
religious non-voters, patients in hospital and those who had moved recently.346 Eventually 
the Government limited discounted voters to only 90,000. The National Union of Students 
said the allowance for nurses and students was well below their own estimate, which in 
fact was 2.5 times higher.347 This coincided with a growing view in the Government that 
they should not be bound by the 40 per cent rule, as a referendum should be only advisory 
and the electoral register could never be accurate. An editorial in the Scotsman supported 
the small deduction as it was necessary for the Secretary of State for Scotland to plead the 
strictness of the Scotland Act, and reminded readers that it was “open to Parliament to take 
a more liberal view of the wretched 40 per cent than Bruce Millan felt able to do under the 
law”.348 The Scottish newspapers overflowed with letters from people with injured kin in 
hospital unable to vote, people who had unsuccessfully applied for a postal vote etc. It was 
suggested that ballot boxes be installed in hospital wards, but this was rejected.  
The opposing sides could never quite agree on whether an abstention was a no-vote. 
The ‘no’ side argued that as the referendum was consultative and the result was not 
binding, Parliament could proceed with or annul the Act as it chose to, and the 40 per cent 
provision would only affect the procedure by which the Government had to ask Parliament 
to reach a division. They also feared that the ‘yes’ campaign’s claim that a non-vote is a 
no-vote could lead to a situation where only the ‘yes’ voters bothered to turn out, with a 
minority victory as a result.349 Robin Cook described at a press conference the no-voting 
argument as a “false and malicious lie designed to serve the objective of the Yes-men in 
obtaining a majority at all costs”.350  
John Smith, the former Minister for devolution, suggested at a meeting on 19 
February that Parliament might be prepared to ignore the 40 per cent rule in the 
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referendum if there was a sizeable ‘yes’ majority. His view was that a poll of up to 70 per 
cent of the electorate would be considered a satisfactory turnout. Robin Cook had 
originally proposed an amendment of 33 per cent in stead of 40 and, although this 
amendment was defeated, he maintained that in the event of the ‘yes’ vote being more than 
33 per cent of the electorate he would have to consider “very carefully” how he would vote 
in the ensuing division in the Commons. Tam Dalyell made it clear that he would stick by 
the 40 per cent rule because of the “basic design faults” in the Scotland Act.351 Smith’s 
suggestion led to the suspicion that the Government would be prepared to ignore a defeat 
in the referendum in order to stay in power. A few days before the referendum Callaghan 
told his Labour parliamentary candidates and MPs that if the Act was to fall “the SNP will 
join the Conservatives in an early vote of confidence and with other minority support will 
force an election much sooner than the Labour Party wants”.352 They were warned that the 
consequences for the Party would be grave, but the Scotsman did not believe this would be 
enough to hammer some of the ‘Labour rebels’ into line.    
The Guardian claimed that Labour ministers were planning to plead with 
Parliament to go against the Act and allow the assemblies to be set up, if there was even a 
slight majority, out of sheer desperation to keep the votes of the 13 SNP Members for as 
long as possible. Some were even believed to go further: “In fact, some Ministers admit 
they will suffer if Scotland votes clearly Yes with the 40 per cent figure comfortably 
passed. That would guarantee the new Assembly and leave the SNP little cause for 
continuing to side with the Government in crucial Commons votes”.353   
The debate about the 40 per cent rule and its implications was hard to grasp for 
ordinary people. The contributions from professors of statistics and mathematics hardly 
made it any easier. In addition, there were plenty of jokes about how for instance the 
Amendment itself had been passed into law by the votes of only 26.5 per cent of the 
membership of the House of Commons, and how the MPs who had suggested and 
defended it in the House had failed to poll even 40 per cent of the total votes cast in their 
constituencies, let alone 40 per cent of the total electorate.354 The issue became so complex 
and claimed so much attention, that towards the end of the campaign several leaders of the 
LVN campaign admitted that they now wished the Cunningham amendment had not 
existed. Brian Wilson commented: “I would be perfectly ready now to settle for a simple 
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majority of the votes cast … The 40 per cent rule has really turned out to be counter-
productive and has given the Nationalists something to exploit”. Archie Birt, secretary of 
Labour Vote No, agreed that it had become a liability. Only Tam Dalyell continued to 
insist that “40 per cent is my threshold”.355 As it became clear how close the race would 
be, the SNP’s opposition to the rule became stronger. An SNP candidate regretted that the 
SNP had not refused to have anything to do with the referendum campaign as soon as the 
40 per cent clause was introduced: “It will be rather late in the day to shout “foul” if the 
total Yes vote falls below the required 40 per cent, if we have already played the game by 
London’s crooked rules”.356  
 
The Last Chance Ever? 
 
In mid-February Callaghan claimed that this was the last chance to bring devolution to 
Scotland. After some persuasion from the Conservative Party hierarchy, the former leader 
and pro-devolutionist Lord Home spoke, and rejected this claim.357 He asked the Scottish 
people to reject the present legislation and instead seek a more “acceptable formula”. As 
Parliament was sovereign, it could do anything at any time. A new Act should find a 
solution to the West-Lothian Question, limit the size of the Assembly, rectify the lack of 
tax-raising powers and reconsider proportional representation.358 The response from pro-
devolution Labour, represented by Donald Dewar, was that this was “arrant nonsense”.359 
If the Scotland Act was rejected there was no way in which Westminster would return to 
the topic. The middle way would be destroyed and the choice for the future would be 
between the unpalatable extremes of no change and separation. In addition, the 
improvements that Lord Home wished for were not supported by the Conservative 
mainstream, and certainly not by Margaret Thatcher. Home was heavily criticised for 
lacking integrity and putting forward “the mirage of an alternative that he knows the 
Westminster Parliament would never carry”.360 The historian and supporter of devolution 
Chris Harvie, with a retrospective eye on Lord Home’s contributions at Munich, 
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commented: “He began his career by betraying one small nation, and ended it by betraying 
another”.361
The Tory pro-devolutionists Alick Buchanan-Smith and Malcolm Rifkind 
responded to Lord Home by launching a separate Conservative ‘yes’ campaign the last 
week before the referendum, arguing that although the Act had many shortcomings it 
should be supported and once implemented it could be amended.362 However, during the 
final days of the campaign Margaret Thatcher made a last-minute intervention in the 
debate with a claim that the Government proposals were a “hashed together” recipe for 
“more politicians, more civil servants and more expenses”. She pointed out that Labour’s 
Assembly was not the only devolution option: “A ‘no’ vote does not mean that the 
devolution question will be buried. It will open the way for all parties to explore together a 
lasting alternative arrangement which can enjoy the support of the whole British 
people”.363 This promise of a return to the plans for a Scottish Assembly contributed in 
making the pro-devolutionists among the Conservative voters vote against the Act, or at 
least abstain.  
 
The Results and Reactions 
 
The question put to the Scottish electorate on 1 March 1979 was “Do you want the 
provisions of the Scotland Act to be put into effect?” and the results were as follows:  
 
 % Electorate % Votes 
Yes 32.9 51.6 
No 30.8 48.4 
Did not vote 36.4 - 
Table A. Source: Miller 1980  
 
For the results including the party affiliation of the voters, see Figure C.  
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When studying the details of the 
referendum results, the geographical 
differences were striking. Orkney and 
Shetland voted ‘no’, while the Western 
Isles delivered a surprising ‘yes’, albeit 
with a narrow majority. Commenting on 
the result the Orkney islands’ Convener 
stated that “I think it shows the Orcadians 
have no wish to be dominated by the 
central belt of Scotland. Our problems are 
different from those of the urban areas who would inevitably have the strongest voice in an 
Assembly”.364  While there was a close result in Lothian, the central region returned the 
largest ‘yes’ in percentage terms, but even that was only 36 per cent of the electorate. At its 
















Figure C. Results of 1979 referendum with 
party affiliation. Source of figures: Brand 1986  
Although almost invisible during the campaign, the class perspective received some 
attention after the referendum results had been announced. Tom Nairn commented to 
Ascherson that a closer look at the results suggested that only the Scottish middle class had 
voted ‘no’, the rest had voted ‘yes’ if they had voted at all.366 Lindsay Paterson, also a 
member of the SLP at the time, wrote in a letter to the editor that as the Scottish working 
class voted for Home Rule and the middle class did not, this confirmed the SLP opinion 
that unless the national movement was led by a left-wing working class party, it would 
never achieve independence. Paterson argued that the SNP Left had to recognise this, and 
if they could not change their party they should join the SLP.367 The SLP, however, was 
soon dissolved, with its former members divided between the Labour Party, the SNP and 
various marginal left-wing groups.   
Returning to the two newspapers which have been consulted, on the day following 
the referendum the Scotsman’s front page gave a somewhat optimistic interpretation of the 
referendum day poll results with the headline “Survey predicts Yes on low poll”, followed 
by the ingress “Scotland is on the way to getting her Assembly, according to the best 
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information available last night as polls closed in the devolution referendum”.368 A survey 
of almost 5000 voters coming out of 45 polling stations showed that 57 per cent had voted 
‘yes’ and 43 per cent ‘no’. The indications were of a turn-out in the 60s, whereas with 
those figures a 70 per cent turnout would have been required to overcome the 40 per cent 
hurdle. The next day the results were clear, and the headline read: “Callaghan fighting for 
survival. Plans for Assembly gravely wounded.” The analysis presented in the editorial 
was that the vote in the referendum may have been as much an expression of 
dissatisfaction with the Government as about the devolution question. Anyway, it left 
Scotland divided. The Scotsman blamed the ‘yes’ campaign for being disunited, and for 
putting too much responsibility on the Labour Party Cabinet Ministers who had little 
authority and only associated devolution with their survival in office. It hoped that the 
Conservative Party would honour its pledge, but feared that if the SNP fare ill at the next 
election the pressure would be off and “the temptation to send devolution back to that 
dusty realm from which it emerged will be strong”.369 On 5 March they continued their 
attempt to explain why the results were as bad as they were, by again stressing that the 
“whole business has been tied in with Labour survival and ambition rather than the good 
governance of Scotland or indeed of Britain.”370
The Guardian’s verdict after the referendum result had been released was “a 
grudging, thin and meaningless consent”.371 It stressed that Parliament could not afford to 
ignore that fewer than a third of Scotland’s voters had turned out in support of the 
Government’s plans. Its analysis included the following comment: “The deep suspicion 
which exists in Scotland (not least among Labour Party activists) that the Government took 
the devolution road in the first place wholly from considerations of party advantage may 
have much to do with the disaster which has now befallen it”.372 It was also very clear that 
there was no reason for the Labour Government to try to “stagger on” until autumn.373  
Any reaction to the result would depend on whether one accepted the 40 per cent 
rule. In Labour, even the pro-devolutionists were quick to admit that Callaghan had no 
mandate to try to ignore the 40 per cent provision. The anti-devolutionists in the party were 
expressing a firm determination all round to kill the Act “whatever the consequences”.374 
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The SNP view was that “a Yes is a Yes is a Yes”. Gordon Wilson, the deputy leader of the 
SNP parliamentary group, stated that “it is a Yes majority and therefore a Yes victory. The 
SNP have always maintained that a simple majority was a Yes victory”.375 On the same 
note, Jim Sillars commented, “We won the referendum. The Yes vote was 33 per cent and 
the Government always claimed to speak for the Scottish people after 1974 with only 27 
per cent support”.376 The Conservative anti-devolutionists blamed the 40 per cent rule for 
the low figure of no-votes, as they believed that people had abstained instead of voting 
‘no’. 
When Labour’s Scottish executive met over the weekend after the referendum, they 
chose to reaffirm their commitment to devolution, but they did not call on the Prime 
Minister to press the Scotland Act through Parliament. In effect, this was only a request 
that devolution would be kept as an item in the next Labour election manifesto. The unions 
were more impatient and more inclined to urge a three-line-Whip than were the Scottish 
Executive, but they eventually agreed on a softer statement. The Guardian was of the 
somewhat mistaken impression that Labour in Scotland was strongly pro-devolution, and 
predicted that the Government would be pressured by Labour in Scotland to go ahead with 
the setting up of an Assembly, and that the Scottish executive was “almost certain” to insist 
that the Government must try to implement the Act.377 They were wrong. The annual 
Scottish Labour Conference was held in Perth the weekend of 9-11 March, and here it 
would have been possible to tell the Government to implement the Act with a three-line-
whip. If the Act then fell, it would have been Labour MPs who had destroyed their own 
government. The Annual Conference nevertheless eventually agreed not to put active 
pressure on the Government, and subsequently voted in favour of a statement prepared by 
the Executive which pledged that devolution “will remain at the forefront of our 
programme” and urged the Government to implement the Act without suggesting when or 
how. This turned the debate into a repair session for party unity. Gordon Brown, a member 
of the Scottish executive, underlined that there should be no bloodletting, and chose to 
attack the Tories and “separatists” in stead. Very few voted against the statement, just the 
most ardent anti-devolutionists. One of them, Archie Birt, complained afterwards that the 
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executive statement “means that I now belong to a nationalist party”.378 Aware that it could 
have to face an election within weeks, the party closed ranks.  
The SNP and the SLP were furious with what they felt was a betrayal from Labour. 
Already in January, Jim Sillars and Margo MacDonald had claimed in a conversation with 
Neal Ascherson that “Labour won’t really fight, that ‘big cheeses’ in the party are putting it 
about the grapevine that they will vote No, that Callaghan and the Scottish Council want 
the referendum to fail”.379 In letters to newspapers following the referendum results several 
SNP and SLP members and party officials complained about the lack of time and energy 
spent by Labour in the referendum campaign: “The only part of their [the Labour Party 
officials] anatomy which has suffered recently is the posterior – for they have been sitting 
on it while those who put Scotland first worked for a Yes vote. … Labour’s campaign was 
a token one. Any tiredness probably stems from boredom.”380 At the Labour Conference in 
Perth, the criticism went the other way when a delegate accused the SNP of failing to 
campaign hard, unlike Labour.381 Both parties had expected a stronger effort from the 
other. 
 
The Defeat of the Labour Government 
 
 
They [Labour] were unable to agree about the Scottish Assembly proposals 
in Parliament. So they passed the parcel to the people. The people shook it, 
squeezed it, listened to it and promptly passed it back again. ‘I don’t know 




If the result of the referendum had been decisive the Commons would probably have given 
reluctant support to the Scotland Act, even if the vote had been under 40 per cent. If the 
‘no’ side had won, the solution would have been simple, as the Government’s authority 
would not have been challenged if they dropped the devolution issue. According to James 
Naughtie, it was only a couple of days after the result before the Labour MP Eric 
                                                 
378 Scotsman 12 March 1979, 1. 
379 Ascherson, The Yes Road: A Reflection on Two Devolution Campaigns, 5. 
380 Ron Wyllie (SLP), letter to the editor, Scotsman 9 March 1979, 10. 
381 Scotsman 12 March 1979, 1. 
382 Chris Baur, “A Time to Lay Down Referendum Rules,” in The Scottish Government Yearbook 1980, ed. 
H.M. Drucker and N.L. Drucker  (Edinburgh: Paul Harris Publishing, 1979), 85-86. 
 103
Moonman was summoning anti-devolutionists for strategy meetings, hoping to put 
pressure on Michael Foot, who held the position of Leader of the House of Commons.383 
The length of time the repeal order could lie on the table before the vote was unrestricted, 
as Cunningham had not imagined that this would be necessary to specify in his amendment 
to the Bill. By Sunday a survey conducted for the television programme “Weekend World” 
suggested that a minimum of twenty-four Labour MPs would rebel against any attempt to 
vote down the repeal order.384  On 6 March Callaghan agreed during Prime Minister’s 
Questions in the Commons that “of course” the Secretaries of State for Scotland and Wales 
would bring forward Orders to repeal the Acts. When Margaret Thatcher suggested the 
Orders be laid before Parliament “fairly quickly”, Callaghan requested some time for 
reflection. He argued that the constitutional issue was a serious one if they wanted to keep 
Scotland and the rest of the UK united. When the SNP’s Gordon Wilson called for a 
recommendation of a rejection of the Order on the Scotland Bill Callaghan responded, not 
particularly clearly and to the point, that the Government had fulfilled their election 
commitment on devolution by presenting the Act and giving the people of Scotland their 
say in the referendum.385  
There had been even less support for the Government’s proposals in Wales, where 
the Labour party by the time of the referendum had come to be even more divided. A 
majority of the Welsh Labour Party constituency publicly opposed devolution, and a group 
of back benchers which included Leo Abse and Neil Kinnock directed a powerful 
campaign against it. In addition to the anti-devolutionist arguments in Scotland, there was 
the fear of a Welsh-speaking elite taking power.386 As the results of the Welsh referendum 
showed that almost 80 per cent were opposed to the Welsh Act, with a turnout of less than 
60 per cent, there was no doubt that the Wales Act had to be repealed. Thus, it was only 
Scotland that represented a problem.  
James Callaghan and Michael Foot met in the Commons late in the evening on 5 
March, together with the Chancellor, the Home Secretary, the Secretaries of State for 
Scotland and Wales, the Chief Whip and the General Secretary of the Labour Party. Foot 
wanted to lay the Repeal Order before Parliament, while simultaneously inviting the House 
to reject it. This way the Act would be left on the statute book, but would not come into 
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force before a Commencement Order was laid after the next general election. Callaghan 
had been through an attempt at the same before, when he was Home Secretary, and felt that 
the criticism levelled at him was too heavy to be worth it, and he thus lacked enthusiasm 
for the idea.387 It was also suggested that the Government should call for a vote of 
confidence, while it still had the support of the Nationalists. The Chief Whip reported that 
the Government could not rely on the votes of Labour Members from Merseyside or North 
England if they moved to reject the repeal order.388  
When the Cabinet finally met, they did not reject Foot’s proposal, termed “the 
Frankenstein solution” by the press, but decided to leave it on the side. In the meantime 
they tried to get the other parties to agree on talks, on which the Guardian commented in 
an editorial that “a distinction needs to be made between a genuine attempt to re-explore 
the available options and a period of procrastination designed to drag out talks until 
Labour’s electoral prospects began to brighten.”389  
 The SNP was split between a faction which wanted to challenge the Government 
immediately and hope for an early election with 
favourable results, and another group which wanted to 
get the Bill through, even if it was in an amended form. 
Publicly they threatened that there would have to be an 
election at once if the Government could not deliver the 
Assembly. Callaghan originally hoped to postpone the 
election until October that year, but as Parliamentary 
pressure mounted June was as late as he dared hope for. 
The SNP’s George Reid announced that they would 
delay a censure vote only if the Scotland Act was put to 
the test within three weeks, but the Parliamentary SNP 
group was still divided on this issue, and they 
eventually decided to wait and see which date the 
Prime Minister named in his statement on the Act, 























Table B. Seats in the House of 
Commons per party March 1979. 
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Shortly after the referendum, the Labour MP for Derbyshire passed away. Two 
other seats were also vacant. Labour held a minority of 306 seats, and could not say with 
any certainty which other members would support the Government (see table B).  
On 22 March the Prime Minister simply announced talks with the minor parties and the 
Conservative Opposition, and promised a vote on the Repeal Order no later than 30 April.  
It is possible that he concluded that it was better to have a plain confidence vote, without 
the disastrous split in the Labour ranks which a vote on the Scotland Act most likely would 
reveal.390 An hour later the SNP tabled their Motion of No Confidence, followed closely 
by Margaret Thatcher’s own motion. The Conservatives’ motion made it impossible for the 
SNP to back down, and a debate was called for 28 March. The days before the debate were 
coloured by rumours and offers. Alfred Broughton, a Labour MP, was seriously ill and 
could not make it to the House. He died only a few days later. Gerry Fitt, the Social 
Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) Member, ordinarily took the Labour whip. At this 
point, however, he strongly objected to a change in the Northern Ireland constituencies 
proposed by the Labour Government and therefore declared his lack of confidence.391 His 
vote, together with the missing vote of the dying MP, decided the issue with 311 to 310 
votes, and thus the Labour Government fell. It was the first time since 1924 that a 
Government had lost a confidence vote. Michael Foot wrote shortly after the 
Government’s fall that “it was truly the results of the Referendum which led to the 
Government’s defeat within that same month of March”. He believed Callaghan had never 
been enthusiastic about devolution, but had gone along with the Party decisions on the 
matter and did his best to assist them.392 In the opinion of Naughtie, devolution had 
become little more than a symbol of the Government’s troubles and a lever for the 
opposition, or, in Eric Heffer’s words, “The Callaghan government had proved to be its 
own worst enemy”.393 
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8. THE LONG ROAD TO PARLIAMENT 
 
The Demise of the Scotland Act 
 
During the referendum campaign in 1979 several warnings had been issued that this was 
the last chance for devolution “for a generation”.394 Dickson Mabon, the Minister of State 
for Energy, told a ‘yes’ rally in Aberdeen that “we would be lucky if devolution was back 
on the UK constitutional agenda in the 1990s”.395 Margaret Thatcher had told the Scottish 
people to disregard such scare tactics, as “a No vote in the referendum would not mean that 
the devolution question would be buried … Instead, it would open the way for all parties to 
explore a ‘lasting alternative’ which would enjoy the support of the whole of the British 
people”.396 However, one of the first items on Thatcher’s agenda after she was elected 
Prime Minister upon the fall of the Labour Government in May 1979 was the repeal of the 
Scotland Act, and a new one did never appear. The repeal took place on 20 June 1979, by 
301 to 206 votes. While Labour actually had not lost support in the 1979 general election, 
the national vote was slightly higher than it had been in October 1974. The abstaining 
Tories flocked back to their party, and thus gave Margaret Thatcher a large majority of 
seats.397 The SNP lost nine of its seats and withdrew to lick their wounds. This chapter will 
trace the devolution issue through the 1980s and early 1990s, concentrating on changes 
within the Labour Party and the ramifications this had on the cross-party campaigns, and 
on the next referendum on devolution to Scotland.   
  
The Thatcher Years  
 
Some of Margaret Thatcher’s less popular policies hit Scotland particularly hard. The 
Conservative Government’s economic policies of monetarism and fiscal conservatism 
destroyed about 20 per cent of the manufacturing industry.398 A large share of the industry 
that had been created or kept alive by the government in the 1960s and 1970s was now 
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shut down, such as car-making and shipbuilding. While the Falklands War resulted in a 
surge in the Prime Minister’s popularity in England, the Scots dissented from the 
consensus favouring the war. Just prior to the 1987 general election, new legislation 
provided for the introduction of a poll tax in Scotland, a year ahead of its implementation 
in England and Wales. As the basic premise of the tax was that each individual taxpayer 
should pay the same amount regardless of income, Bochel et al. described it as an 
“extremely regressive form of taxation”, and it was met with fierce resistance in 
Scotland.399 The fact that it had been first introduced in Scotland made it easy for the SNP 
and Labour to portray the Conservative Party as anti-Scottish. When the Conservative 
Party was re-elected in 1987, it was on the basis of their support in England, as they lost 
more than half of their Scottish seats and received less than a quarter of the votes.400 When 
asked in 2004 why both the Scottish majority and the Labour Party supported devolution 
so much more strongly in 1997 than in 1979, the Labour MP Tam Dalyell blamed 
Margaret Thatcher entirely. He reported that there was a very strong consensus of opinion 
that some of the damage done to Scotland in the Thatcher era could have been avoided if 
only there had been a Scottish parliament or assembly.401 In Scottish Labour, opposition to 
Thatcher and her politics translated into a strong-devolution policy.  
 
The Tartanisation of the Labour Party 
 
After 1979 important ideological and organisational changes took place in the Labour 
Party. At first the party experienced a move to the left, resulting in a more state-
interventionist and centralist economic strategy which was hard to combine with the 
support for devolution, although attempts were made. In 1981 the ‘Labour Campaign for a 
Scottish Assembly’ published Socialist Arguments for Devolution, introducing the guiding 
principle that because socialism requires democracy, and as devolution to Scotland is a 
step towards democracy, devolution was likely to lead to socialism, instead of being a 
diversion from achieving it.402 However, before the 1983 general election a new strategy 
was formulated.403 It was also agreed that it was necessary to take on board some of the 
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arguments made during the 1979 referendum campaign.404 One of the changes was that the 
Labour Party now committed itself to a far stronger and more convincing “Assembly with 
teeth”, with substantial economic powers. This made devolution more bearable for the left 
wing of the party, and in February 1983 an NEC statement committed the next Labour 
government to the creation of a directly elected Assembly with various revenue-raising and 
industrial powers.405 This was reflected in the 1983 general election manifesto, which 
stated that the “Scottish Assembly will have tax-raising powers, thus ensuring that the level 
of services provided can be determined in Scotland”.406
By the late 1980s, Scottish Labour was enthusiastically and genuinely for home 
rule, having convinced themselves that a Scottish Assembly would have protected Scotland 
from the worst depredations of the ‘Thatcher revolution’. 407 Senior Labour councillors, 
who had been vehemently opposed to devolution in the 1970s (see p.89), eventually came 
to regard a Scottish Parliament as a means of protecting local services. As early as 1981 
Noel Foy argued in a Scottish Labour publication that if there had been an Assembly it 
would have been controlled by Labour, and thereby could have provided a substantial 
degree of protection against Thatcherism.408 In the Parliamentary Labour Party opposition 
held on a little longer, especially in the Northern group of English Labour MPs. The 
Yorkshire group also expressed disquiet, claiming a measure of equal treatment for 
themselves. To secure the maximum support for devolution within Labour, and to 
campaign for it outside the Party, a ‘Labour Campaign for a Scottish Assembly’ was 
established, open to all Labour Party members.409  
As the Conservative vote in Scotland declined in the general elections throughout 
the 1980s, the ‘idea of the Scottish mandate’ appeared. The crux of this concept was that 
Scottish political sovereignty was vested in the people of Scotland rather than in 
Parliament. A fundamental principle for the SNP and other nationalists, it was adopted by 
Scottish Labour during the Thatcher years. It implied that the Conservative Party had no 
mandate to govern Scotland, and that the majority vote in favour of devolution in 1979 had 
to be respected. This was reflected in Devolution: Labour’s Green Paper from September 
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1984 which stated that the people of Scotland recorded a clear vote in favour of the 
Assembly.410 Scotland was seen as a nation of socialists, and devolution as the vehicle to 
translate this socialist will into action. This also indicated that “the Scottish people” was a 
natural political unit within the United Kingdom. At the 1987 general election 75 per cent 
of Scottish voters supported pro-devolutionary parties. Labour won fifty seats in Scotland, 
something that in their opinion gave them the mandate to decide Scotland’s future. They 
even launched their own Scotland Bill.411  
With a few exceptions, the SNP and other nationalist groups were the only ones 
making explicit references to Scotland’s loss of statehood, with rhetorical statements such 
as “a nation once again” during the devolution debate of the 1970s. Now this all changed. 
In 1987 a prospective Labour candidate urged the party to show voters “that the control 
over their own lives, which Scots have been deprived of for almost three centuries, can be 
re-established”. Dennis Canavan, MP, argued that “the people of Scotland did not give 
their democratic consent to the Act of Union”.412 The image of Scotland as a semi-colony 
was also adopted by Labour, as when Henry Drucker declared that “we are fed up with 
seeing our laws and or customs overruled as if we were some forgotten colony”. 413 After 
the 1987 general election, the Labour MP John Maxton expressed the hope that Margaret 
Thatcher would “not try imposing a semi-colonial administration on Scotland”. Dennis 
Canavan even claimed that Scotland was “being treated worse than a colony”, with the 
Secretary of State behaving “like a colonial governor-general”.414  
In August 1987 Robin Cook, previously an outspoken opponent of devolution, 
urged Labour MPs in Scotland to set up an alternative forum to Westminster somewhere in 
Scotland, and invite the MPs of other parties to join them and vote on Scottish issues.415 
The same year the Annual Conference of the Labour Party endorsed the proposal that 
Labour MPs and local authorities should obstruct government legislation if the latter 
rejected a Scottish Devolution bill.416 Even Eric Heffer changed his mind, and became a 
pro-devolutionist in 1990/91.417
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In 1994, Labour’s Scottish Conference voted to change its name, and the Scottish 
Council of the Labour Party was changed to the Scottish Labour Party, the name of Keir 
Hardie’s first Labour Party and Jim Sillars’ group in the late 1970s. The name change 
conveyed that the Party was comfortable with its Scottish identity, and also suggested that 
being associated with two strongly pro-devolution parties was not considered a problem. 
 
The Struggle Continues 
 
Neal Ascherson wrote in the Scotsman on 5 May 1979, “An entirely maddening poll, taken 
on Thursday night, showed that the very people who had evaded a clear ‘Yes’ vote in the 
referendum and then deserted the SNP still thought, by a majority of more than seventy per 
cent, that devolution had been a ‘good idea’”.418 With a Scottish majority in favour of 
some measure of devolution, the campaigning for an Assembly continued for the better 
part of the next two decades.  
In 1980 the bipartisan pressure group ‘Campaign for a Scottish Assembly’ (CSA) 
had been established. In 1988 it issued a document entitled Claim of Right for Scotland, 
where the setting up of a Constitutional Convention was proposed. The Convention was 
supposed to agree on a scheme for devolution and campaign for its implementation. This 
time, Labour’s leadership concluded that it would be better to join as one of the major 
participants, than to campaign alone. The victory of Jim Sillars, now representing the SNP, 
in the Govan by-election in November 1988 may also (again!) have pushed Labour into the 
more active pro-devolution camp. When the Convention was launched in 1989 it consisted 
of Labour, Liberal Democrats, Greens, trade unions, local authorities, churches and other 
civic bodies, but lacked the SNP, which feared Labour dominance and decided not to 
participate. They declared that they could only support a directly elected convention 
prepared to draw up a constitution for an independent Scotland.419  
Further progress was made after the 1992 election with the establishment of a 
committee to consider the issues which had not been satisfactory resolved in the Scotland 
Act. The Convention produced two reports, Towards Scotland’s future (1990) and 
Scotland’s Parliament, Scotland’s Right (1995). These reports, especially the latter, would 
come to form the basis of the Scotland Act in 1998. No solution was found to the West 
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Lothian Question, but several other issues which had been unclear in 1979 were not only 
debated, but also attempted solved. For instance, it was agreed that the Scottish Parliament 
(which it was now to be termed) should be able to vary the rate of income tax by three 
pence in the pound. Bochel et al. described this as “fiscally feeble”, but it still had an 
important symbolic effect regarding the powers of the Parliament, and it was to become an 
important issue for debate later in the process.420 The criticism about unclear vires was met 
by proposing that matters to be devolved would be defined in the legislation and that all 
other matters would remain at Westminster. Regarding the size and composition of the 
Parliament, the Scottish Executive of the Labour Party finally agreed to support an 
electoral system which would be fairer to the smaller parties. This measure also alleviated 
concerns in the Highlands and Islands about a Lowland-dominated Parliament, something 
which had increased the opposition to devolution in these regions in 1979. The Convention 
thereby concluded in favour of the Additional Member System with each voter having two 
votes: one for the constituency MP, and one for a party or group list in a larger 
constituency, resulting in a 129-member Parliament, and combining the principles of 
proportional representation and the Westminster system.  
 
New Labour Emerges 
 
In the mid-1990s the Labour Party culminated its ideological change and swing to the right 
by changing parts of the Party’s constitution and rebranding itself as New Labour. The new 
ideological platform made a pro-devolution policy more consistent with the Party 
principles.    
The sociologist and New Labour ideologist Anthony Giddens is one of the most 
prominent proponents of the argument that the shape of the nation state is being altered 
significantly by globalisation. According to this position, some of the powers that the 
nation states used to possess have been weakened, and this makes Keynesian economic 
management difficult. However, globalisation also creates new possibilities for 
regenerating local identities. Boundaries between different countries are becoming fuzzier, 
especially within the European Union.421 The divisive aspects of nationalism will not 
disappear, but a more cosmopolitan version of nationhood is needed to keep them in check. 
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According to Giddens, national identity can be a benign influence only if it is tolerant of 
ambivalence, or has multiple affiliations. As described previously (see chapter 6), an 
individual can be Scottish, British and European at the same time, and even have a sense of 
a global citizenship. One of these identities might in a particular context override the 
others, but this need not prevent them accepting the others too.422 In this light, devolution 
to Scotland and Wales was seen by New Labour as a way of keeping a diverse kingdom 
united, by giving them a measure of self-government instead of regarding the national 
identities as threats.      
The argument that devolution threatened to weaken the unity of the working class 
in England and Scotland meant less in the 1990s than in the 1970s, both inside and outside 
the Labour Party. While some survey evidence suggests that Scottish electors in the late 
1960s were inclined to think that they had more in common with an English person of the 
same class than with a Scottish person of a different class, by 1997 the respondents in the 
Scottish Election Study opted for a Scottish person of a different class by a margin of two 
to one.423  
One of the crucial points in the Labour Party’s transformation was the attempt to rid 
itself of the ‘tax-and-spend’ image, and this was what led to the introduction of a new 
referendum on devolution in Scotland. The Constitutional Convention and the Scottish 
Labour pro-devolutionists were strongly opposed to another new referendum, and the idea 
first gained currency amongst the few anti-devolutionists left in Labour, such as Tam 
Dalyell. At the same time, the Conservative Party pressured the Labour leadership on the 
“tartan tax” they were going to introduce along with the Scottish Parliament, once they 
won the upcoming election. The controversy over tax-varying powers for the Scottish 
Parliament led to Tony Blair’s decision in the summer of 1996 to call a referendum, and to 
include an extra question. The first question was whether Scotland should have a 
parliament, and the second was whether the parliament should have tax-raising powers. 
This change of policy met the Conservative criticism and worked well in the election 
campaign, but created difficulties within the Labour Party.424 The decision to hold a 
referendum at all came as a surprise to Scottish Labour activists, including John McAllion, 
front-bench spokesperson on devolution, who resigned from his position in protest. Lord 
Ewing, who as Harry Ewing had played an important part in 1979, resigned as co-chair of 
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the Constitutional Convention, and a number of Scottish Labour MPs spoke out against the 
referendum and a former senior councillor even defected to the SNP. Several alternatives 
were debated in the Scottish Labour Party, but in the end opposition withered out. In early 
1997, almost all of the executive members who had opposed the leadership’s line were 
defeated at party elections and replaced by New Labour members who could be trusted by 
the London leadership.425
 
The 1997 Referendum and Beyond 
 
At the general election on 1 May 1997 Labour won by a landslide, and consequently 
formed a Government with Tony Blair as Prime Minister. The Labour Party in Scotland 
was, with few exceptions, united around the cause of Home Rule, but some members of the 
new Labour Cabinet of 1997, most notably the Home Secretary Jack Straw, were quite 
outspoken in their hostility to the whole project.426 This was countered by the appointment 
of the respected pro-devolutionist Donald Dewar to the position as Secretary of State for 
Scotland.   
The Referendum (Scotland and Wales) Bill was the first public Bill of the new 
Parliament, introduced as early as 15 May, and with its Second Reading only a week later. 
The referenda it sought to legislate for were pre-legislative, and the debate was thus 
centred on who should be able to vote and the number of questions put to the electorate, 
not the issue of devolution as such. The result was a referendum to be held in Scotland on 
11 September and in Wales a week later. This time no qualified majority was required, a 
simple majority would be sufficient. Only people who were resident in Scotland and Wales 
could vote and, as we have seen above, in Scotland there would be two questions on two 
separate ballot papers. On 24 July the Government published a White Paper as a 
foundation for the vote, outlining the content of the Bill that would follow the referendum.  
The pro-devolution activists had learnt their lesson from 1979. This time around, 
the ‘yes’ organisation was far more unified, and had begun their preparations early. They 
had learnt that co-operation between the parties which favoured devolution was of 
fundamental importance. To bring the SNP onboard it was essential that a new 
organisation was launched, as the Convention was dominated by Labour and the Liberals. 
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Talks were initiated already in November 1996, and after the general election and the 
issuing of the White Paper in July 1997 the SNP finally agreed to join the new campaign 
organisation, ‘Scotland Forward’, to fight for a Yes-Yes result in the referendum. While 
some Labour members were still reluctant to cooperate with the SNP, the new Secretary of 
State for Scotland, Donald Dewar, was not. When ‘Scotland Forward’ was publicly 
launched, the Devolution Minister Henry McLeish was there to show that a genuinely 
bipartisan campaign was supported by the Government. At the local level, all the Labour 
Constituency Parties campaigned for a ‘yes’ result.  
The ‘no’ organisation ‘Think Twice’ was not initiated until after the general 
election, and was not launched until late June. It was largely dominated by the 
Conservative Party, which was busy recovering from their election defeat and electing a 
new leader. This time business leaders were split on the issue, and many key figures were 
hesitant of campaigning publicly and challenging the new and very popular 
Government.427 There was no official Labour anti-devolution campaign, but a small group 
of people around Tam Dalyell argued against the Parliament which they feared would lead 
to increased support for the SNP and eventually independence for Scotland. This time, Jim 
Sillars contributed by urging voters to abstain, as he feared devolution would stall 
Scotland’s move towards independence.  
One of the striking features of the 1997-98 debate on home rule in Scotland that 
contrasts with the devolution debate in the 1970s was the inclusion of a significant gender 
dimension. This relates both to the way in which women political activists were involved 
in the debate, and to the fact that equality of representation in a Scottish Parliament had 
been pushed up the political agenda in an unprecedented way. In 1979 many women 
regarded the assembly debate as irrelevant, while others feared that a parliament in 
Scotland could be a backward step for women, with Westminster providing an opportunity 
for more progressive social policies. In the late 1980s a separate ‘Women’s Claim of Right 
Group’ was formed as a response to the Scottish Constitutional Convention which was 90 
per cent male. This put a certain pressure on the Convention, and when it reported in 1990, 
a commitment to equal representation was included.428  
The referendum date was set for 11 September. A short three-week campaign was 
shortened further by the death of Princess Diana. The campaign was suspended until after 
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the funeral on 6 September, leaving only 100 hours for the finishing stage. On a 60.2 per 
cent turnout, 74.3 per cent voted in favour of a Scottish Parliament, and 63.5 wanted it to 
have tax-varying powers. The proportion of the electorate voting ‘yes’ was 44.7 per cent, 
and would therefore have been sufficient also if the Cunningham amendment still had been 
in effect, in spite of the rather low turnout.429 In the Welsh referendum a week later, there 
was an extremely narrow victory for the ‘yes’ side, with 50.1 per cent of the votes. When 
taking a closer look at the results in the different Scottish regions, the results did not vary 
as much as they did in 1979. In all the regions, there was a majority in favour of a Scottish 
Parliament, even in Orkney and Shetland. The proposed Additional Member electoral 
system had to a large degree removed the fear of central belt domination in the new 
Parliament.  
The Scotland Bill was introduced into the House of Commons on 17 December 
1997. This was the tenth time a major measure of devolution had been introduced since 
1886 but, unlike most of its predecessors, it was not introduced in a hung parliament by a 
government dependent on nationalist votes. In 1886, 1893 and 1912 it had been the Irish 
nationalists, in 1976 and 1978 it had been the Scottish. This time the Government had a 
majority of 177 seats and a solid majority vote in the referendum to back its policy.430 The 
contents of the Bill differed little from the White Paper the Government had issued the 
previous July. During the debates the SNP and the Liberal Party generally proposed 
amendments increasing the powers of the Parliament, and argued in favour of any such 
measures. The Conservative Party chose to respect the referendum result and did not 
oppose devolution in principle, but attempted to limit the powers that were to be 
transferred. As the legislation was highly complex the Government also needed to propose 
numerous amendments. In spite of a smooth process with almost no intra-party dissent in 
Labour, it took almost a year before the Bill became the Scotland Act by Royal Assent on 
19 November 1998. On 1 July 1999, the British Queen opened the new Scottish Parliament 
in Edinburgh. Seven years later it is still an open question whether the Scottish people 
consider this a sufficient degree of home rule.  
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9. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The purpose of this thesis has been twofold: to explore the reasons for Labour’s policy 
change on devolution in 1974, and to explain why it was not possible for the Labour Party 
to secure a large enough majority in favour of its Scotland Bill in the 1979 referendum. 
The answers to these two questions are closely intertwined.  
A return to David Bleiman and Michael Keating, to consult their conclusion from 
1979, has been chosen as a fruitful point of departure for reviewing the main findings of 
this thesis. According to their book Labour and Scottish Nationalism there were four major 
factors which made the party adopt a policy of devolution: pressure from the national 
leadership, conviction, support of loyalist trade union leaders, and electoral worries.431 
That there was pressure from the national leadership in London is supported by the 
evidence of the primary sources studied for this thesis. But, what made it possible and even 
desirable, for the party leaders to adopt this policy in the first place? When Wilson 
promised a White Paper and a Bill in the House of Commons in March 1974, this has been 
described as an off the cuff remark, prompted by a comment by Winifred Ewing (see p.28). 
According to several of the Government’s critics, such as Dalyell and Lawson, it could not 
have been planned, as such a major policy change would have required preparation in 
advance. This view however ignores the fact that an advisor had just been brought on 
board to assist in drafting plans for devolution. It seems likely, then, that the policy change 
was indeed planned, but not through the ordinary democratic Labour Party channels. It has 
been argued by, amongst others, Frances Wood, that Wilson had a positive opinion of 
devolution, traceable at least to the year before. With the lack of sources indicating any 
Labour Party discussions prior to the Prime Minister’s Speech, it is possible – indeed likely 
– that since he knew there would be severe disagreements in the party this was the way he 
deliberately chose to deal with the issue. The Prime Minister’s commitment in front of the 
House significantly narrowed room to manoeuvre for the NEC’s Home Policy Committee 
and other Party groups who were then asked to formulate the details of the policy, as it was 
not possible to conclude in opposition to the Prime Minister in the current political 
situation – a minority Government with an upcoming general election.    
As seen throughout the thesis, it was repeatedly argued by the Party leadership that 
Home Rule for Scotland was within the ideological tradition of the Labour Party, as it had 
                                                 
431 Bleiman and Keating, Labour and Scottish Nationalism, 170. 
 117
been the prevailing party line in the decades prior to the Second World War, and had even 
been endorsed by Keir Hardie and other founders of the party. Still, as this thesis has 
shown, after the centralist policy of the post-war decades it was not easy, neither for party 
activists nor voters, to detect traces of a consistent policy which starts with the founding of 
the party and ends in devolution to Scotland. As touched upon in chapter 2, Scotland’s 
position in the union always involved negotiations and compromises, and it was thus 
possible to regard the pressure for a Scottish Parliament as being simply the latest phase in 
the process of negotiation within the union.432 This was what the Labour Party leadership 
tried to convince its voters and its somewhat reluctant members of after 1974, by arguing 
that “the devolution of power to a directly elected legislature in Scotland is part of a long, 
natural and developing process begun after the Treaty of Union in 1707. Far from 
representing a move to fragment the United Kingdom it will further strengthen and 
consolidate the union”.433 It was hoped that Labour’s support for administrative and inter-
parliamentary devolution could be reinterpreted as leading to an assembly. This would, 
however, have been far more convincing if the Labour policies on devolution from the 
1960s and 1970s, as expressed in programmes, internal discussion papers and statements, 
had not been so aggressively anti-devolution, and if they had not repeatedly argued in 
favour of administrative devolution as an alternative to an elected assembly, not as a 
stepping-stone to one. In the long run (and especially with a New Labour perspective) the 
centralist era of 1945-1975 can possibly be seen as an ideological exception in the history 
of the Labour party, but from a 1979 viewpoint this could hardly have been convincing. 
The idea of legislative and executive devolution as a natural consequence of administrative 
devolution did not convince the voters - understandably so since surveys showed that few 
of them had ever heard of St Andrew’s House or were familiar with the contents or scope 
of administrative devolution (see p. 43).   
The rapid transformation of Labour policy suggests that either the old centralist 
stance was not a matter of deeply held ideology, or that it had not seriously been infringed 
upon. The argument supporting the latter alternative was that the level of devolution on 
offer (with no tax-raising powers and only limited powers on industry devolved) was 
clearly within the economic framework of the United Kingdom, and that as devolution 
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could head off the nationalist separatist challenge, there was a chance it could actually 
strengthen the union instead of weakening it. Whether the Scottish Assembly should have 
significant economic powers was a key issue dividing the committed decentralisers from 
the rest, a divide that continued into the devolution debate of the 1990s.  
The relationship between the TUC and the Labour Party had always been close, and 
the pro-devolution stand of the Scottish TUC has often been mentioned in attempts to 
explain Labour’s policy change. Regarding the impact of the trade unions, it is important to 
bear in mind that the 1974-1979 Parliament was the period of the first Social Contract 
between the Labour Government and the unions, which made it crucial that the relationship 
with the unions should not be disturbed (see p.76). This relationship can have worked two 
ways as far as the devolution policy was concerned. The unions did not want to jeopardise 
the Labour Government (and subsequently their own material achievements), especially 
over something they cared so little about as devolution. Thus, several of the unions which 
had opposed the majority recommendations of the Kilbrandon Commission at the March 
Annual Conference of the Scottish Council in 1974 had changed their minds by August.434 
However, as the union representative Alex Kitson, who served on the National Executive 
Committee and the Scottish Trades Union Congress, argued so strongly in favour of 
devolution from an early stage onwards, the national leadership of the Labour Party 
probably perceived devolution to be something the unions truly desired.  
The devolution issue was probably made easier from an ideological perspective by 
not strictly following the traditional left/right divide as there were left and right-wingers in 
both camps, although this does not imply that ideological reasons were not invoked for the 
positions adopted by several of the participants in the debate. The members belonging to 
the left wing of the Party, which would be expected to oppose the devolution plans on 
ideological grounds, were of course mostly sceptical, but this was clearly a stronger trend 
in England than in Scotland. There, the idea of moving power closer to the people appealed 
to certain sections of the Party, and the break-away Scottish Labour Party provided an 
ideological combination of socialism and home rule for Scotland. Also, the recent EEC 
entry had already represented a major challenge to the doctrine of the sovereignty of 
Parliament, leaving parts of the left wing disillusioned. That the devolution debate did not 
follow the left/right divide, and thereby tap one of the more permanent divisions in the 
party, seems likely to be one of the reasons that the split was so rapidly healed after the 
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defeat in 1979. On the whole, there was surprisingly little internal debate and conflict after 
the loss in the referendum. The Scottish Council of the Labour Party was supposed to have 
changed its view on devolution wholeheartedly, but the Scottish Conference following 
immediately after the referendum put no pressure whatsoever on the Labour Government 
to make the issue a priority. If this had been a policy with deep-seated support in the Party, 
the disloyal Party members who had campaigned for a ‘no’ result would most certainly 
have been condemned. Instead, the keynote of the Scottish Conference in March 1979 was 
unity. This is of course understandable, with such a dire situation at hand and the 
Government on the verge of a collapse, but it is not hard to envisage other political parties 
where sections of the party would have spoken out against saving the Government if the 
price was considered too high. Clearly loss of credibility on the devolution issue and 
criticism from the SNP was not too high a price to pay if the party could cling to power for 
a few more months, or at least appear united if a general election was unavoidable. This 
image of the Labour Party as purely pragmatist (or even borderline opportunistic), leads us 
to the fourth explanation for the policy change – fear of the loss of votes.  
The SNP by-election victory in Govan in November 1973 was a sign that the secure 
working-class support that had allowed Labour to suppress the national dimension was 
beginning to crumble. The argument that Scotland benefited economically from the Union 
had always been an important one, but with the discovery of North Sea oil, which 
coincided with an economic recession, this argument clearly carried less weight. As shown 
above, Labour was dependent on Scottish votes to achieve a majority in the House of 
Commons. However, the SNP had always done better in by-elections (Motherwell, 
Hamilton, Govan) than in general elections. They possessed an impressive by-election 
machine, with activists pouring into the constituency from all parts of Scotland, and thus 
the by-elections were considered to be the greatest opportunities for a SNP advance.435 
Therefore, although there had been some warning signs, the result of the 1974 February 
general election represented a powerful shock to Labour.  
It is of course difficult to tell whether the support for the SNP in 1974 was simply a 
protest vote. While the SNP’s 22 per cent vote in February could be discounted as 
equivalent to the English third party (the Liberal) vote at the time, the English Liberal vote 
declined somewhat at the next election in October, while the SNP rose to over 30 per 
cent.436 As mentioned above, William Miller has attempted to link the support of the SNP 
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in this period to Labour’s failure to deliver devolution (see p.75). However, his analysis 
does not explain the decline of support the SNP experienced in the 1979 general election, 
which was held after the Labour Party had failed to deliver devolution. Miller might still 
have a valid point when he concluded that while anti-devolutionists among Scottish Labour 
activists feared that Labour was befriending the SNP, that it is more reasonable to believe 
that Labour adopted devolution to appease its friends the Scottish voters, not its enemies 
the SNP.437  
As political parties and their leaders are supposed to represent their voters, there is 
certainly nothing wrong with a political party listening to the wishes of the people and 
changing its policy accordingly. But, when a significant policy change takes place within a 
very short time, made by a minority government planning the next election, and crashes 
with present party ideology and a policy clearly stated only six months previously, the 
issue is much more complex. When the two former Prime Ministers, Wilson and 
Callaghan, in their memoirs, attempt to rewrite history by misleading their readers about 
what was actually in the Labour Party’s manifestoes and when the policy change was 
made, this indicates that the truth might be somewhat embarrassing. This makes it easier to 
believe that it was the electoral threat from the SNP that was the main reason for the 
change, not a heartfelt desire for greater democracy and more power to the people of 
Scotland. There were also numerous attempts at placing the initiative with the Scottish 
Council of the Labour Party instead of with the Party leadership in London, ranging from 
the paper issued in August 1974 (see p.32) to the glossy 1997 pamphlet which simply 
states that “the Scottish Labour Party reasserted its support for Scottish home rule in 1974. 
As a result of this the Labour Government began to implement plans for a Scottish 
Assembly”.438 Had the demand for devolution really emerged from below, in the shape of 
a coherent public demand brought forward through the SCLP,  the Scotland Act and the 
result of the 1979 referendum might have looked very different.  
Not only before, but also after the referendum on 1 March 1979 did there exist a 
majority in favour of some measure of devolution in Scotland. In spite of this, a minority 
of the electorate voted in favour of the implementation of the Scotland Act. It is therefore 
reasonable to believe that it was the Scotland Act itself that was rejected, not necessarily 
the idea of devolution, and it might also have been a rejection of the Government which 
tried to convince the Scottish people of the merits of the Act. It is necessary to remember 
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the context; the Callaghan Government, struggling through its final months, attempting to 
rid itself of the image that the “winter of discontent” had brought upon it.  
The Labour Party put little effort into the referendum campaign. As devolution had 
been presented by the leadership as a demand coming from “the Scottish people”, it came 
as a surprise when devolution actually had to be fought for in the face of a ‘no’ campaign. 
Labour Party activists, and thereby their devolution campaign, were lacking in conviction, 
while the ‘no’ campaign hammered away at fears of more government, more bureaucracy, 
higher taxes and separatism. As shown earlier, the ‘yes’ side came through as divided, 
especially with the Labour Party’s vehement refusal to cooperate at all with the other 
organisations. It is never easy to campaign together with people who envisage a totally 
different goal at the end, and the SNP’s image of Scotland as a separate nation had little in 
common with Labour’s view of devolution as a measure to ultimately strengthen the union. 
It was less problematic on the ‘no’ side, where the ‘Scotland Says No’ campaign made no 
attempt whatsoever to offer alternatives, and thereby succeeded in keeping a more united 
front against the Assembly (see p.80).  
It is also possible that Bleiman and Keating have a point when they argue that 
Labour, by endorsing devolution, deprived the SNP of an important issue, and that this 
ironically led to a cooling of public enthusiasm for devolution as the referendum campaign 
opened.439 Within the Labour party, the campaign was largely fought by the party 
leadership from Edinburgh and London, with the Party grassroots displaying at best 
uneasiness or resignation, at worst opposition. Based on the empirical findings of this 
thesis, it is natural to conclude that Labour local councillors did not fear the removal of 
power from London, as this power to a large degree already rested at St Andrew’s House, 
but rather the transfer of powers from the local councils to an Edinburgh-based Assembly.  
As touched upon in chapter 6, the choice between conflicting identities and 
priorities is to a large degree decided by context. The “winter of discontent” probably 
witnessed a decline in the loyalty to the Labour party among party members as well as 
Labour voters. The existence of the ‘Labour Vote No’ group made it easier for people to 
vote ‘no’ or abstain without feeling that they betrayed their own party identity. When for 
instance Tam Dalyell chose the defector and left-wing rebel Jim Sillars as a combatant 
instead of a faithful Labour politician, this was a brilliant strategic move, as it made 
opposition to the Scotland Act look compatible with being a loyal Labour member  (see 
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p.89). On the Conservative side, Lord Home’s late opposition to the Scotland Act made it 
possible for Conservative pro-devolutionists to vote ‘no’, preserve their loyalty to the 
Conservative Party, and not feel that they had betrayed the Scottish cause. In the next 
decade, Margaret Thatcher’s projecting of a British identity gave rise to a stronger Scottish 
identity juxtaposed to it, and a strong and popular Labour Party would come to receive 
support for its plans for a Scottish Parliament. It is also reasonable to assume that loyalty to 
a political party is weakened when the party itself is divided, and when it does not 
convincingly convey the impression that it is working for an issue it holds to be important. 
In contrast, the fear of an Assembly dominated by the central belt seems to have led to a 
stronger regional or local identity, in opposition to a Scottish identity.   
To briefly sum up, this thesis has shown that the Scotland Act was weakened by 
resistance from within the Labour Party, and therefore rejected in the referendum by a 
majority of the electorate (either by voting against it or by not voting at all). The fact that 
the Labour Party failed at getting the rather sudden policy change to permeate the entire 
party, led to the Scotland Act being debilitated in Parliament. First of all a referendum was 
included, something which was not part of the initial strategy. Then the 40 per cent rule 
was added, the ultimate reason for the repeal of the Act. The Assembly that was presented 
to the electorate was feeble, with few economic powers, and several issues were left 
unresolved. It is true that few amendments to the Bill were passed, but that was because the 
opposition was strong inside the Party and, as the Government was desperate to get the Bill 
through without a repetition of what happened to the Scotland and Wales Bill in 1977, it 
had already taken the changes on board and included them in its last version of the Bill. In 
retrospect, after studying what happened during the 1980s and 1990s, it is possible to see 
how different the result could have been with grassroots mobilisation, a policy thoroughly 
embedded in the party, and a government with a larger majority not dependent on the vote 
of every single Member. It is also, of course, possible that the issue was somewhat 
premature in 1979 and actually benefited by a twenty-year delay, resulting in a more 
powerful Scottish Parliament than the Government could have delivered in 1979, and 
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